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THE METHOD OF TELEOLOGY IN ETHICS

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"Ethics is sometimes considered as an investigation into the true moral laws or rational precepts of conduct; sometimes as an inquiry into the nature of the Ultimate End of reasonable human action—the 'Good' or 'True Good' of man—and the method of attaining it."

These words from the late Professor Sidgwick's able and interesting volume entitled *The Methods of Ethics*,[1] describe the two methods that are most widely employed in works on moral science. They may be conveniently, if not quite accurately, denominated, the intuitional and the teleological method. In the present paper an attempt is made to estimate their comparative worth both in their theoretical and in their practical aspects.

The teleological is undoubtedly the older method. Socrates, who was the first moralist to treat his subject with a degree of system that we should now call scientific, conceived ethics as an inquiry into the nature of the highest good. Unless, he maintained, we know the supreme end or good that reason commands us to strive for, we can neither live virtuously ourselves nor direct along the path of virtue the wayward footsteps of those who commit themselves to our guidance. His disciple, Plato, likewise regarded as respectively good or bad those actions that move man toward or turn him from the good that is highest and final. Aristotle in his turn expressed the general rule of conduct in the same way. Man always acts for some end; but among the many ends at which he aims there exists one that is ultimate and supreme, and to the attainment of which all his actions must, if he is to act reasonably, be directed. For all these philosophers

[1] *The Methods of Ethics*, p. 3.

the final goal is some form of well-being, welfare, objective happiness. In modern times the representatives of every school of hedonism and of utilitarianism, from Jeremy Bentham to Herbert Spencer, have started from the assumption that some form of happiness, individual or social, is the supreme good, and have thence inferred that the morality of particular actions is to be sought in their relation to this end.

The chief exponent of the intuitional method is, of course, Immanuel Kant. In his view the morality of conduct is determined by its relation to the law of duty and the motive of duty. Teleology is excluded from his system by his rule that the moral quality of acts is to be sought in their "form," that is, their agreement with the standard of duty, and not in their "matter," that is, their content and results. The intuitional method dominates the system of the Scottish moralists, Hutcheson, Reid, and Smith, who maintained that there exists in every person a "moral sense," which gives him immediate information concerning the goodness and badness of his actions.

Both methods have an important place in Catholic ethical works. Intuitionism is employed chiefly in the discussion of the natural law, where it is maintained that the supreme precepts of conduct are self evident principles of the practical reason. These are said to be written in the heart or intellect of every human being. The teleological method is exemplified in the detailed treatment of man's final destiny, and in the emphasis that is placed upon his obligation to attain that end through his own conduct. Within these general lines both methods are made use of in all Catholic treatises; but the relative importance attributed to them varies considerably among the different authors. According to some, man's ultimate end is the formal, or even the discriminative, norm of morality; according to others, it is only a material rule, and the precise, immediate reason why some actions are good and others bad is to be found in the natural law, or in man's rational nature. These differences of method and of theory give rise, as we shall see, to certain practical consequences.

What is the proper province of each of these methods in a manual of natural ethics? In the first place, teleology cannot provide us with a *complete criterion* of right and wrong. This statement remains true whether man's ultimate end be defined as the glory of God, the perfect possession of God through knowledge and love, or the subjective condition called perfect happiness. It must, indeed, be admitted that man's attainment of this final destiny is conditioned by the

kind of life that he lives on earth. To deny this would be to ignore the dignity of human life and the moral imputability of human conduct, and to make man as independent of the consequences of his actions as the brute which is guided solely by impulse and instinct. Since man's will is free and his acts created by himself; since the demands of justice, both distributive and retributive, are not adequately satisfied in the diverse fortunes allotted to men on earth; since existence on this planet is scarcely worth while except as a preparation for the life to come; since it is the same subject, the same person, that lives through both existences; and since he will carry with him into immortal life the character that he has formed here,—the conclusion is inevitable that man's final condition of existence is dependent upon his earthly conduct. Hence it is quite clear that acts of knowing, loving, worshipping, and honoring God performed here below will help him to attain his life immortal, and that the contrary acts will impede his progress toward this goal. The kind of conduct that in the life of realization contributes to God's glory and fulfils man's destiny, cannot but have a similar worth and produce analogous effects in the life of preparation. The morality of this general class of actions, or rather, their bearing on the ultimate end, can therefore be learned by a study of the end itself. When, however, we turn from actions having immediate reference to God to actions that concern primarily ourselves and our neighbors, we find that such guidance is no longer obtainable. Mere consideration of the ultimate end cannot tell us whether veracity, justice, and chastity are more apt to move us toward that goal than lying, theft, and impurity. Since the latter actions show forth the power that God has conferred upon His creatures, they might be regarded as a certain animal-like glorification of the Creator. Nor do they prevent the doer of them from knowing and loving God. Now if these actions are consistent with the glorification, and knowledge, and love of God on earth, we must infer that, as performed on earth, they will not prevent him from glorifying, and knowing, and loving God in the after life. As they do not hinder man's attainment of these ends here, so they ought not to render him unfit to attain them hereafter. To be sure, the man who is addicted to the essentially selfish vice of impurity, and the man who disregards the welfare and rights of his neighbor, cannot love God as well as the man who practices the opposite virtues; but he can love God to some extent; and the fact not the degree of love is all that can be proved obligatory from a consideration of the ultimate

end. According to Father Tanquerey, such acts as intemperance and impurity turn man from the ultimate end because they tend to the injury of the individual and the race; but the inference is not strictly necessary.[2] Cannot the man who in the prime of life fills a drunkard's grave, attain his end in the other life as well as the virtuous man who dies young through some accident or illness for which he is not responsible? There is no direct and clear relation between the obligation to reach one's final destiny and the act of shortening one's earthly existence through dissipation. Nor does any obligation to contribute to the preservation of the race logically and necessarily follow from the essentially individual duty of arriving at the end appointed by God in the life to come. Even if the general principle were valid that whatever contributes to the destruction of the individual or the race is impeditive of the ultimate end, it could not be shown that certain isolated, exceptional acts, such as lying to save the life of a friend, or fornication in order to escape death, or stealing from a wealthy spendthrift for a good purpose, are in any vital sense socially or individually harmful. We shall presently return to this aspect of the teleological method. In the meantime sufficient has been said to indicate that only in the case of actions having immediate reference to God, such as worship and blasphemy, can the bearing of conduct on man's ultimate end be known from a study of the end itself. So far as all other actions are concerned, we are in the position of a man who knows the city that he wishes to reach, but knows not which of the several roads confronting him will lead him thither. Hence if the morality of acts be defined in terms of their relation to the ultimate end, the latter is not a complete criterion, or discriminative norm, of conduct.

If the ultimate end does not enable us to distinguish all good conduct from bad conduct, it can scarcely be the *formal determinant*, or constituent, of morality. It can scarcely be the precise *reason why* acts are respectively right and wrong. This inference is confirmed when we consider the essential distinction that exists between the notion of conduciveness to an end and the notion of moral goodness. To say that certain actions further our attainment of the ultimate end is to declare a relation not of morality but of utility. Good is either *bonum utile*, *bonum delectabile*, or *bonum honestum*. *Bonum utile* is that which is desirable inasmuch as it leads to some other good, while *bonum honestum* is that which is in itself desirable or becoming.

[2] *De Virtutibus et Preceptis*, p. 14.

Consequently the formal constituent of utility in actions, the quality that puts them into the category of utility, is precisely this character of conduciveness to an end. Moral goodness, on the other hand, comes under the head of *bonum honestum*; as predicated of actions (in contradistinction to possessions, such as health, knowledge, beauty, etc.), it is, in fact, co-extensive with *bonum honestum*. It is not equivalent to *bonum delectabile*, for some pleasurable actions are not good morally; nor to *bonum utile*, for some useful actions, as stealing with reference to the aims of the thief, are morally evil. To pronounce actions morally good because promotive of the ultimate end is, therefore, to confound two essentially distinct kinds of good, and to empty moral goodness of its formal content. If it be urged that actions that move man toward his final destiny are useful in so far as conducive to this end, but morally good inasmuch as the end to which they lead is morally good, that the moral goodness of the means is derived from the moral goodness of the end, the answer must be that this view regards as a formal cause something that is merely a condition or necessary concomitant. Let us consider a parallel case in which the morality of the act seems to originate in its proximate end, owing to a similar confusion of condition with cause. We know that to be free from all taint of evil an act must be good in its object, its motive, and its circumstances. How are we to determine whether these conditions, aspects, features, of the act are good? Only by comparing them with some standard distinct from the act itself, such as right reason, rational nature, or the moral law. Hence we say that the formal cause of the goodness of the act is neither its object, motive, nor circumstances, but its relation to this extrinsic standard. The three facts mentioned are merely conditions, prerequisites, endowments of the act itself, which it must have in order to be in harmony with the standard of right conduct, and through which it is brought into comparison with the standard. They are not the true cause of the act's goodness, the precise determining reason why it is good. An act of heroism on the battle field is pronounced good *ex objecto*, since it tends to promote the welfare of a nation; but why is this object, the welfare of the nation, good? Whence does it get this moral goodness that it is supposed to communicate to the act of heroism? Not from itself, for national welfare is not the formal standard of morality, but from its conformity with the needs of rational nature. Hence conformity with rational nature is the formal constituent, the fundamental reason (this side of God)

of the moral goodness of the act that we are discussing. Analyzing in the same way the relation between actions and the ultimate end, we see that if those derive their goodness from the latter they are good only because it, the end, is good. But why is the final end good? Ultimately because it is in accordance with the nature of God who has established it; proximately because it harmonizes with the rational nature of man who is to attain it. Now since the ultimate end accords with the rational nature of man, the means, that is, the actions that move man toward the end, will likewise be in harmony with rational nature. The fundamental reason therefore why these actions are morally good lies in their conformity with rational nature, and not in their adaptation to the ultimate end. Just as conduciveness to the national welfare is a *necessary prerequisite* of the moral goodness of the act of military heroism, so conduciveness to the ultimate end is a *necessary concomitant* of the moral goodness of any good act; but neither of these relations of conduciveness is the *formal cause* of the act's moral goodness. Their formal effect is to make actions not moral but useful. Conduciveness to the ultimate end is said to be a necessary concomitant of a good act, inasmuch as an act that is in harmony with rational nature is perforce in harmony with the ultimate end of rational nature. Moreover, neither of these relations enjoys any logical priority over the other: an act is not good *because* it conduces to the ultimate end; it does not conduce to the ultimate end *because* it is good. They are simply different aspects of the act, conduciveness to the ultimate end making it useful, and conformity with rational nature making it morally good.

That the ultimate end is not the formal determinant of the morality of actions likewise appears from the concepts of right and wrong in the consciousness of the average human being. When a person condemns his own conduct, for example, lying, betrayal of a friend, impurity, as bad or wrong (in contradistinction to harmful or injurious) he thinks of it primarily in relation to himself, or to the will of God, rather than to his ultimate end. He detests it as something unbecoming, unworthy, out of joint with his standard of righteousness. When, on the contrary, he has resisted the temptation to do evil, and approves such resistance as good, it is not the idea of the ultimate end but the idea of becomingness, order, harmony, and the law of right that is explicit in his consciousness. If he goes further and adverts to the consequences of his conduct for a future life he forms a specifically different concept, and represents his actions in a specifically

different light. His mind is now occupied with the folly and harmfulness, or prudence and utility, of his conduct, and he would if questioned be able to draw a sufficiently clear distinction between his moral and his utilitarian concepts.

This obvious and fundamental distinction between the usefully good and the morally good is clearly and fully set forth in some portion of their works by all Catholic writers on ethics. Some of them, however, confound the two ideas by asserting more or less explicitly that man's ultimate end is the formal determinant of morality. Father Ming writes as follows:

"Moral goodness or badness is predicated of our actions because of their relation to our final destination. The action which is directed to our ultimate end, thus conducing to its attainment, is good; the action, on the contrary, which is deviating from this end, and so hinders us from reaching it, is bad."[3]

This language has a generic resemblance to a fundamental statement in Spencer's *Data of Ethics*:[4]

"Always, then, acts are called good or bad according as they are well or ill-adjusted to ends."

Both of these passages state the moral quality of actions in terms of utility. Of course, the end of conduct as defined by Spencer is totally different from the ultimate end defended by Father Ming, but the failure of the latter to emphasize more strongly than he does the difference between morality and utility—even utility for an ultimate end—leaves his case weaker than it need be, and, as we shall see presently, tends to obscure the unique character of the concept of morality. Even St. Thomas is sometimes cited in favor of the teleological conception.[5] Those who hold that rational nature is the formal determinant of morality explain the passages here referred to in a different sense, and appeal to other portions of the writings of the Angelic Doctor, in which he seems to teach the contrary doctrine.[6] That the authority of St. Thomas should be claimed in support of opposing views is not, indeed, a unique fact in ethical and theological discussion. And it is quite likely that the same general conditions surround the present case that are true of some other disputed doctrines. In the time of St. Thomas ethical concepts and terms were not as sharply defined, nor was the controversy concerning the standard of morality

[3] *The Data of Modern Ethics*, p. 102.
[4] *Data of Ethics*, p. 26.
[5] See especially 1a 2æ, q. 21, a. 1, 2; q. 106, a. 4.
[6] In particular 1a 2æ, q. 54, a. 3; q. 94, a. 2, and *Contra Gentiles*, l. 3, c. 129.

as acute, as in later ages. Hence it is possible that he used terms with less accuracy and consistency, and stated his view on the formal determinant of right and wrong with less precision, than subsequent writers. Among the latter who certainly held the teleological view were: the Salmanticenses,[7] Sylvester Maurus,[8] and Viva.[9] Another prominent writer sometimes cited in favor of this view is Valentia, but the passage appealed to is by no means conclusive.[10]

The objection might be urged that, since acts promotive of the ultimate end are in fact right, and acts impeditive of it in fact wrong, the questions that we have been discussing have merely an academic interest. What practical harm can result from the assertion, or the implication, that the ultimate end will enable us to discern right from wrong? or that it is the formal determinant of morality? In the first place, this way of conceiving the matter seems to lead many authors to describe insufficiently the proximate rule or rules of conduct. Specifically, it seems to impel them to neglect the standard of rational nature. They begin fundamental ethics with a long—sometimes disproportionately long—disquisition on the ultimate end of man. Having determined the nature of the ultimate end, and asserted either explicitly or implicitly that it is the formal criterion of right and wrong, they proceed to consider the moral act, the human act, which is the means by which the ultimate end is reached or forfeited. The next step should logically be to show that the morality of particular actions and their bearing on the ultimate end, can be known by referring them to, comparing them with, the ultimate end. As this would be impossible, the authors in question do not seriously attempt it, but strive to set forth some more immediate criterion. Not infrequently their statement of this proximate norm is vague and unsatisfactory. Sometimes, for example, it is said to be "objective evidence;" sometimes, "right reason." Nor does their exposition of natural law fully meet the need of greater objectivity and definiteness. The conception of the moral standard as law dates from the beginning of ethical thought, and it possesses some noteworthy advantages; for man's civil and religious duties are declared and determined through the medium of law, and the concept of man's direction to an ultimate end by God suggests the idea of a divine law through

[7]Tr. 11, disp. 1, dub. 5, no. 6.
[8]*Opus Theol.* tom. 2, q. 24, n. 7.
[9]*Cursus Theologicus*, pars 2, disp. 7, q. 1, no. 5.
[10]*De Actibus Humanis*, disp. 2, q. 13, punct. 1 ad 3.

which this direction is effected. Nevertheless there is room for seriously doubting whether natural law provides the most satisfactory means of distinguishing between right and wrong. It is too vague. In the most general acceptation it signifies an obligatory rule of conduct that is somehow engraven on the mind or heart. The more specific definitions vary considerably. Some authors define it as "a participation by the creature in the eternal law;" others, as "an intellectual light placed in us by God and enabling to perceive what is to be done and what avoided;" others, as "the dictate of the practical reason;" others, as "rational nature;" others, as "the divine direction of man to his ultimate end;" still others, as "the order or relation that exists among and binds together moral essences." The *content* of the natural law is likewise stated in different ways. In general the law is concretely represented either as a group of precepts intuitively known independently of any other standard, or as one supreme intuitive principle from which all the necessary particular precepts are deducible. But when it is taken as a collection of self evident precepts without explicit reference to rational nature which is its basis, the natural law does not afford sufficient moral guidance. The intuitions, for example, that condemn lying, stealing, and impurity, do not clearly manifest the essential immorality of a falsehood told in order to preserve life from an unjust attack, of theft for a great public good from a rich and reckless spendthrift, or of an act of unchastity in order to escape death. The moral intuitions that concern self preservation and the public good seem to suggest that these exceptional actions may be morally lawful. Similar difficulties may be raised against all the intuitive provisions of the natural law which cover actions that are primarily personal and primarily social. When, on the other hand, the natural law is reduced to one supreme intuitive principle it is not infrequently thrown into the form of a practically worthless analytical proposition. The command, "do good and avoid evil," is self evident, but it does not carry us far. It does not help us to distinguish good from evil in the concrete. It contains, indeed, all the precepts of the natural law and of morality, but it conceals them so thoroughly that no direct examination of it will bring them to light. Some of the authors, however, describe the supreme principle in terms of the relations that ought to exist between conduct and rational nature. Thus the formulation preferred by Meyer is, "rectum naturæ ordinem tamquam divinitus sancitum servato."[11] In this or some equivalent form the principle is unex-

[11] *Institutiones Juris Naturalis*, I, p. 237.

ceptionable,—although it is reached through a consideration of rational nature rather than through analysis of that intuitive rule that is generally thought of when men speak of the natural law.

Another practical defect of the method that we are discussing is, as already intimated, that it tends to deprive the concept of moral goodness of its unique character. This happens especially when the hedonistic aspect of the ultimate end is too strongly emphasized. The ultimate natural end of man is primarily the glory of God, and secondarily an immortal existence spent in knowing and loving God. Yet the authors generally speak of this latter condition as though it were the primary end and the sole purpose that man is bound to realize. Not infrequently this blessed condition (*beatitudo*) is presented in such a way that its subjective aspect, namely, the state, or feeling, or experience, called perfect happiness, appears as the true goal for which man should strive, and the rule of right and wrong. As a natural result, the utilitarian side of conduct is overemphasized, a foundation is suggested for the more or less explicit belief that moral good is a matter of expediency, and that the problem of conduct is to seek that course of action that will contribute most to the ultimate enjoyment of the seeker. Thus the strictly ethical character of good and evil is greatly minimized.

When they give such a large place to the ultimate end, and when they describe the end in terms of beatitude or happiness, Catholic moralists are, of course, following St. Thomas who in turn adopted the method of Aristotle. The Stagirite conceived the problem of morality in terms of the relation of acts to ends, neglecting almost entirely its intuitive aspect. He does not seem to have often thought of actions as intrinsically good or bad, becoming or unbecoming, irrespective of the ends that they served. His inquiry concerned primarily the reasonableness and unreasonableness of actions, which is not the same thing formally as inquiry into their morality. Thus, good conduct is in the long run the most conducive to the life and progress of the race, but to appraise and describe all actions in terms of social utility is to deprive them of that peculiar and unconvertible character called moral. Similarly, to place a large and frequent emphasis on the relation between good actions and man's ultimate end,—more especially when the end is presented as happiness,—is to neglect, underestimate, and convey an insufficient notion of their intrinsic worth, essential sanctity, and ethical excellence.

This habit of emphasizing too strongly the function of the ultimate end seems, furthermore, to be in some degree responsible for an underestimate of the *object* and an exaggeration of the *effect*, as sources of the morality of particular actions. By the *sources* of morality is understood, of course, those phases or conditions of the act through which it is brought into relation with the standard of morality. These are the object, the motive, and the circumstances. In many Catholic treatises the moral character of the individual act is too often appraised and determined by referring to its effect, which is a circumstance, instead of to its immediate object. As there is too much teleology of the ultimate end, so there is too much teleology of proximate ends or consequences. Let us consider a few typical instances.

The usual argument for the Catholic doctrine that all deliberate sins of unchastity are grave, is drawn from their assumed damaging effects on the propagation of the race. It is asserted that a single deliberate carnal sin, even of thought, will expose the doer to serious danger of falling into sexual excesses, and so of becoming unfit or disinclined to undertake the burdens of marriage and parenthood. Evidently there is much exaggeration in this condition. Isolated acts of impurity, whether of thought or of action, do not uniformly entail such grave consequences. The propagation of the race is fairly well safe-guarded in Ireland and the Tyrol, even though some of the inhabitants of these countries sometimes yield to temptations of impurity. When, however, the argument from consequences is based on the evils that would follow if individuals were permitted to decide to what extent they might, consistently with individual and social welfare, indulge in sins of this nature, the case becomes immensely stronger. Undoubtedly the great majority of persons would be too lenient with themselves, and would yield to their sexual desires to such an extent that by the time they became convinced that their own health or character or the propagation of the race was endangered, the unchaste habits would be practically beyond their control. It is quite likely, moreover, that almost every offender would assume that the future of the race would be sufficiently cared for by others. In view of these grave consequences, reason and the prescriptions of the moral law forbid and proclaim as unreasonable and wrong the exercise of any such discretionary power by individuals.

The argument just outlined shows that the overwhelming majority of unchaste acts are wrong, but it is not sufficient to condemn them all. We can picture cases so exceptional and peculiar that the moral

power to say that they are exceptions could, compatibly with private and social welfare, be left to individual judgment. Sanchez discusses one such instance when he asks whether it is lawful to commit self-pollution in order to save life.[12] He answers the question in the negative, but admits that it is very difficult to find satisfactory reasons for his decision. The lawfulness of checking a mortal disease by castration appears to him to afford some ground for an *a fortiori* argument in favor of the action that he condemns. To offset its force he introduces an argument from consequences. If, he says, self-pollution were committed in order to save life, the vehement pleasure accompanying it would impel the person to persuade himself that sufficient reasons existed for repeating it in many other situations. As a further consequence, he would fall into other sexual excesses which are admittedly incompatible with the proper propagation of the race.

Commenting on this passage, Father Palmieri confesses that there are certain moral truths which men perceive by a kind of rational instinct, but which can only with the greatest difficulty be justified by conclusive reasons. Certainly the reasoning of Sanchez is far from conclusive. According to the terms of the case the act would not be permissible except when death was imminent. Let us assume that a physician, or a council of physicians, pronounces the danger to be of this character. Is it not preposterous to say that the desire aroused through one such act would render a man so morally blind (*passione libidinis excæcatus*) that he would in good faith think the action lawful in other and totally different circumstances. Strong and passionate men who have lived for years in the marital relation do not as widowers find that their moral sense in the matter of chastity has become perverted to this extent. Moralists do not think it necessary to throw such extraordinary safeguards around any other commandments. The starving man is not forbidden to take a loaf of bread belonging to his neighbor, lest he might thereby lose his grasp of the principle of private property, and think it right to steal whenever a tempting motive presented itself. Theologians keenly appreciate the dangers attendant upon "mental restriction," yet they do not prohibit its use in extreme circumstances. Although some persons cannot define the precise number of drinks that will expose them to immediate danger of getting drunk, they are not therefore forbidden by moralists to take a single glass of whiskey. In all these cases the

[12] *De Matrimonio*, l. 9, d. 17, no. 15.

power of the single act to pervert the judgment of the agent, and render him incapable of drawing the line between circumstances that justify and circumstances that do not justify a repetition of the act, is almost if not quite as certain as in the case that Sanchez discusses; yet no such universal prohibition is pronounced.

Let us suppose that a virtuous man is threatened with immediate death unless he yields to the sinful solicitations of a woman whose fury has been aroused by his repulses. This case is said to be not merely imaginary. Can it be seriously maintained that consent in these circumstances would cause grave injury either to the man's power of self control, or to his moral perceptions, or to the welfare of the race? Again, it sometimes happens that the verdict both of personal experience and of competent physicians forbids certain wives to become pregnant, under pain of almost instant death. Why is it wrong artificially to prevent conception in such cases? No injury to the race would be caused, since the alternative is the death of the mother, or possibly of both mother and child. That some persons would take advantage of such an admitted privilege, and *in good faith* make use of it where no grave danger existed is very improbable; for the distinction between imminent and remote peril of death is quite as easily made in such a contingency as in that of a surgical operation. Those who are not in good faith would, generally speaking, resort to preventives as readily without as with this narrowly restricted permission. Hence the condemnation of these practices even where life is at stake, cannot be justified solely on the ground of their consequences to the race.

In their endeavor to prove the universal wrongfulness of fornication Billuart and Cajetan combine the argument from consequences with a quasi-intuitionism that is worth noticing because of its incompleteness. To the objection that no evil results to race propagation and education can follow from fornication when one of the persons is sterile, Billuart answers that such immunity occurs not *per se* but *per accidens*.[13] *Per se*, the act of fornication leads to the birth of a child whose education is not properly provided for; consequently the act is always sinful. But the problem is not satisfactorily solved by this simple device of antithetical formulas. What is the vital, practical, concrete meaning of these phrases in the present instance? Only this: in the majority of cases, or, when all the conditions are what may be called normal, which is but another name for usual,

[13] *Cursus Theologiæ*, 2a 2æ, q. 154, a. 2.

fornication leads to harmful results; but in exceptional circumstances these results will be absent. Now the principle that the morality of an individual action is to be determined by the *per se*, or normal, or usual, effects of the general class to which the action belongs, is not applied universally. It is not applied to "mental restriction," which is *per se* contrary to the veracity that one man owes to another; yet *per accidens* it is permitted for a sufficiently grave reason. Nor to the amputation of a diseased limb, which is *per se* an injury to bodily integrity, but *per accidens* becomes the body's salvation. Nor to seizure of the goods of another to relieve extreme need, which is *per se* the taking of what does not belong to the taker, but *per accidens* appears as the temporary appropriation of common property. Nor to the matrimonial impediment of impotency; for *per se* every adult has a right to enter the marital relation, but *per accidens* he may be lawfully forbidden to do so, owing to his inability to discharge its physical functions. These are only a few of the instances that might be cited to show that the distinction between what happens *per se* and what happens *per accidens*—which in more concrete terms is merely what generally occurs and what is of exceptional occurrence,—is not regarded as sufficient to determine the morality of every act that belongs to a general class or type. Both the dictates of right reason and the general rules and methods of Catholic casuistry, show that the moral character of particular actions is to be judged by their particular composition and circumstances.

Cajetan does, indeed, seem to give a deeper ethical significance to the phrase, *per se*, by making it synonymous with the *natural order*.[14] Sexual intercourse, he says, should occur only in those conditions that are compatible with the proper education of offspring; but in the natural order of things these conditions are provided only through the marital union; hence fornication is contrary to the natural order. "Fornicatio est concubitus privatus naturali ordine ad naturalem educationem et instructionem prolis." But if one of the persons is sterile, or if the education of possible offspring is amply provided for beforehand, the *end* at which the natural order aims is safeguarded. Why then should fornication in these circumstances be condemned as illicit? In other words, why is it wrong to disregard the natural order when the end to which the order points, and to which it is in most cases a necessary means, can be reached or safeguarded by other means? If the morality of sexual intercourse depends entirely upon

[14] *Idem locus.*

its end and consequences, the natural order applying to it is valid and sacred only in so far as demanded by the end and consequences. Therefore, when the end can be safeguarded and the evil consequences averted by pursuing another course the natural order may reasonably and lawfully be abandoned. Why not? What sacredness is there in the concept of "natural order," any more than in the phrase, *per se*? As here employed, both describe the usual, but not the only, means of attaining a necessary end. If, however, the natural order be conceived as the standard or type to which conduct must conform under penalty of violating one's own nature, it becomes endowed with an ethical value that affects every act of a given class, independently of particular consequences. In this view fornication as a violation of the natural order is always wrong because it subjects man's higher to his lower nature. The moral supremacy of the rational faculties over those of sense requires that man should not yield to his sexual desires until he has undertaken the burdens of self control and self denial involved in the marital union; that his procreative faculties should not be indulged except in connection with the amount of self restraint that is necessary to render the supremacy of the higher faculties secure. This principle will be developed at greater length presently. As Cardinal Cajetan does not insist upon this interpretation of natural order, his argument remains inconclusive.[15]

The teleology of proximate ends has been discussed at this length in relation to sins of unchastity because it is in this field that the method is most frequently and least convincingly employed. There are other actions in regard to which it is not used exclusively, and yet its importance is exaggerated. For example, lying is admitted to be intrinsically wrong, but its social effects too often receive an emphasis from the authors that is out of all proportion to reality. Even if all men acted on the principle defended by Grotius, and resorted to falsehood whenever the interrogator had no strict right to the information sought, it is quite unlikely that human commerce and intercourse would suffer irreparable injury. At any rate, no serious harm would befall society were men to tell an out-and-out lie in all cases in which the theologians permit "mental restriction."

[15]According to another view, the natural order condemns every act of fornication for the reason that the union of man and woman effected in sexual intercourse is so intimate that it demands the permanent relation of marriage. Otherwise there remains after the act a condition of separation that is as unnatural and abnormal as the separation of the head from the body, or the immature fetus from the womb. This consideration has been used as an argument against divorce.

So much for criticism. The writer's conception of the place of the ultimate end in ethics can best be stated by outlining the order and method according to which the different portions of the science should be treated. When the average person who has gotten hold of the notions of right and wrong inquires after the general principle that divides these two classes of actions, when he asks himself: Why is right right and wrong wrong? he does not, unless he has become so self-centered that he habitually measures conduct solely by the standard of personal advantage, think of answering the question in terms of the relation that his actions bear to his ultimate end. He may, indeed, have arrived at the conclusion that, since he has been created by God for a purpose, he is morally bound to realize that purpose; but so far as this conception goes, it represents right conduct not as leading to the ultimate end, but as corresponding with the will of God. He looks upon actions that conduce to the ultimate end as good simply because God has enjoined them. In a scientific treatment of ethics, therefore, the meaning of the concepts "moral," "morality," "good," and "bad," should be explained at the outset. Since a considerable portion of human activity is not moral, not susceptible of classification as either good or bad, the inquirer and the student should be made acquainted with the facts that distinguish moral from non-moral conduct before he turns his attention to the criteria that separate the morally good from the morally bad. This means the section on "human acts," in which their nature and elements are analyzed, and their imputability determined. The next step should be to ascertain the norm of morality. And this norm should be presented first of all as a type, an ideal, a standard, to which actions ought to conform, not as a goal at which it is reasonable to aim. If the ultimate end is discussed either before or immediately after the treatise on "human acts," the strictly ethical concepts are liable to take on in the mind of the tudent a utilitarian coloring. The rule of right and wrong should be presented to the student in the first instance as a principle that is at once discriminative, formal, proximate, and objective. It should not only enable him to distinguish good from bad actions, but also give him the reason of the distinction. It should be proximate, so that actions could be referred to it directly and immediately. It should be objective, in order to provide a secure and unvarying basis for moral judgments. Reason is a proximate norm, but as such it gives no objective ground for its decisions; nor does the concrete reason of individuals appraise the morality of a given

act in a uniform way. And it is quite clear that the ultimate end does not fulfil these conditions, for it is neither fully discriminative, nor formal, nor proximate. The norm that meets all requirements most satisfactorily is man's *rational nature*.[16] The proximate norm of conduct being established, the inquiry should now be directed toward the norm that is remote, fundamental, and ultimate. This appears as the divine Nature, or Essence, upon Which rational nature is based, and of Which it, in its capacity as rule of conduct, is a reflection or imitation. Thus the mind is led gradually and logically to the final conclusion that, as good actions are in accord with the divine Nature, or Essence, so they are in accord with the divine Will. Thus, too, moral goodness is represented as something holy, possessing intrinsic worth, nobility, excellence, stamped with a character that differs *toto cœlo* from the concept of utility.

At this point the teleological aspect of conduct may properly be discussed. In accordance with the method of Aristotle and St. Thomas, it may be pointed out that all voluntary actions are performed for the sake of some *end*; and the problem of conduct may be stated as that of ascertaining the supreme and final end that it is reasonable to seek. The first answer to this inquiry need not be and should not be drawn from an analysis of the tendency toward happiness—whether objective or subjective—that appears in human activity. This, indeed, was the method of Aristotle, but perhaps his imperfect knowledge of God as the First and Last Cause left him no alternative. In the case of the Christian the preferable method would seem to be to give the answer immediately from the conclusions of natural theology: the ultimate end to be aimed at in all conduct is the glory of God. Now, since the glory of God must, in so far it depends upon human action, be in accordance with man's nature, the acts that promote it will necessarily be those that are in harmony with rational nature. Nature and end being correlative terms, only those acts that harmonize with nature will harmonize with, conduce to, the final end of nature. Or, to consider the matter from another viewpoint, God's glory must be in conformity with His Nature, or Essence; consequently human conduct that agrees with the latter will also agree with the former. Thus the categories of morality and of impersonal utility are exhibited

[16]Chief among the writers who have defended this norm are: Suarez, *De Bon. et Malitia Act. Hum.* disp. 2, sect. 2, no. 10; Lessius, In. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 3; Vasquez, In. 1, 2, disp. 58, c. 2; De Lugo, *De Principiis Act. Hum.*, II, c. 8, no. 3; Coninck, *De Moralitate Act. Hum.* disp. 3, dub. 2, no. 32.

as coincident, as objectively and materially, though not conceptually and formally, the same. It is shown that man moves toward his ultimate end by acting in accordance with the standard set up by his rational nature. Finally, the problem of conduct may be stated in terms of personal utility. What is the supreme end that man should seek for his own welfare? This question will lead, of course, through the well-known analysis of the radical tendencies of human nature, to the conclusion that man's ultimate end in this secondary sense is to possess God through knowledge and love in an immortal existence, in which he will find complete satisfaction, subjective happiness. What actions will enable him to attain this end? Again the answer must be, those that harmonize with his rational nature; for the end to which man's nature and faculties impel him to move, and in which they will find perfection and completely harmonized activity, must correspond to his nature, which is the source and principle of all his activity. Again we get the objective coincidence of the ethical and the useful. Acts in accord with man's rational nature are both morally good and promotive of his ultimate end in all its aspects. Their relation to rational nature makes them good; their relation to the ultimate end makes them useful.

The ultimate end deserves a place in ethics for two reasons: first, in order to set forth man's purpose in the universe, and the direction that his life and conduct should take *as a whole*; and, second, to provide him with an answer to the irrepressible question that rose to the lips of even the chief of Christ's Apostles: "Behold, we have left all things and have followed thee; what, therefore, shall we have?" All men ask at some time or other, and most men ask frequently, "what is the use of living a good life? What will befall me if I disregard the moral law?" Hence the rôle of the ultimate end in ethics is that of a *sanction* rather than a determinant or measure of morality. Its function is complementary and incidental rather than primary and essential.[17]

What we have called the teleology of proximate ends, that is, the determination of the morality of actions by their consequences, is a

[17] In the first volume of his *Moralphilosophie*, Father Cathrein, S. J., treats of "human acts" before he takes up the ultimate end, and, on the whole, he gives the latter subject a relatively less important place than do most Catholic writers. He points out clearly and explicitly that the ultimate end is neither the formal determinant nor an adequate criterion of morality. Dr. Karl Werner devotes the first part of his *Ethik* to a study of the meaning of moral good, of man's faculties, and of the norm of morality. The methods of these two writers are, however, exceptional, so far as Catholic works are concerned.

legitimate method in its proper sphere. Some actions can be *adequately* compared with the standard of morality, and their moral character can be *adequately* appraised, only by observing the *effects* that they produce. Such are, for example, the refusal of a man to provide for his family, and the throwing of a stone into a crowded square. Most sins against chastity are in the some category, inasmuch as a part of their morality arises out of their consequences. On the other hand, there are actions whose morality cannot be fully determined from a study of their results alone. Among them are the actions that have been considered in detail a few pages back. These cannot be proved bad except by showing their intrinsic and objective disagreement with the standard of morality. In technical terms, they are wrong *ex objecto* rather than *ex circumstantiis*, or *ex effectibus*. They are out of harmony with rational nature, either because they imply a lack of due subordination of the lower to the higher nature, or because they compel one faculty (as in the case of lying) to contradict another. Impure desires and imaginations which are so exceptional in the subject that they produce no injurious results, are intrinsically wrong because they permit the lower faculties to escape from due control by the reason and the self-denying will. Representatively and through the imagination, the sexual sense is exercised out of proper subordination to the rational part of man. The imagination, moreover, is misused by being exercised on improper subject matter. The immoral character of internal acts of unchastity may also be conceived and described as the will's approval of illicit external acts. For that approval is as certainly given when the act is deliberately and complacently performed in the imagination as when it is externalized. Given suitable circumstances the person that sins internally would commit the external sin. The only difference between these two methods of appraising the actions under consideration, is that the former regards them directly as an internal perversion of faculty, while the latter conceives them as the approval of an external perversion.

All the external acts of unchastity that have already been discussed at length are likewise intrinsically wrong because a violation of rational nature. They mean a failure to subordinate properly the sense-faculties to the rational faculties. They constitute an undue assertion of the senses to the detriment of those higher powers whose function it is to maintain reasonable self control and to repress irrational self indulgence. They imply an undue exaltation of the animal in

man, and a disregard of the just claims of the spirit. They injure the spirit, inasmuch as they diminish man's appreciation and love of its worth, and dethrone it from its place of pre-eminence. They amount to an inversion of the proper order in man's double nature, a setting up of the animal in him as the rule of conduct in the place of his rational nature. Why are not some of the actions that we have in mind wrong when they take place within the bonds of marriage? For instance, why is sexual intercourse between a husband and a sterile wife not an undue assertion of the lower nature? The reason seems to be the one already given, namely, that when these actions take place in the marital relation the selfish element in them is overbalanced by the act of assuming the burdens and obligations of marriage. Thus the injury to and degradation of the higher nature is avoided. In the case of husband and wife there is no attempt to indulge the sense-faculties without putting a compensating burden on the rational faculties. There is no disproportionate yielding to animal nature.

It must be admitted that the determination of the precise degree to which the lower nature may be exercised without injury to the higher, and therefore without sin, is by no means an easy task. It is not maintained that the standard of rational nature enables us to determine infallibly the moral character of all actions. No standard of judgment within the reach of man, whether it has to do with truth, beauty, or goodness, provides him with absolutely and completely sure guidance, or lifts him above the limitations of his finite nature. All that is claimed for rational nature as a standard of morality is that it constitutes a guide that is truly *objective*, that it separates right from wrong at least as satisfactorily as any other criterion that can be named, and that it provides a rational explanation of many moral conclusions that are on any other basis inexplicable.[18]

[18]The following observations by Father Joseph Rickaby, S. J., are submitted because of their general agreement with the doctrine defended above and because of their general suggestiveness. After explaining that he has long been haunted by the thought of a certain "unconsidered ground of morality," he continues: "Certain actions are wrong, because in them some type is violated, some sacred symbolism outraged, and the dishonor done to the type redounds upon the antitype or thing typified. Such I conceive to be the radical reason of the grievousness of sins against purity. There are hygienic motives for that virtue, as there are for abstinence and sobriety. But the hygienic reason is never the whole reason; it does not cover the whole ground and matter of the virtue. The hygienic reason, closely touching as it does both the individual and the race, still is not the principal reason for purity. It fails to account for the peculiar sacredness of the precept, and the damning wickedness of all serious violation of the same. . . . The mischief and malice (of a life of unchastity) is not simply its unhealthiness, or its undoing of character, or even its

As for the natural law, it affords us no guidance concerning the rightness or wrongness of actions that is not more clearly and objectively provided by rational nature. Its chief utility is to bring out clearly and explicitly the concept of *moral obligation*. We perceive, indeed, that the dictates of rational nature ought to be obeyed, that they are clothed with this moral constraining force, this ethical necessity called obligation; but we do not feel that rational nature is of itself sufficiently sacred or sufficiently stable to justify the absolute validity that we attach to this concept. When, however, we think of conduct as prescribed by law, we pass easily to the thought of a *lawgiver*, and of a personal will as the basis of obligation. Thus we realize that the moral force constraining our will has its origin in the will of a person who has the right to command. This Person is, of course, God, from whom the natural law proceeds, and whose Essence is the ultimate basis of rational nature. We could, indeed, find a sufficient justification of moral obligation by recalling the fact that the dictates of rational nature are ultimately the dictates of the divine Reason, but the concept of natural law enables us the reach the divine origin of obligation somewhat more directly. Natural law also presents the idea of obligation somewhat more explicitly than does rational nature. Considered objectively as a standard of conduct, however, and considered apart from the eternal law, the natural law is merely man's rational nature as sanctioned by God, and by Him willed to be the proximate norm of morality. Hence the supreme reductive principle of the natural law is: live conformably to rational nature.

To sum up very briefly: there are theoretical defects in the presentation of the ultimate end as found in some authors; in very many authors the ultimate end is made too important, to the detriment of rational nature; and this neglect of rational nature seems to be at least indirectly responsible for an overemphasis of the consequences of certain actions in estimating their morality.

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uselessness or injury to the race, but further its offending against the symbolism of things mighty and holy." (*Political and Moral Essays*, pp. 287-289). May we not say that the type which Father Rickaby declares is violated by these sins is the divine Essence, as imaged and symbolized in human nature with its distinction and order of higher and lower?

NEWMAN AND CONCEPTUALISM

Thomas J. Gerrard

The sermon of His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster on the occasion of the opening of the Newman Memorial Church at Birmingham may well be taken as a landmark in the history of religious thought in England. At no time more than now has so much importance been attached to the great Oratorian's teaching. It was surely then most fitting for the head of the Church in England to speak as plainly as he did with regard to that teaching. "We must be very jealous," he said, "of his name, and very mindful of his doctrines. God raised him up to meet difficulties that had arisen and gave him insight into perils that to most men were not yet apparent. In dealing with the former we have a sure guide in his writings. In meeting the latter we must be on our guard not to force his teaching into a shape which he would disavow." His Grace then went on to speak more particularly of those interpreters in other countries not too familiar with our mother tongue. The movement in France is now well known and is appraised at different values according to the point of view from which it is taken.

Apart, however, from this particular danger on the Continent, there is another danger nearer home. Here in England there is a school whose tendency is to force the teaching of Newman into a shape which he would disavow. It is a school of ultra-scholastics whose minds are so fixed in the scholastic groove that they cannot possibly see the truth except from their own standpoint. I do not say for a moment that their view is not a true one, but I do suggest that possibly it is not the only true one. So far has this school gone that some of the members openly call Newman a conceptualist, while others, less courageous, suggest that if he is not actually a conceptualist, he is something uncommonly like one. Up to this point they speak in the concrete. Then they fall into the abstract: the distance from conceptualism to atheism is very short indeed.

One would have thought that in view of the strenuous attempts outside the Catholic Church to make little of Newman's faith; in view of the ugly rumors concerning the stability of that faith, and of the indignant denials of such rumors, such for instance as in the

letter of Newman read by His Grace the Archbishop at Birmingham; in view of the history of the signification of the Cardinal's hat, a sense of loyalty to the Church would have given pause to these well-meaning champions. After the close of the controversy in the *Tablet* which followed on my article in the *Dublin Review*:[1] "The Grammar of Assent and the Sure Future," I had intended to write a supplementary article on the undeveloped point of implicit middle terms. Circumstances deferred the carrying out of this intention, and in the meantime the charge of conceptualism has been repeated. Taking the Archbishop's words then as an inspiration, I feel justified in once more venturing an humble effort towards the clearing up of Newman's position.

It may be granted at once to those who ask it that Newman was not familiar with scholastic philosophy. Certain it is that his books afford no evidence of such knowledge. If therefore he has built an independent structure complete in itself yet not out of harmony with scholastic thought, we have all the more reason to admire his genius. When, however, it is remembered how Newman and the schoolmen both drew so largely from the same source, namely the Fathers, such harmony is less to be wondered at. But this completeness and harmony is just what is denied to him. The chief of his supposed defects is that he has left out of account the scholastic doctrine of universals. A less modest charge goes a step further and reads into his method a contradiction of one of the best elements of scholastic doctrine, moderate realism.

The difficulty arises through the attempt to read Newman through scholastic spectacles, the effort to express Newman forms in scholastic forms. Indeed, some writers have been at considerable pains to demonstrate that the *Grammar of Assent* is not merely a translation or re-statement of scholastic doctrine. But I beg leave to ask whether any disciple of Newman ever claimed that it was. Anyone who holds such a view must miss the whole point of the book. The sole object of the work was to show how, without having recourse to the scholastic method or any other theory of thought, the mind could arrive at practical certitude. Over and over again did Newman say—and his disciples have repeated it *usque ad nauseam*—that his intention was not to formulate a theory but to present an analysis of phenomena. His age had acquired a distaste for *a priori* reasoning; and so he chose to meet it on its own ground, namely, that of experience. His method

[1] July, 1905.

was not a breaking away, either conscious or unconscious, from the method of the schools. It was a transcending of or prescinding from it.

This brings us to the chief point at issue. When Newman says that the mind can pass from the concrete to the concrete without being able to assign any reason therefor, does he thereby imply that the mind does not use an abstract middle term? And I answer: not necessarily so.

Let us state the question in scholastic form but in plain English. A universal is a general idea which is common to many things. Thus the general idea "brute" is common to the dog, the cat, the lion, the lamb, the camel and the monkey. The general idea "man" is common to Peter, Paul, William, George Washington and the German Emperor. Do these general ideas "brute" and "man" as they exist in the mind possess a corresponding generality in the things themselves? Among the several answers which have been given to this question, there are two which concern our present enquiry, the answer of the conceptualists and that of the moderate realists. The conceptualists say that the universality exists in the mind but has no corresponding universality in things. The moderate realists say that the universality exists in the mind, but that this universality is derived from things as they exist outside the mind. Thus all the individuals of a species have a nature which is alike in each; but such nature is not as it were one thing existing in many, but rather many similar things existing in the various individuals. The difference between the universality as it exists formally in the mind and the universality as it exists fundamentally in the thing is that, in the former, it is stripped of all its particular notes. Thus "brutality," although it is common to the dog, the cat, the lion, and the lamb, is not the same in number, but the same in kind. This view of the moderate realist, I may say in passing, I take to be the only sane one.

The correspondence between the generality in the mind and the generality in the thing is, as has been pointed out, the groundwork of all science. Still, we must not forget that it is only a theory, albeit a good working one. Like all other theories it must be modified in practice. Other circumstances must be taken into account. Theoretically, all bodies fall to the ground at the same rate of speed. Practically, lead falls quicker than feathers. The circumstance of the surrounding air upsets our calculations. So also is it with our theory of thought. Although it may be granted that there is a true correspondence between the abstract universal and its foundation

in the concrete, yet it does not follow that in every living mind the abstraction corresponds to the essence in the thing precisely as it is supposed to do. The living mind may receive impressions and from those impressions form in itself abstract universals which *de facto* it cannot formulate and express in words. Thus although there may be a constant correspondence between the essences of things as they exist in the things and the same essences as they exist in mind, or better still, as they exist in the mind of God; yet it is not so certain that they have that correspondence when the abstraction has been made by this or that living human mind. In other words, I offer the suggestion of "implicit universals." And if my suggestion be true to fact, then the *Grammar of Assent* has thrown a new light on scholastic philosophy.

Before this suggestion however is allowed to pass, the objection will be made that if the supposed universal is not explicit then the abstraction has not been made; that if the mind cannot formulate its middle term of the syllogism, then no middle term exists, and the conclusion is, at best, a shrewd guess. Thus, for instance, Dr. W. G. Ward, whilst he maintained that there was a distinction between implicit and explicit reasoning, yet claimed that the reason was able to formulate everything explicitly that it held implicitly.[2]

At the outset I would recall Newman's remark at the beginning of the *Grammar*: "In this Essay I treat of propositions only in their bearing on concrete matter."[3] A clear line must be drawn between the mind considered abstractly as a function separate from the rest of man and the mind in working order as it is in any given normal living man. In the ideal abstract man, the process of explicitating every implicit thought, is a possibility. In the real concrete man it is an impossibility. Or to express the matter scholastically: It is possible to express explicitly what is held implicitly: I distinguish; metaphysically possible, I grant; physically possible, I deny; and I explain the distinction. It is quite easy and true to say in the abstract that what is implicit must have its counterpart explicit. It is possible to take one little experience and explicitate that. But then we must remember that every experience of the human soul makes an impression on the soul. Every human act therefore, in greater or less degree, characterizes every subsequent human act and is characterized by every previous human act. A living man has his character more

[2] *Essays on the Philosophy of Theism*, II, 131.
[3] *Grammar of Assent*, p. 7.

or less formed. His judgments are colored by his character. Now I ask: Can any living normal man recall the multitudinous number of impressions which he has received and which influence his implicit reasoning? Can he marshal in explicit array all the particular reasons which go to make up the justification of any given serious judgment?

I shall proceed to draw out an example, capable of wide application, which will show that, at least in many cases, the reliability of knowledge is in inverse ratio to the facility with which it can be converted from implicit to explicit knowledge.

A certain young man has just finished his studies preparatory to embarking on his profession. The final examination has left him tired and unfit. He has a bad cold in the bargain, and a severe cough. One day as he is walking in the garden he has an attack of hæmoptysis. The local doctor is sent for—a man with a brilliant degree: M. D. Lond. He applies the stethoscope but hears nothing. He advises the young man to keep quiet for a day or two, take a week's holiday, and then go to work. The advice is faithfully followed. After a fortnight's work the hæmoptysis appears again, this time much more violently; and the young man is carried off to the hospital. The doctor there is one of wide general experience and of moderate academic qualifications. He applies the stethoscope and hears the most alarming sounds. Indeed the case is pronounced serious, if not quite helpless. The only hope is a sanatorium. At the sanatorium the specialist applies his stethoscope. Yes, the mischief is rather bad, but it can be put right in six or eight months. And in six or eight months it is put right.

The first doctor has clear ideas. He can explicitate his knowledge quite easily. He can tell you the exact chapter and verse in his "General Practitioner" which will justify his advice. Yet, after all, his advice is worthless, and worse than worthless. The second doctor has read his books. He has also had a considerable experience in a large town. He has examined a fairly large number of chests. He has made his abstractions and formed explicit judgments as each diagnosis has been entered in the day-book. These explicit judgments have each made an impression on his mind, have gone to form and cultivate the illative sense. So when he comes to diagnose a fresh case, although he is quite unable, physically, *hic et nunc*, to assign all the reasons for his judgment, yet his judgment is sound and reliable. On the other hand, however, his knowledge of sanatoria is confined to what he has read in the *British Medical Journal*. It is

"notional" and not "real." It is explicit enough, for has he not seen the article by Dr. Jones, who himself has been a patient? The advice, however, although given with fears and misgivings, *happens* to be correct. The third doctor has experience, both of diagnosis and of treatment. His life of study and observation is devoted to these. He has experience. not only of the stethoscope but of the weighing machine, the thermometer, the atmosphere, and the thousand and one other influences which bear on the patient. He lives with his patients and directs them three times a day what to do. He looks at his patient and the temperature chart, and says: "Walk to the Round Tower and back and take three hours over it." He passes from the concrete to the concrete, but he is no more able to assign particularly all his reasons than he is able to count the grains of a handful of sand. If he were to attempt to put all his reasons into syllogistic form, perhaps with an infallible memory and a thousand years at his disposal, he might partially succeed. But the memory is a faculty which not only remembers but also forgets. Nor does it come within the sphere of practical affairs to give a detailed rational account of every rational action. That were metaphysically, but not physically possible. And it is only the physically possible, namely, that which pertains to the living concrete whole man, which Newman contemplates in his analysis of the way to certitude.

It will be noticed that in the foregoing paragraph I have carefully qualified the implicit reasons by the words "particular" and "detailed." For the expert doctor might reply that he had a very explicit reason for his action, namely the experience of twenty years. That, however, would only be another way of saying that his illative sense was able to pass general judgments on all his past particular judgments; for, let it be repeated a thousand times, the illative sense is nothing but the reason acting in its perfection. It may be noticed also that Newman takes the precaution not to exclude the implicit middle term. Thus, in speaking of genius, in which natural inference or implicit reasoning is found in greater perfection, he says: "It is difficult to avoid calling such clear presentments by the name of instinct; and I think they may be so called, if by instinct be understood, not a natural sense, one and the same in all and incapable of cultivation, but a perception of facts without *assignable* media of perceiving."[4] Therefore it is not that he denies the media of perceiving but that he is unable to formulate them. The fact that he uses the

[4] *Ibid.* p. 334.

word "assignable" shows that he is conscious of something which may in reality be a middle term or universal, but which, not coming within the sphere of phenomena, could not be taken into account in an analysis of phenomena. It was therefore with my eyes wide open to the necessity of the universal that I wrote of formal inference in my article in the *Dublin Review*: "It may be said to be a method of passing from one concrete proposition to another without the use of any *tangible* middle term."[5] The position then which I take up is that in natural reasoning the mind does follow the rules of thought, it does use universals, it does use abstract middle terms; that those rules of thought, universals and abstract middle terms are, metaphysically speaking, all capable of being explicitly accounted for; but that, physically speaking, such explicitation is impossible in the concrete living man. It could be accomplished by the perfect human mind of Christ aided by Divinity, but not by the minds of ordinary mortals such as we experience men to be.

It will be convenient now, perhaps, to examine a few of the supposed conceptualistic expressions of Newman. Thus he says: "Inference is conditional, because a conclusion at least implies the assumption of premises, and still more, because in concrete matter, on which I am engaged, demonstration is impossible."[6] From this it will be argued that since demonstration is claimed to be possible only in the abstract and not in the concrete the consequence must be that there is no correspondence between the universal in the mind and its foundation in the thing. Nay, it will be urged that this discrepancy is expressly asserted, as witness the following: "All things in the exterior world are unit and individual, and are nothing else; but the mind not only contemplates those unit realities as they exist, but has the gift by an act of creation, of bringing before it abstractions and generalizations, which have no existence, no counterpart out of it."[7] Surely, it will be said, there does not need much forcing to see conceptualism there. No! Nor to see moderate realism there either. When Newman says that the abstractions and generalizations created by the mind have no existence or counterpart out of it, what he evidently means is that they have no formal existence *a parte rei*. Thus the statement, if it touches the doctrine of universals at all, merely gives the denial to exaggerated realism. William of Champeaux, and

[5] July, 1905, p. 119.
[6] Grammar of Assent, p. 8.
[7] *Ibid*, p. 9.

after him Laforet and Ubaghs, taught that the universal existed in the individual things in such a manner that all the individuals of a given species not only had natures similar to each other but that they shared a nature which was in reality all one thing. It was, according to them, just as the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity share one individual nature. But it is precisely this that Newman denies in the passage in question. He is dealing with things as they are in the concrete; and a concrete thing can not be dissected. Then the universal and the essence are found to correspond, and moderate realism is saved. But that has nothing to do with the passage under consideration. That has regard only to the concrete. Therefore it is that we may say that in concrete matter demonstration is impossible. Demonstration requires a middle term by which to pass over from premiss to conclusion. But middle terms are abstractions and exist only in the mind. Therefore only when dealing with abstractions can we deal with demonstrations. In dealing with concretes the mind contemplates similarities. Therefore, the concretes, in so far as they are concretes, can produce only a number of probabilities, the accumulation of which begets practical certitude; though on the other hand, in so far as they have in them the foundations of universals, and in so far as those universals are correctly abstracted by the living mind, they produce demonstration. But, as I have pointed out, this latter process is a beautiful theory which is considerably modified by the circumstances of actual busy human life.

Again: " . . . though I may have eaten a hundred peaches in times past, the impression which remains on my memory of the flavor, may be of any of them, of the ten, twenty, thirty units, as the case may be, not a general notion, distinct from every one of them, and formed from all of them by a fabrication of my mind."[8] The objector may here urge that the author is once more ignoring that abstraction which everybody makes who constitutes himself a connoisseur in peaches. To that I answer: Yes, when people judge of peaches in the abstract, but not necessarily so when they judge of peaches in the concrete. Indeed Newman expressly makes this important reservation in the words immediately preceding: "*Nor need* such an image be in any sense an abstraction." The mind may make the abstraction, but it does not do so necessarily. Thus I may recall the phantasm of the flavor of a peach which phantasm may arise from the most luscious individual I have tasted, without neces-

[8] *Ibid.* p. 25.

sarily making the abstraction of a universal. On the other hand I may make the abstraction and use it, and compare it with the abstractions drawn from other phantasms. It is in this point that is found the psychological justification of those literateurs who express the sensations of one sense in terms of those of another. By abstracting from Gounod's music and from scented toilet water, both are reduced to immateriality, and so, without doing violence to language, they may be compared and found quite like each other.

Once more, after illustrating the phenomena of passing from particulars to generals, from images to notions, the author says: "In processes of this kind we regard things, not as they are in themselves, but mainly as they stand in relation to each other. We look at nothing simply for its own sake; we cannot look at any one thing without keeping our eyes on a multitude of other things besides. 'Man' is no longer what he really is, an individual presented to us by our senses, but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and contrasts which we have made him suggest to us. He is attenuated into an aspect, or relegated to his place in a classification. Thus his appellation is made to suggest, not the real being which he is in this or that specimen of himself, but a definition. If I might use a harsh metaphor, I should say he is made the logarithm of his true self, and in that shape is worked with the ease and satisfaction of logarithms." Now I confess that with regard to this example I think I should have to use force, and violent force, in order to construe it into a conceptualistic expression. Yet the suggestion has been made. The comparison is between the mental universal and the living concrete man, and not with the nature existing in him. Consequently the passage has no more to do with conceptualism than it has to do with moderate realism or the categoric imperative or the polarisation of light.

The same distinction between the concrete and the abstract man serves also to solve the difficulty of the supposed confusion or rather identification of sense and intellect. "After all, man is *not* a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal."[9] In the dissected abstract man, of course we can separate sensation from intellect and say that the corresponding essences of each are different in kind and not merely in degree. But in the concrete living man we must admit that, though they are essentially distinct, yet they are most intimately mingled together. They are

[9] *Ibid.* p. 94.

faculties of the same undivided indivisible simple soul. The inferring faculty may be *thought of* as stripped of all association with sensation; but in the living man it is never so stripped. In the concrete man there is no such thing as pure thought, such for instance as there is in the concrete angel. Substantially speaking, sensation only furnishes data for the mind to act upon and the mind controls the sensation. But speaking accidentally, sensation has a certain amount of control over the mind. Indeed that is one of the saddest facts of our fallen condition. And it is the endeavor of the mind to obtain complete control over sensation which constitutes the warfare of the Christian. The difference, therefore, between the concrete man and the concrete brute is that the man has a mind which, for the most part, controls his sensations, whilst the brute has no mind at all to control its sensations. In fact, it may be readily admitted that man, in so far as his reason is controlled by his sensation, does share in the nature of the brutes.

There is, however, another very large class of experiences to be taken into consideration which are neither mere sensations nor yet consciously reflex thought. It is that large class of impressions of the mind which are never reflected upon. Newman calls them "simple assents," as distinguished from "complex assents." "Indeed, I may fairly say," he writes, "that those assents which we give with a direct knowledge of what we are doing are few compared with the multitude of like acts which pass through our minds in long succession without our observing them. That mode of assent which is exercised thus unconsciously, I may call simple assent, and of it I have treated in the foregoing section; but now I am going to speak of such assents as must be made consciously and deliberately, and which I shall call complex or reflex assents."[10] Are these simple assents valueless in the building up of knowledge? No. They do influence all subsequent judgments, though they do not carry the same weight as the complex assents. The faculty which appraises their value is the illative sense, that is, the reason working on the implicit as well as on the explicit knowledge, the reason taking the whole experience of the living concrete man into account. This is also the answer to the charge that Newman undervalued evidence. It was not that he undervalued objective or explicit evidence, but that he put it in its proper place. If man must judge on evidence, then let him take *all* the evidence into his reckoning, subjective as well as objective, implicit as well as explicit.

[10] *Ibid.* p. 189.

I cannot but think that it is the neglect of this large class of implicit and purely subjective evidence which leads some men to find a stronger spring of action in abstractions than in realities. They are, I think, chiefly those whose tasks and interests lead them to the abstract sciences. Then by education and occupation they come to be so absorbed in abstractions that these things become to them the "realities" of life; whilst sordid things such as bread and butter and work and wages are little more to them than "notions." Indeed, it is the part of ecclesiastical superiors to keep their eyes respectively on the men with speculative minds and those with practical minds. The former make good professors; the latter, good procurators and administrators. If the former seem to predominate in the literary world it is because they happen to have more time and opportunity to write articles and text-books. And it is they who, if they ever changed their opinions at all, would rather be converted by the smart syllogism, although probably even they would not exclude the less strictly logical basis of conviction.

In conclusion, I would remark that in insisting on these distinctions between abstract truth and concrete, between explicit truth and implicit, there is a principle at issue of far more importance than even the vindication of the fair name of Newman. It is the right of those who favor the subjective method of apologetic to pursue their work without incurring the suspicion of heterodoxy. It is the right of those who seek the Catholic truth by the more personal way—and they constitute by far the great majority of our converts—to do so without afterwards being considered only half-converted. There is a head-logic and there is a heart-logic. They are not contradictory; they are complementary. The syllogism has its place in the great scheme of truth, but it is only the skeleton of truth. The sinews must be laid upon it, the flesh must grow over it, skin must cover it, the spirit of life must be breathed into it. Logic is necessary for the right *expression* of thoughts. Rhetoric, and rhetoric in the true sense of the word, is necessary for the right *impression* of thought. As wax must be melted before the seal can be impressed upon it, so must the human soul be prepared for the Christian revelation. If, as has been declared by the Christian Church from the beginning, the soul was made for God, then there must be in each individual soul a detailed exigency for the detailed truths of faith. And it is the honest humble endeavor of the school of subjective apologists to make a scientific presentment of that exigency. After all, the master-piece of St. Thomas

is but a *Summa*, a synopsis. It needs a Newman to show us how to breathe into it the spirit of life. It is possible to be a thorough-going disciple of St. Thomas and of Cardinal Newman at the same time. The name of Newman stands unquestionably for a sign of the truthfulness of the Catholic priesthood. Similarly it may be held up for a sign of the right to approach the living Truth as Christ said it must be approached, not first by reason and syllogism, but first by the whole heart and the whole soul and the whole strength, and lastly "with all thy mind."

THOMAS J. GERRARD.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE BIBLE:

V. ITS RELATION TO TRADITION.

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

As any other branch of human science, the Higher Criticism of the Bible aims at reaching positive conclusions and doing constructive work. The aim of its true exponents is not to destroy, but to build up. Their ambition is to contribute to the actual advance of Biblical knowledge by means of the best and latest methods of scientific inquiry. For this great and worthy purpose, they gather up data from every available source of information, ascertain facts, test ancient and modern views, put forth conjectures, frame theories, and produce valuable works of all kinds and sizes. Truth-lovers, they welcome any and every particle of truth embodied in old or new positions, and shrink not from the toil necessary to make sure that their own conclusions are correct and to impart them to others. In thus acting, they are conscious of doing what is universally allowed to biologists, psychologists, historians, theologians, etc., in their respective departments of human knowledge, and consequently resent the opprobrious epithet of Rationalistic with which their own efforts and conclusions are freely branded by men little, if at all, conversant with the vast and important field of Biblical Criticism.

Of course, if the questions mooted by the Higher Criticism of the Bible belonged to the sacred sphere of Revealed doctrine, they could not be controverted by any one without making him chargeable with the taint of Rationalism. In vain would he protest against such an accusation, the very fact that he dared to lay an impious hand upon what pertains essentially to the Catholic Faith would stand against him as an undeniable proof of his rash audacity. But if there be a well-ascertained fact, it is that the questions of authorship, date, literary kind, method of composition, etc., that is, the questions discussed by the Higher Critics of the Bible, do not belong to the sacred deposit of Revelation. They naturally fall within the province of literary and historical criticism, and consequently one may freely deal with them anent the various books which make up the Bible,

provided he be careful not to go against the divine character of the inspired writings.

And yet, there is abroad a more or less definite impression that the student of the Higher Criticism underrates the value of "Tradition," that his attitude towards it is that of an open, or at least covert, and in any case unjustified, hostility. His positions, as a Higher Critic, are regarded at once with an instinctive suspicion, and the integrity of his faith is considered as more or less compromised. He is looked upon as an unsafe man, who, carried away by his love of novelty ventures to set himself up against a tradition which goes back to the Jews of old, and which as a Catholic he should respect and defend. The difficulties which, he thinks, offset that venerable tradition have been examined and disposed of by a host of writers during the course of the nineteenth century, so that tradition fully remains *in possession*. In a word, tradition is unquestionably correct, is the standard of truth in Biblical matters, and consequently, neither he, nor any body else, can have a just reason to depart from its authoritative teachings.

Confronted with such undoubted and wide-spread distrust of, and opposition to, himself and his method of work and his conclusions, the Higher Critic of the Bible may well wonder if he has taken the right view of the relation that actually exists between tradition and his own branch of Biblical Criticism. Puzzled he may well feel, when he realizes that people at large expect practically that he shall ascribe the same infallibility to the pronouncements of tradition concerning mere literary and historical questions, as to the sacred teaching of tradition regarding doctrinal and moral matters. Astounded he may well be, when he finds himself treated as an enemy of human tradition,—the only one here in question,—because he does not follow it blindly, because he complies with his duty as a man of science, when, before endorsing tradition fully, he wishes to make sure that it fulfils all the conditions required for its validity. Provoked too he may feel tempted to be, at the thought that his orthodoxy will be suspected as soon as he sets aside or even simply modifies a time-honored and widely-received opinion, although he acts thus out of a desire to use exclusively sound and tried material in rearing the edifice of scriptural science. But whatever his feelings, he clearly sees that he is not guilty of rashness, heterodoxy, etc., and that he is entitled to consider his view of the relation existing between tradition and the Higher Criticism as decidedly more correct than that of his

opponents. In the future, as in the past, he will therefore start on his study of the questions of the Higher Criticism of the Bible by consulting ancient traditions, and also by probing them, fully determined to abide by their verdict if he finds them solid, and only to the extent they are really so. In the future, as in the past, he will examine them most carefully: if he finds upon testing them, that they are only partly correct, he will preciously treasure up their actual amount of truth, diligently add to it whatever particle of truth he may detect in his other sources of information, and thus secure a re-statement of traditions that will make them acceptable to his fellow-workers; if on the contrary, the examination forces him to regard those traditions as groundless and unreliable, he will courageously discard them, saying: *mihi amicus Plato, mihi magis amica veritas.*

In thus acting towards traditional positions, the Biblical scholar views their relation to the Higher Criticism in a sober, matter-of-fact way. He assumes, and indeed justly, that tradition anent the human element of the sacred writings must be given a hearing because it may be right, and must be accepted to the extent in which it is right. The only thing he declines to do, is to take for granted that a traditional view concerning the author, date, literary kind, method of composition, integrity, historical setting, etc., of an ancient production, must be correct always, and in every deatil, and that the Higher Criticism whose real business it is to deal scientifically with such literary and historical questions, has but to bow its head before tradition and to abide by all its dicta, right or wrong. And, indeed, why should he be baldly requested to change his view of the matter? Is it not precisely in virtue of such a relation between tradition and literary and historical Criticism, that, in dealing with the literary productions of the Christian era, the learned Benedictines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, gave to the world their masterly critical editions of the Fathers and Writers of the Church? Would those able editors have done anything comparable to their actual work, if they had felt bound implicitly to trust traditional views concerning the authorship, date, etc., of the ancient Christian literature? And why should the Higher Critic of the Bible be expected to consider the traditional positions of the Jews of old anent their national literary products, as necessarily more trustworthy than those of the ancient Christians regarding the various literary works of the great Ecclesiastical authors?

Of course, it is easy to claim that the ancient Jews actually knew, at the beginning of their tradition concerning a particular book of

Holy Writ, the name of its author. Easy also is it to assume that the name of the author once ascertained has been faithfully transmitted in the course of ages without the least variation. But it is exceedingly difficult to prove that the Jewish tradition connected with several sacred Writings of the Old Testament fulfils these two conditions, as it plainly should do to deserve full credence with regard to the question of authorship. Very easy on the contrary, it is to show that time and again, with regard to this first and foremost question of Criticism, Jewish tradition cannot be implicitly trusted, because clearly deficient in these two requisites for a sound tradition. How, for instance, can Jewish tradition be believed when it ascribes from of old to the prophet Samuel the authorship of our first two books of Kings (i, ii Samuel), since they record his very death, and numberless facts subsequent to his lifetime, and when at a later date, ancient rabbis admit a threefold authorship manifestly opposed to the unity of plan observable throughout these inspired books? Again, in regarding Josue as the author of the book which bears his name, Jewish tradition cannot be seriously considered as correct, since that sacred Writing relates Josue's death and burial, and contains other traces of a date later than Josue's time. In like manner, the authorship of the whole book of Psalms must not, in spite of the ancient Jewish tradition to that effect, be referred to King David, even as a collector of all those inspired hymns, because it includes such poems as Ps. 136 (Heb. 137) which plainly describes the Babylonian Captivity (several centuries after David) as a thing of the past, and as Ps. 78 (Heb. 79) of which our Douay Version itself says that "it seems to belong to the time of the Machabees." The Jewish ascription of all the Proverbs to Solomon is likewise untrue, as plainly appears from the fact that it contains minor collections attributed in the book itself to other writers. With regard to the book of Esther, the most authorized tradition among the Jews is to the effect that it was written by the *Great Synagogue*, whereby is meant a body of Jewish rabbis whose mission it was to settle the questions relative to the Sacred Scriptures, but whose existence is, to say the least, doubtful.

How then, one may naturally ask, does it come to pass that the Higher Critics of the Bible are denied the liberty of questioning the authorship of certain books in virtue of a tradition that often breaks down before ascertained facts? In answer to this pertinent question we will simply quote the following words of A. Condamin, S. J., (Etudes, Nov. 20, 1906, p. 535 sq.): "In works on Introduction and in Diction-

ary articles written by Catholics during the course of the last century, the objections against ascribing the Holy Writings to the traditional authors are refuted *ex professo*, on principle, in virtue of a previous conviction that the Jewish tradition is reliable and almost infallible in this matter, and that it must be maintained at any cost. The difficulties are bound to disappear: they have not, they must not have, they cannot have any serious value. As they are set forth by men in such a frame of mind, it is rare or even impossible that those difficulties should appear in their true light and with all their force. But what does it matter? since, after all, they must give way before the traditional position. . . .

"In Biblical, as in theological matters, *Manuals* have proved very injurious. Manuals deal with a large number of topics in a few words, and hence rapidly and at times superficially. They are not the proper place for the learned discussion of a new theory. The author abides by the opinions which are ascertained, or rather, by those that are commonly received, in order not to arouse opposition or shock the reader; and he acts wisely when he writes for children, for young students, for men who do not need a more complete information. The misfortune is that the author gets into the habit of taking his positions somewhat hastily, of considering them too readily as unassailable, of disposing of his adversary in a few short sentences whose tone, categorical if not disdainful, finally persuades him that his own thesis is solidly proved, and that every other view is false, wrong or even dangerous. In order to be consistent with himself, he defends the same conclusions, with the same ardor, in other works; and finally cherishes them with a kind of passion for the remainder of his life. Few and admirable indeed are those who, after having long admitted and defended certain traditional opinions which they deemed correct, though perfectly free, have the breadth of mind necessary to revise their earlier views by means of a persevering study, and, if they find out their error, have the power of will required to surrender to truth cost what it may."[1]

Thus then, according to the learned Jesuit just quoted, it is not true to say that the Jewish tradition regarding authorship has been thoroughly tested by Catholic writers during the nineteenth century, and proved in all points reliable. The Higher Critic of the Bible

[1]The latest scholar who has thus courageously modified his views is Jos. Knabenbauer, S. J., one of the contributors to the "Cursus Scripturæ" published by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus.

knows this well, and therefore persists in claiming that his view of the relation existing between tradition and his special branch of Biblical Criticism, is correct: tradition may be right; it may be wrong; whence it is the plain duty of the student of the Higher Critism to examine its testimony, and to abide by it to the precise extent in which it is found trustworthy.

That the data of Jewish tradition regarding authorship are not necessarily such as to preclude all inquiry into their exact value, and to forbid all rejection of that value when they prove incorrect, may be shown in several other ways by the Higher Critic of the Bible. First of all, he may point to the variations of the Jewish tradition itself as telling in favor of his view. If the Jewish doctors had considered tradition as to authorship as absolutely binding, they would not have departed from its testimony once it was ascertained. Now, in the course of ages, we find them questioning, modifying, and even setting aside altogether, a traditional position, when it does not seem to tally with the data of Holy Writ. And indeed, who can reasonably blame them for not regarding as absolutely true their primitive tradition respecting Moses' full authorship of "the Law," for admitting a dual authorship of the Pentateuch, since the Pentateuch records Moses' death and burial? Who can reasonably blame them for questioning and rejecting the traditional testimony to the authorship of Ps. 138 (Heb. 139) which ascribes it to Adam regardless of the fact that there is question of Adam's mother in the contents of that Psalm? In the second place, the Higher Critic of the Bible may bid his opponents consider how the Fathers of the Church and ancient ecclesiastical writers act towards the Jewish tradition concerning the authorship of the Sacred Scriptures. As a rule, they simply abide by the title or inscription to a book as it is found in their own translations of the Old Testament, when that title or inscription contains a man's name, and thus their view usually coincides with that of Jewish tradition. It is manifestly in virtue of this that they have referred the Lamentations to the prophet Jeremias; all the Psalms to David; all the Proverbs to Solomon; etc. But when the title bears a woman's name, as is the case with Esther and Ruth, or has no distinct name inscribed, as is the case with the books of Kings, either they say nothing concerning its author, or feel free enough to speak of authorship irrespectively of the data of Jewish tradition. Thus, they do not seem to have ascribed to a particular author the book of Ruth, although the data of Jewish tradition are in favor of Samuel as its writer. Again, while

the ancient tradition of the Jews refers the authorship of Esther to the *Great Synagogue*, Clement of Alexandria considers Mardochai as the author of that sacred Writing, on the basis of Esther ix, 20, whereas Eusebius, St. Epiphanius, St. Augustine, St. Isidore, etc., ascribe the composition of Esther to Esdras. With regard to the book of Job, although Jewish tradition regards Moses as its author, St. Ephrem and St. Gregory think that Job is the writer as well as the hero of the poem. In view of these facts, and of others that could be set forth, the Higher Critic of the Bible may well argue that if Jewish tradition has thus been treated in the Christian Church by her great Fathers and writers, he should not be found fault with for departing from it when he knows that there is a sufficient reason for doing so. In the third place, appeal may be made by the student of the Higher Criticism of the Bible to the conduct of such conservative scholars as Fathers Clair, Gillet, Kaulen, Vigouroux, etc. During the course of the nineteenth century, these writers whose orthodoxy is beyond all suspicion, have deliberately gone against the positions of the Jewish tradition regarding authorship. Despite the fact that tradition had invariably regarded Solomon as the author of Ecclesiastes till practically the beginning of the nineteenth century, Dr. Kaulen, Dr. Bickell, and the Jesuits Condamin, Zenner, Prat, and Durand, have rejected, on critical grounds, that time-honored tradition. Fr. Clair, in his valuable contributions to Lethielleux' Bible translation and commentary, clearly goes against the Jewish tradition when he declares that "the author of the first two books of Kings (i, ii Samuel) is absolutely unknown;" and he discloses his attitude towards that same tradition when he says that "we have not sufficient data to determine who is the author of the book of Ruth." Absolutely alike is Fr. Gillet's frame of mind when he writes in the same series: "The opinion of the Talmud (the uncanonical law of the Jews which records their tradition anent the authorship of the sacred books), which asserts that the book of Esther was written by the Great Synagogue, is not more solid than the other opinions." With regard to Ruth, Fr. Vigouroux declares: "We do not know who is the author of that narrative." Concerning the various opinions more or less prevalent regarding the authorship of the first two books of Kings, the same learned author says: "None of these hypotheses (those of the Jews included) rests on any solid ground; the author of i, ii Samuel is unknown." The author of Esther, according to him, is also unknown. Of course, in the present day, no student of Holy Scripture admits

the view embodied in Jewish tradition that David is the final editor of the Psalter, and Solomon the author of all the contents of the book of Proverbs; no Catholic scholar feels bound to abide by the oldest, and even now best authorized tradition among the Jews regarding the Mosaic authorship of "the Law," which is to the effect that Moses wrote himself the whole Pentateuch under divine dictation, that, in fact, he wrote the account of his own death "weeping." (Cf. Rabbi L. Wogue, *Histoire de la Bible et de l'Exégèse Biblique* jusqu' à nos jours, pp. 21-23; Paris, 1881). At the present day, too, almost all scholars of any note, Catholic and Protestant alike, reject the traditional view of the Solomonic authorship of the book of Wisdom for the simple reason that it was originally composed in Greek; and even the current editions of the Douay Bible affirm in the notice to that sacred Writing: "It is written in the person of Solomon . . . ; but it is uncertain who was the writer." Whence the Higher Critic of the Bible not unnaturally infers that approved Catholic authors agree with him as regards tradition, since they weigh its testimony, modify it when they think this necessary, and abide by it only when they consider it as decidedly correct.

To the foregoing arguments which manifestly go against the general impression that tradition is absolutely binding in questions of authorship, the student of the Higher Criticism of the Bible may add a last one which is of considerable weight. It is drawn from the formal teaching of Catholic theologians in that regard. Father A. Condamin, S. J., (Etudes, Nov. 20, 1906, p. 535) sets it forth in the following manner: "Do the questions of authorship pertain to matters of faith? Assuredly not; and in particular, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, they have no bearing on the dogma of inspiration, except in the very special case where a critical opinion would do away with a perfectly ascertained prophecy. Our best theologians admit this, as a general principle. In learned works, a certain number of Catholic interpreters have, in this free matter, freely given up, at times, the traditional view. When they advocated it, they at least confessed that others were free to hold a different position." And centuries before this learned Jesuit penned the words just quoted, the celebrated Dominican Melchior Canus had written in his excellent *Loci Theologici*, published in 1563 (Book I, chapter xi): "It does not import much to the Catholic Faith, that a book was written by this or that author, so long as the Spirit of God is believed to be the author of it; which Gregory, in his preamble on Job, chap. i, delivers and explains: 'for

it matters not with what pen the king has written His letter, if it be true that He has written it.' Whence in this matter, which does refer to faith (in ea re, quæ ad fidem not pertinet). . . ." From all these reasons, and from others that could be easily brought forth, the Higher Critic of the Bible may, as it seems, validly argue that tradition regarding authorship is not so absolutely binding as necessarily to rule out all examination of its data, all departure from its commonly received conception. And if so, may he not further urge that he should not be blamed all at once, when he claims a like liberty in dealing with the other problems of the Higher Criticism, such as the date, integrity, literary kind, method of composition, etc., of a sacred Writing? These problems naturally cluster around the question of authorship, and in many ways, are of but secondary importance in comparison with it.

In concluding, we subjoin a somewhat long but interesting passage of Fr. Hull, S. J., the able editor of the weekly Bombay *Examiner*. To our mind, it well sets forth the relation which exists between tradition and the Higher Criticism of the Bible, while it gives a plausible account of the antagonism which that branch of Biblical Criticism often meets with on the score of its opposition to tradition. "There is no doubt that opposition to modern Scripture theories proceeds to a large extent from unpreparedness or unfamiliarity. In the first place, it is a lamentable fact that on the whole, Scriptural research, both archeological and philological, was initiated and has for the most part been carried on by non-Catholic scholars. With a few isolated exceptions, no Catholic has contributed any important item of discovery to the progress which has been made. Catholic writers have in recent years embodied into their works certain results derived from outside sources. But the great mountain of new data which we now possess has been built up almost entirely by men who have had no connection with the Church. Until very recent times, little notice was taken of these discoveries by Catholic scholars, nor had much been done to popularize them for the Catholic public. Consequently the first news heard by Catholics in general about new discoveries and new conclusions has to come directly from outside sources: and generally it comes in an aggressive and hostile form. These presentments therefore naturally produce a shock; and the first impulse among Catholics has been to regard them as so many blasphemies, sure to be erroneous because the production of unbelievers. And as the new theories are often presented with ingenious and plausible

arguments, their introduction to Catholics has often been attended with results injurious or at least disturbing to their faith. When the first shock is over, and Catholic scholars begin to study the matter for themselves, they gradually recognize that such theories can be stripped of their objectionable accompaniments, and can bear a better sense than at first appeared. It comes to be seen that after all the traditional view on a certain point is not infallible—that is to say, not a part of divine revelation; that it may be reconsidered, and even abandoned, if modern evidence seems to furnish something better. By further examination, they next begin to see that the theory which was in the first instance so shocking, now after a spell of familiarity seems capable of being accepted without any compromise of Catholic principle.

"We are at the present time passing through a crisis in which all these three stages are represented. There are some who still live in the 'shock' stage; others who have come to the 'reconsideration' stage, and others again who have come to the 'acceptance' stage.

"Of these three stages, the first is of course natural enough, but still irrational and wrong; the third is capable of moderation and also of excess; with the middle stage, which is transitional, no fault can be found. This is in effect what our Holy Father, writing to Mgr. Le Camus, seems to intimate in the following terms: 'As we must condemn the temerity of those who, having more regard for novelty than for the teaching authority of the Church, do not hesitate to adopt a method of criticism altogether too free—[the third stage run to excess]—so we should not approve the attitude of those who in no way dare to depart from the usual exegesis of Scripture, even when, faith not being at stake, the real advancement of learning requires such departure—[the first stage]. You follow a wise course, and by your example show that there is nothing to be feared for the sacred books from the true progress of the art of criticism: nay, that a beneficial light can be derived from it, provided its use be coupled with a wise and prudent discernment' [second stage, and also third stage, where free from excess.]" (*The Examiner*, Sept. 29, 1906, pp. 387, 388).

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

PERSIAN MYSTICS

II. THE REACTION AGAINST ISLAM

William Barry, D. D.

To be well up in the "religious books of all nations" is not perhaps a delightful accomplishment, nor yet without its dangers; but for the modern divine it is fast becoming a duty. To us it now appears not a little strange that in our course at the Roman College we never heard from a professor's lips the name of Mohammed. In like manner, Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, those high teachers who were engaged about the sixth century before Christ in founding systems which have reckoned their disciples by myriads and conquered whole nations, might for all we learned of them have lived and died in another planet. Concerning the Sufis it may be doubted whether so much as their existence was known to our venerable masters. Yet a science had been growing up (some acquaintance with which the present writer then owed to Max Müller's *Lectures on Language*), that undertook to compare, to locate, and from an historical point of view to interpret the multitudinous beliefs embraced by mankind. But we must know before we can judge. And these elementary observations on the mystics of Persia may help younger students to that indispensable knowledge. Explaining the summary in our first article, we continue as follows:

If with eyes purged from prejudice, we travel through the Koran, it will be found a human document of rare interest; but nothing in it will lead us to fancy that its author proposed to veil under his eloquent apostrophes a deep or secret doctrine. "He felt the need," says Troyer in his introduction to the *Dabistan*, "of seizing some safe and essential dogmas in the chaos of Magian, Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian notions." Therefore, "he broke all the figures of planets in the temple of Mecca, and declared the most violent war against all plastic, graven, and painted idols." True, he left for veneration the black stone, formerly Saturn's emblem, in the Kaaba or God's house, and made it an object of pilgrimage to succeeding times. But he abhorred the star-worship of the Sabeans; and his aim was to restore the Monotheism which, as he declared, Israelites and Nazarenes

had alike corrupted. He proclaimed that God is one, and that He is a Spirit; that He neither begets nor is begotten; that the sum of all piety is resignation to the Divine Will.[1] Thus he bursts forth in the celebrated text on the Throne: "God!—there is no God but He, the living, the self-subsistent; slumber takes Him not nor sleep. To Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth. Who can intercede with Him save by His permission? He knows what is before them and what behind them, and they comprehend not aught of His knowledge but what He pleases. His throne extends over the heavens and the earth and it wearies Him not to guard them, for He is high and grand."[2]

But, we say, this proclamation of one God was intended as a preface to the code of Laws which Mohammed drew up; it neither aimed at speculative enquiry nor furnished a hidden way into communion with Allah. In Islam as in the Hebrew Scriptures we find, let us say once more, no metaphysics; all drives at practice; and obedience, not intellectual satisfaction, is the end in view. Between God and His creatures Mohammed comes indeed as a mediator; yet not as a redeemer or a pattern of holy living. Among the last words of Christ was, "Father, forgive them;" the last recorded exclamation of Mohammed was, "O God, pardon my sins; I come to my fellow-citizens on high." He claimed neither miraculous powers, nor freedom from transgressions, nor a supernatural birth, nor even so much as the authorship of those disjointed fragments which undoubtedly were his composition. He died without binding them together. The Koran was edited, as we now call it, when Abubakr reigned, thanks to Omar, who employed one of the Apostle's secretaries, Zaid the Ansari of Medina, to collect and arrange the text. This he did "from palm-leaves, skins, blade-bones, and the hearts of men," presenting the fruits of his labor to the Caliph. But variations in the reading were numerous and went back to the Prophet himself, who did not observe a uniform style. Twenty years passed, and Othman appointed a committee of whom Zaid was one, the other three being taken from the Koreish, to settle the text and establish the true reading. Copies were sent into every part of the Empire; all the older editions were burnt; and from about 660 A. D. Moslems have enjoyed a Scripture in which the variants are of no importance.[3]

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[1] *Dabistan*, I, cxxix. Paris, 1843.
[2] *Koran*, II, 256, Chap. of *the Heifer*.
[3] Palmer's *Koran*, I, vii-lix.

These early believers had set up an inspired text. But who was to determine its meaning? The Apostle had left no succession of prophets, no rules by which to interpret the Book, no priesthood, hierarchy, or monastic institute. The Church was governed by assemblies: the law fell as a prey into the hands of canonists. Four famous lawyers became the heads of as many schools—Abu Hanifa (700-768), Malek Ibn Anas (after 708 to 800), Al Shafei (768-820), and Ahmed Ibn Hanbal (780-856). All these were Sunnites. They professed to follow the tradition as it came down from Mohammed; boasted of their orthodoxy, scorned metaphysics, and strongly condemned the holders of Al Kalam, or literary pretenders, who dared to expound Scripture by reason, and borrowed their wisdom from Aristotle or Plato (the Motazirites and Asharians).[4]

To the year 863 is generally assigned the definite Shiah Schism, —contemporaneous, we may observe, with Photius at Constantinople, whose intrusion called down the censures of Pope Nicholas I and marks the rending of East and West into hostile Churches. But whereas the sects we have mentioned were more strictly schools of jurisprudence, the Shiites, not in this unlike the Byzantine Greeks, represented a nation, a literature, and an *orbis terrarum* of their own. It was the awakening from a long sleep of the Persian genius which neither Arabs nor Syrians could forever subdue.

As is known to everyone, the quarrel had broken out over Mohammed's succession. Not as though a second Apostle could take his place. He summed up all in himself, was the last and greatest. But the Church required an overseer and the Prophet a vicar. Living, he had accepted under that name his first cousin, son-in-law, and primitive convert, Ali, known to after ages as the "Lion of God." Let us quote Gibbon: "The son of Abu Taleb," he remarks, "was in his own right the chief of the family of Hashem, and the hereditary prince or guardian of the city and temple of Mecca. . . . The husband of Fatima might expect the inheritance and blessing of her father . . . and the two grandsons of the Prophet had often been fondled in his lap and shown in his pulpit, as the hope of his age and the chief of the youth of Paradise. The first of the true believers might aspire to march before them in this world and the next."[5]

But Ali was passed over and Abubakr, Omar, Othman chosen, other kinsfolk of Mohammed. Only as fourth in the sacred dynasty

[4]Sale's *Koran*, Introd. 107-113.

[5]Gibbon, VI, 269. Smith's edition.

could he reach the throne; and he fell a victim at Kufa to the poisoned sword of Ibn Muljam the Kharejite (661 A. D.) His two sons, Hasan and Husain, were murdered. An elder branch of the Prophet's race, the Ommeyads, contrived to hold the Caliphate in Damascus from 661 to 750. The Abbassides, who overthrew them, were descendants of Mohammed's second uncle, Abbas, and junior to the line of Ali. Yet fortune aiding them, the succession remained in their house until 1258, when Hulagu the Mongol seized Baghdad, executed Mustassim, and destroyed every member of the "holy family" on whom he could lay hands. The Fatimite and other Caliphs of Egypt, Morocco, and Spain, who assert their descent from Ali, were not recognized in Eastern lands. But as early as the year 700 a new article had been added by multitudes in Irak and Persia to the common faith. Rejecting tradition as a whole, these Protestants of Islam declared that Ali was by divine right the Vicar of God, equal if not superior to the Apostle himself; his only genuine successors were the Imams, who had sprung from his murdered children; and the rest were usurpers. Even the Abbassides once and again pretended to be heirs of the soldier-saint whose legend melted men's hearts. Persians gladly took up his claims and went on pi'grimage to Kufa, where he died—a shrine which now rivalled Mecca. And the dynastic quarrel broadened into a religious controversy, under shelter of which old and strange beliefs rose, as it were, from the grave.[6]

"Persia," said the French historian Michelet, "is the great high road of mankind." Certainly it has been a meeting-place for all religions. There is some ancient deep connection between the Hindu Nature-worship and the Dualism which we ascribe to Zoroaster. No critical student can be unaware of the Persian vestiges in our Old Testament from Cyrus onwards.[7] The extraordinary diffusion of a secret cultus dedicated to Mithras or the Sun all over the Roman Empire, in the second and third Christian centuries, is a well known fact, bearing witness to the same recurring influence. Many and perplexed as were the Gnostic systems which disputed the Western world with Christianity, in all of them we trace a doctrine of emanations from the Supreme Unknowable God, such as will take us back to the first of the Magians and forward to the most distinguished among Sufis. The rites and dogmas of the Persian Manes (216-277) were celebrated from the borders of Hindustan to the schools of Carthage

[6]S. Guyard, *Encyc. Brit.* xvi, 592 seq.; Muir, *Caliphate.* London, 1892.

[7]Later sections of Isaiah, Books of Zechariah, Esther, Daniel, Tobias, Esdras, I-IV.

and Rome. They inculcated a gross material philosophy, yet with arguments so persuasive as to win the assent of Augustine in his earlier years. Mohammed and his genuine disciples hated above all idolaters those who worshipped fire. We cannot read the Arabian Nights without feeling how intense is the loathing of every good Moslem for the Magian or the Gheber, whom he fears as much as he detests, and on whom he fastens a ritual of blood exactly similar to the story which for generations has been hung like a millstone round the necks of Eastern Jews.

By the sword and the Koran that Parsi religion had been vanquished; but while the nation survived it could never be rooted out. In tale and poem it lingered on; its adherents took refuge in remote provinces or fled to India; but many thousands who submitted ostensibly to the conquering creed were dissenters at heart. From time immemorial the East has been honeycombed with secret societies. It is the home of "the Lodge." Its people delight in mysterious associations, in passwords, talismans, and symbols, by which they shall attain to "magic" power. The very word that has dropped from our pen bears evidence to a reputation for theurgic wisdom enjoyed during some twenty-three centuries by the disciples of Zardusht. Magic and theosophy go hand in hand. To Orientals it is the only science. The religion of their mystical teachers may be a doctrine on paper, but of necessity it is first an experience. At all times, indeed, men have attributed to the saints dominion over nature; by prayer and austerity miracles are wrought. But who is sufficient for these things? We return to our history.

Gibbon places "the fall of the religion of Zoroaster,"—which had lost the sovereign power since 651—under the Buyide dynasty between 933 and 1020. But the Buyides were Turks, not Moslems; Persia was lost to the Caliphs of Baghdad 304 years after the Hijra; and at this very time Firdusi rose up, to chant in undying verse the *Epic of Kings*. Therein old Iran, with its faith, its heroes, and its victories over the stranger, took its place by the side of Hellas in Homer's *Iliad*. If the Koran is a Bible for Arabs, the *Shah-Nameh* answers it with a Persian chronicle of immensely greater poetical force, and of as enduring an inspiration.

Firdusi, "the man of Paradise," was born near Tus of Khorasan in 940 A. D.; he completed the Epic in 1009; and died in 1020. His name written at length was Abul Kasim Mansur, from which Arabic style we learn that in profession he could be nothing else than Moslem;

but his works give evidence of quite another spirit. We may liken Firdusi to Shakespeare on this ground, at all events, that he throws into forms of sublime poetry a world which lay in the past, and with its romantic episodes created a literature for his people. As Shakespeare was not a Protestant when he wrote plays, but a medieval Catholic, so Firdusi doffed his Mohammedan garb when he sang the glories of Iran. Gathering from far and wide the traditions of that age-long struggle between North and South, he wove them into a rhyming history, which was instinct with noble thoughts, grandly free from the unchastened fancies by which other Eastern poets too commonly degrade their writing and themselves, while it preached a lofty theism, and exalted man's power of choice. Firdusi proves, once for all, that Aryans, even though Asiatic, knew how to breathe a pure and spiritual sense into those fundamental beliefs which Mohammed so rudely and so violently taught, of God's justice, judgment, and Providence. He trusts in the victory of the Good, but it comes to pass by heroic human effort, by free will cleaving to virtue, and is greater than destiny, however mortal things appear subject to Fate. His management of the Fire-worshipper's creed is delicate, never betraying him into the heresy of co-equal principles, though rivals impeached him on that score and he was compelled to answer them with fierce invective. Honestly read, he is just as little of a Manichean as is the ordinary Christian.[8]

It had been well for the poetic divines who came after him, if instead of yielding to a nerveless or suicidal Pantheism, they had imitated his faith. There is nothing in Firdusi flaccid, sentimental, extravagantly sensuous, or which tends to the absorption in trance that has ever been the peril of Asia. He was intensely loyal to his nation and its beautiful, witty language; but he did not waste the strength of either in effeminate conceits. And so the great Persian uprising against foreigners bore its finest fruits in the *Shah-Nameh*. Firdusi excels all other poets of his people as decidedly as Jelal of Rum excels its other mystics. From the royal chronicle our Sufis might have borrowed as much of their mythology as was not in the Koran; their Monism and its evil consequences they derived from elsewhere.

Whence, then, it will be asked. The answer is not easy. We find it admitted on all sides that during the ninth and tenth centuries

[8]The *Shah-Nameh* was published by J. Mohl in Persian and French, 6 vols., Paris, 1850-'66; Italian by Pizzi, 8 vols. Turin, 1885-'89; *Epic of Kings*, by H. Zimmern, London, 1883.

Greek ideas, in the main Platonic, were current among Mohammedans, resisted by the fanatical orthodox multitude, and finally beaten off the stage when the Koran was taken to be eternal and uncreated. But something of their influence remained. Can we be sure that in the revolution which we are now considering, Eastern, that is to say, Indian systems did not play their part? Firdusi's poem, which comprised well-nigh sixty thousand distichs, was dedicated to Mahmud of Ghazni, who had given him the commission. How the king rewarded the poet is a tragic tale, not for this place. But the Ghaznevide (997-1028) was a fiery Moslem. Twelve times he carried the holy war into Hindustan. He captured Lahore and Delhi, destroyed temples, smote idols, and planted his religion along the Ganges. Are we to believe that the civilization thus trampled on did not take its revenge? From of old India possessed its sacred books and systems of philosophy, which could not fail, when they were known, powerfully to react on the Persian mind. Anyhow, it is significant that in our eleventh century a new doctrine raises its banner among the Iranians; and that, while it handles the Koran sceptically and flounts the *ulema*, it aspires to a union with God which we cannot distinguish from absorption into Him. That is the heart of Hindu theology and the soul of the Sufis. We will consider some of its aspects in due course.

William Barry.

ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI IN MODERN CRITICAL THOUGHT

Ernesto Buonaiuti, D. D.

St. Francis is perhaps the most attractive character to be met with in the whole range of Christian hagiography, as well as the most eminent type of spirituality that has graced the history of the Italian peninsula. This fairly accounts for the persevering activity displayed by both ecclesiastical and lay writers[1] in studying the life and works of the saint; the former recognizing in him a most remarkable imitator of the Divine Master, the latter extolling his pacifying power over the "communi" of the Middle Ages where they still find his influence reflected in the blithesomeness and buoyancy of the Italian popular spirit, so calm and well balanced in its estimation of life, so bright and happy amidst the attractive surroundings of ever verdant fields under a sky of perennial azure. This lively historic interest in everything pertaining to the "poverello" of Assisi is furthermore justified when we advert to the carefully drawn conclusion at which modern critics have arrived, viz., that neither the historical nor the legendary documents which emanated so copiously from among the early followers of the saint are at one in giving a consistent picture of him, nor are they by any means agreed even as to the nature and characteristics of his preaching.

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[1]The following are the principal works that have appeared on the question during the last three years. H. Boehmer, *Analekten zur Geschichte des Franciscus von Assisi.* Tuebingen, Mohr, 1904. H. G. Rosedale, *St. Francis of Assisi according to Brother Thomas of Celano.* London, Dent & Co., 1904. W. J. Knox Little, *St. Francis of Assisi, his times, life and works.* London, Isbister & Co. 1904. H. Felder, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franziscanerorden bis um Mitte des XIII Jahrhunderts.* Freiburg i. B., Herder, 1904. W. Goetz, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte des hl. Franz von Assisi.* Muenchen, Perthas, 1904. P. Sabatier, *Examen de quelques travaux récents sur les opuscules de S. François.* Paris, Fischbacher, 1904. (*Opuscules de critique historique, X*). F. Tarducci, *Vita di S. Francesco d'Assisi.* Mantova, Mondovi, 1905. S. Minnocchi, *La leggenda antica.* Firenze, Biblioteca scientifico-religiosa, 1905. G. Schuerer, *Franz von Assisi.* Muenchen, Kirtheim,1905. U. d'Alençon, *Les opuscules de St. François d'Assise.* Paris, Poussielgue, 1905. P. Robinson, *The Writings of St. Francis of Assisi.* Philadelphia, The Dolphin Press, 1906. N. Tamassia, *S. Francisci Assisiensis vita et miracula, additis opusculis liturgicis, auctore fr. Thoma de Celano.* Romae, Desclée, 1906. U. Cosmo, *Rassegna Francescana. in Giornale storico della Lett. it.*, Aprile, 1906. G. Garavani, *La questione storica dei Fioretti. Rivista st. cr. delle Sc. T.*, 1906. F. Tocco, L'*ideale francescano*, in *Rassegna nazionale*, 16 maggio, 1906.

The time is gone by when writers, of real value indeed, but more pious than critical, such as Wadding, blindly relying on the written annals of the Franciscans, believed that nothing was required for the production of an ideal biography of the saint, beyond the artistic fusion of the elements contained in these records. In our own day a careful and more discriminating study of the documents has demonstrated what indeed might have been unhesitatingly affirmed a priori, viz., that the Franciscan movement, like all great movements of public conscience, did not long retain the original character and impress given to it by its author. Answering as it did to a real and general need of the times, it soon attracted innumerable followers, but with numerical expansion came naturally a relaxation of fervor, and soon there appeared leaders who deemed it necessary to adapt and bring down to the level of the multitude the principles and precepts which St. Francis had formulated for the guidance of an elite—of a select few who under the spell of his enthusiasm were capable of realizing to some extent the beautiful ideal of evangelical peace which at that time had been so shattered by the conflict of the empire with the papacy, and also by the struggles of nascent municipal freedom against the thraldom of autocracy. Hence arose in the order itself a division which soon became quite manifest.

The first followers of Francis, those whose vocation had involved a real sacrifice of privileged social positions as well as the hard task of triumphing over the frivolities and passions of youth, insisted on the observance of the primitive rule in all its integrity; others, less hercically inclined, pleaded for a tempering of the regulations and wished to have them relaxed especially with regard to poverty which was the real basic principle of the Franciscan reform.

These opposing tendencies are necessarily reflected in the writings of the time emanating from the two parties. Each of these pretends to be the sole legitimate inheritor of the spirit and ideas of the humble founder, and each strives to substantiate its claim by quoting his words and representing his life in such a way as to confirm its own view. This preoccupation on the part of the Saint's followers is responsible for the existence of a great number of legends and "specula" which for us, children of a much later generation, are the cause of no small embarrassment, for they hinder us from obtaining a true idea of St. Francis, and make necessary to that end a careful documentary study—a task which, hard in itself, is rendered doubly so by the opposition of those critics and biographers who with dogmatic

assurance claim to have said the last word on the subject. The object of the present paper is to point out briefly the more probable conclusions arrived at by modern writers concerning the available sources for a reconstruction of the biography of St. Francis, and to touch upon another question intimately connected with the first, viz., what was the real aim and program of the saint.

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Chief among the sources at the disposal of the student are naturally the writings of St. Francis himself, of which Boehmer has given us a very accurate and complete edition. They are the following: *Regula prima non bullata*; *Fragmenta regulæ ante bullam Honorii papæ III conscriptæ*; *Epistola ad quemdam ministrum*; *Regula bullata*; *Forma vivendi sororibus S. Claræ data*; *Ultima voluntas quam scripsit sororibus S. Claræ*; *Testamentum*; *Verba admonitionis*; *Opusculum commonitorium*; *Epistola ad capitulum generale*; *De reverentia corporis Domini*; *Laudes de virtutibus*; *Canticum fratris solis*; *Laudes Dei*; *De religiosa habitatione in eremo*; *Epistola ad fratrem Leonem*; *Cartula fratri Leoni data*; *Salutatio beatæ Mariæ Virginis*. This rather long list does not imply that the original writings of St. Francis are by any means voluminous. They are very short compositions, forming altogether only a small octavo volume of seventy pages, and they are either the result of the vehement outpourings of the seraphic spirit of the saint, or were composed by him for the benefit of his followers, or were written on various occasions, but never with the purpose of setting forth systematically the views and ideas of the author. It goes without saying that such compositions furnish little or no chronological or biographical information—indeed, to conceive of St. Francis in the rôle of an autobiographer would seem well nigh a contradiction in terms—but the sagacious reader finds in them not a little that throws light on the refined psychology and peculiar spirit of the saint. How significant, for instance, is the short salutation placed at the beginning of the letter to Brother Leo, wherein Francis inverting the order of the regular formula writes: "F. Leo f. Francisco tuo salutem et pacem," showing at once his great humility. And how sublime is the hymn of the creatures to the "Altissimo, onnipotente, bon-signore," etc., which is one of the loftiest creations of Italian poetical genius, as well as one of the most beautiful songs that the rapturous love of nature has ever elicited from a human soul.

But, as has been already remarked, it would be impossible to gather from these sources alone a biography of St. Francis, though

they do throw light on the character of the saint and may serve as a means of control in appreciating the biographies which very soon became numerous among his disciples. Like many other great personages in history, Francis exercised a mysterious fascination over men and accomplished a lasting social mission, not by his writings but by his warm and inspiring exhortations, by the deep impression made by his example, by the living eloquence of his whole life. The writings ,the object of which was to perpetuate his memory and his ideas, are the work of a later generation.

The most important of the biographies those which are at present the object of much animated controversy among critics, are the following: *La prima Vita* written by Tommaso da Celano; the *Legenda trium sociorum;* the *Speculum vitae S. Francisci et sociorum ejus;* the *Secunda vita* by Tommaso, in two parts, and the *Legenda* of S. Bonaventure. This mass of documentary material is really embarassing on account of its profusion and lack of harmony. We shall note first what is positively known concerning its growth and compilation, next that which is more or less conjectural in that connection—tentative views subject to revision should new light be forthcoming from the discovery of new manuscripts or from other critical researches.

St. Francis died at the "Portiuncula" on a Saturday evening, October 3d., A. D. 1226. The disappearance of the founder naturally accentuated the dissensions which had already sprung up among his followers. Brother Elias, who had been the confidant of the saint and who, nevertheless, was much inclined towards moderating his rules, had already held at that time for five years the office of "general minister" of the order under the title of "vicar." He was in great favor with Cardinal Ugolino, who in 1227 succeeded Honorius III as Gregory IX. Being a man capable of wielding authority, and endowed with a calm, calculating, practical mind, Elias foresaw the special mission to which the Franciscan order was called in that period of history so fraught with grave consequences for the Church. While heresy was invading France and northern Italy, while the representatives of the imperial power were waging an obstinate war against the political prerogatives of the papacy, while the people eager for freedom were gazing with jealous eyes on the conflicts of the powers, the Franciscan order seemed destined to strengthen by means of its immense popularity the authority of the Church, having to that effect aroused in mens' souls a powerful wave of Christian religious feeling. The heretical movement which had been brewing for several centuries and had appeared

from time to time under various names was but the religious expression of the chronic hatred entertained towards the ecclesiastical hierarchy—hatred which had its origin from the time that the bishops, coupling the sword with the crozier, began to assume the rôle of secular "barons."

Over against this attitude the aim of the Franciscan movement was to show that the Church is really a powerful force making for peace and harmony, that Christianity and true freedom are perfectly compatible, that the Gospel alone, interpreted by legitimate authority, is the true root of all happiness. As a matter of fact, Francis himself never had this end in view. A soul entirely free and detached from things of earth, appearing as a strange and beautiful flower on the green fields of Umbria—he felt that his mission was to speak forgiveness and detachment to his violent and bloodthirsty fellow countrymen; through these simple and artless means did he hope to effect the desired spiritual reform, and thus he avoided as far as possible all contact with the ruling powers, disclaiming any official authorization or sanction for the exercise of his beneficent activity. But it is often the lot of great men to initiate movements, the importance of which soon surpasses by far the expectations of those who set them on foot, and thus the order of the Friars Minors in passing under pontifical supervision was destined to become soon a powerful support of the papacy during a period of nascent and lawless democracy.

Brother Elias understood the situation and the new mission which the course of events was shaping for the followers of St. Francis and tried to advance its interests. But the new program could not be carried out without giving up much of the severity characteristic of the original Franciscan discipline. Great poverty and humility are not the means whereby the world is ruled, and so Brother Elias, who had been a teacher in Bologna,[2] sought to bestow on the Franciscan institution the pomp of wealth and the prestige of learning. But the order as a body was not yet prepared to fall in with the new ideas, and in consequence the Chapter of 1227 elected John Parenti to the office of "General Procurator." This, however, did not change the plans of Elias who desired first of all to erect a magnificent tomb to the memory of St. Francis, a thing which might well seem incongruous with regard to a founder who had on one occasion caused a community of his disciples to give up their abode because it was said that they owned the house

[2] *Frère Elie de Cortone.* Paris, Fischbacher, 1901.

in which they lived.[3] On March 29, 1228, Elias received as a gift the ground on which the great basilica was to be constructed, and on the 17th of July of the same year, the day before the canonization, Gregory IX laid the corner stone of the new edifice. In less than two years from that date the basilica was finished and ready to receive the body of the saint. Meanwhile Fra Tommaso, of a noble family of the Abruzzi, who had entered the order in 1215 after having received a good literary education, was commissioned at the command of Pope Gregory to write the biography of the founder. His work, of which D'Alençon made a definite critical edition, is notable for its rashness. Together with a deep sense of veneration for his hero, he exhibits throughout a partisan bias of which he may have been unconscious, but which was well nigh inevitable when we consider that the work was brought out having for its promoter Gregory IX, and under the supervision of Brother Elias.

The latter is always spoken of as the authoritative custodian of the legacy bequeathed by Francis to his disciples, while Angelo, Leo, Matteo, and Illuminato, who were the austere expounders of the master's ideas are never even so much as mentioned. This partial attitude on the part of the biographer appears plainly in his description of the last moments of St. Francis, which runs as follows: "When he (Francis) saw that his last hour was nigh—the precise moment of which he already knew from a revelation accorded to him three years before—having called together those of the brothers whom he wished, he imparted to each a particular blessing according as was revealed to him from on high, acting thus after the manner of the patriarch Jacob blessing his sons, or again after the pattern of Moses who, about to ascend the holy mountain divinely prepared for him, bestowed abundant blessings upon the children of Israel. Now while the little group of disciples were seated around the saint to receive his blessing, he crossed his hands, placing his right hand on the head of Brother Elias who chanced to be seated on his left. And having no longer the use of his eyesight, he asked: 'Upon whom does my right hand rest?' 'Upon Brother Elias,' they answered. 'That is what I wish,' he replied, and then he continued: 'Thee, my son, do I bless particularly and in all things, and, as through thy hands the Most High has increased my brethren and children, so in thee and through thee do I give my blessing to them all. May God the king of all things bless thee in Heaven

[3] *Spec. Perf.* ii 6. Ed. Sabatier p 15. Q. II. Quod nolebat beatus Franciscus stare in cella dicebatur esse sua.

and on earth. I bless thee as far as I am able and more than I am able; and what I am unable to impart, may it be given thee by Him to whom all things are possible. May God remember thy toil and thy labors, and may the reward thereof ever follow thee. Every blessing that thou desirest thou shalt receive, and whatsoever thou shalt ask for worthily shall be fulfilled.'"[4]

The partiality of the solemn narrative is made still more manifest when two chapters further on we find the following lengthy circumlocution employed to designate one of the brethren of the stricter school. "One of his brethren and disciples whose fame is not a little notorious, and whose name I judge better to withhold, since being still in the flesh he would not wish to glory in such a prerogative, saw . . . etc."

A biography characterized by such one-sided views and special pleading could hardly prove satisfactory to the brethren of the other party who had been devout witnesses of the saint's life and teachings, who had heard him lay such stress on strict poverty, and who were now to behold with sorrowing hearts the lowering of his lofty ideal to the level of worldly transactions. Few in number, they endeavored to make up for their numerical inferiority by the daring energy displayed in their deeds as well as in their exhortations. Thus Brother Leo was one day seen to rush into St. George's and smash the urn which Brother Elias had placed on the tomb of the saint to receive the offerings of the faithful. This antagonism naturally increased in proportion as the influence and power of Elias declined. Elected General in 1232, his position in the order became that of a real dictator, but his luxurious living, the grandeur of his projects and the strict obedience which he exacted from his subjects soon caused him to lose the sympathy and support of his brethren. So great was the opposition towards him in the chapter of 1239 that his protector Gregory IX was forced to announce his dismissal from office, whereupon ensued between the ambitious "minister" and the aged pontiff a lively quarrel, which became the scandal of all Christian Europe. The biography of Tommaso da Celano in which Brother Elias appeared surrounded by an undue halo of praise was therefore no longer circulated as the sole authentic account of the saint's life. A new biography was wanted which would meet the constant need of seeking inspiration in the words and deeds of the founder, without, however, exposing to doubt the simple souls of the brethren. It might be expected that the new work would embody

[4] 1,108.

rigoristic tendencies, but not so. For though Brother Elias had lost favor, the tendency toward relaxation had survived his fall, and his successors Albert of Pisa (1239–40), Aimone of Faversham (1240–44), Crescenzio of Tesi (1244–47), governed the order on practically the same lines that he had laid down during his administration. Thus the ideas of Brother Elias were retained when personally he had lost favor and influence. The explanation of this apparent contradiction is to be sought in the need which was being more and more felt of rendering more practical the original beautiful ideal of the enthusiastic "Poverello."

At all events, as soon as Crescenzio of Tesi was elected, he asked that any of those brothers who knew anything about St. Francis should put their reminiscences in writing and send them to him. This he did with a view to a new "legenda," the compilation of which was again entrusted to Tommaso of Celano. Of the works preparatory to this biography only the *Legenda trium sociorum* (Leo, Angelo and Rufino) is extant, and this is incomplete, as is clearly shown by Sabatier.[5] The striking disproportion between the prologue, in which the three companions of St. Francis present their work to the General, and the meagre contents, to say nothing of the surprising lack of a detailed account of the saint's later years, goes to show that the "legenda" was arbitrarily mutilated before it was circulated among the communities of the order.

This loss, however, is not irreparable, since we find the missing material embodied in the second biography written by Tommaso, the first part of which deals with the life of St. Francis, while the second is devoted exclusively to his teaching concerning poverty and humility—teachings which could have been related only by the three companions, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that the biography was composed at the beginning of the administration of John of Parma (1247–57) who was extremely zealous.

But the vicissitudes of the Franciscan literature did not end here. While the order was under the guidance of John of Parma, there crept in strong tendencies towards the opinions embodied in the works of the famous Abbot Joachim (†1202). The apocalyptic promises of the "seer" of Florence found a new and responsive echo among the followers of St. Francis, and had the effect of unsettling them in the possession of their peaceful heritage. For ten years the expectation of the "kingdom of the Spirit" disturbed the tranquillity of the Franciscan

[5] *Vie de s. François.* p. lxi.

communities until the election of Bonaventure to the office of General. Although an ascetic in the fullest sense of the word, the new General was endowed with a great practical good sense and prudence. Though exceedingly contemplative he was safeguarded from eccentric speculation by a deep sense of orthodoxy. He was a "savant" according to the learning of the time, but not a worshipper of science, nor was he inclined to exaggerate the claims of reason. He was a devout admirer of St. Francis albeit not fully understanding his master's peculiar spirit; a faithful observer of the rule though reasonable in favoring the modifications that had been brought into it through ecclesiastical authority. Such was Bonaventure who was thus a superior well qualified to check the Joachimite movement which had disturbed the equanimity of the brethren, to restore definitely to the figure of St. Francis, which had been blurred by passing into the domain of legend, something of its true historic outline, and finally to exhibit in him a typical founder of a religious order. The chapter of Narbona held in 1260 assigned to Bonaventure the task of writing a new biography of the saint; three years later he delivered the finished work to the chapter of Pisa, and in 1266 the chapter of Paris enjoined that his biography should be universally accepted as authentic, "suppressis aliis quibusque legendis." This supreme decision did not, however, entirely check the tendency to make use of special memoirs and stories suitable to illustrate and recommend the divergent views of the two parties, for, as a matter of fact, the conflicting ideals were never brought into unison.[6] Indeed it became a fashion to put together disconnected and fragmentary passages gathered here and there from earlier biographers in an attempt to obtain a more perfect picture of the saint by combining selections from various sources, somewhat after the manner of a composite photograph.

Such in brief is the series of attempts to tell the story of St. Francis and his first followers—attempts which have become the center of an extended discussion known as the Franciscan question. The chief points at issue are the following: What historical value should be attributed to the work of Tommmaso of Celano, and what is to be thought of the *Legenda trium sociorum*. Paul Sabatier in his Life of St. Francis, analyzing one of the eclectic or compositive narratives—

[6] A group of rigorists continued to defend the sacred inviolability of the first inspiration and ideals of the order to the point of thereby falling into heresy. See *Practica Inquisitionsi haereticae pravitatis*. Ed. Douay, p. 278.

the one known as the *Speculum vitae S. Francisci*[1]—undertakes to divide it into its original elements, and the attempt has been productive of some very important results. Investigation showed that the beginning of the work was made up of some chapters from the *Legenda* of St. Bonaventure, that a whole series of chapters were but faithful reproductions of the *Fioretti;* that others embodied extracts from St. Bernard, while others contained Franciscan formularies of prayer. What was left after eliminating this borrowed material was found by the learned critic to be so homogeneous in its austere and enthusiastic spirit that he concluded to an exact correspondence with the ideas embodied in the *Legenda trium sociorum.* This led to the further conclusion that this residue was made up of authentic fragments of the *Legenda* which had been preserved from the mutilations of Crescenzio by transcription on the part of devout rigorists. The fact that in this reconstructed portion of the *Speculum* are found several passages which are quoted by Ubertino of Casale and Angelo Clareno as the work of Brother Leo, confirms the foregoing hypothesis.

Continuing his researches, Sabatier reached other conclusions more definite and more important, and which, notwithstanding the discussions of which they have been the object, are, we think, well founded and accurate. The document extracted by him from the *Speculum vitae* (edition of 1509) comprised 118 chapters. Of these, 116 were later discovered by him in a manuscript of the Mazarine Library (Cf. Catalogue par Molinier, Paris, 1885, II, 423) which contained eight chapters more than the aforesaid document, but began with these words: "Incipit speculum perfectionis status fratris minoris beati Francisci," and closed with the following important passage: "Explicit speculum perfectionis status fratris minoris scilicet beati Francisci in quo scilicet vocationis et professionis suae perfectionem potest sufficientissime speculari. Omnis laus, omnis gloria sit Deo Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto. Honor et gratiarum actio gloriosissimae Virgini Mariae, ejusque sanctae martyri Kunerae, magnificentia et exaltatio beatissimo servo suo Francisco. Amen. Actum in sacro sancto loco Sanctae Mariae de Portiuncula et completum V Idus Maji, anno Domini MCCXXVIII." A passage found in the body of the manuscript informs us that "after the second rule made bv Blessed Francis was lost, he went up into a certain mountain with Brother Leo of Assisi and Brother Bonizo of Bologna" (Chap. I); and in another place we read "But we who were with him when he wrote the rule" etc. (Chap. II).

[1] *Speculum Perfectionsi, seu s. Francisci Assisiensis legenda antiquissima, auctore fratre Leone, nunc prium edidit P. Sabatier.* Paris, Fischbacher, 1898.

From such passages Sabatier reasonably infers that the writer was precisely Brother Leo, who was one of the three companions, and, in fact, his conclusion is strongly confirmed by the frequent repetition of the words: "we who were with him."... He next undertook the task of examining the internal features of this document and he found that they answered well to the character of Brother Leo as revealed in the *Legenda trium sociorum*. Thus the acute scholar could well be proud of his new completed biography of St. Francis, while the newly discovered documents confirmed in a striking manner the results of his critical investigations. He was of the opinion that the remaining part of the *Legenda trium sociorum* was embodied in a section of the *Speculum vitae*, when a new document was brought to light containing the same section of the *Speculum* but in more ample form and bearing a date which was not 1246 but 1228. This would make the manuscript contemporaneous with the first biography of Tommaso da Celano, whose work it seemed to offset by favoring the views of the stricter school. But it is asked by some if Sabatier was justified in preferring as a biographical source the *Speculum vitae* or the *Speculum perfectionis* to the rhetorical but moderate work of Tommaso, and it was hardly to be expected that his conclusions on this head would not be called in question.

According to Minocchi most of the chapters of the *Speculum perfectionis* come from Brother Leo about 1246, and the others (about 40 in number) are a later imitation, while Van Ortroy (*Analecta Bollandiana*, t. XIX, f. 2) holds that the *Legenda trium sociorum* is a more or less arbitrary compilation made in the latter part of the XIII century and denies that either it or the *Speculum* has any value as an authoritative source. Minocchi furthermore thinks he can discern in the *Legenda trium sociorum* the biography of St. Francis written by the notary John of Ceprano.

But the one who dissents the most from the theory of Sabatier is Gaetz, who arrives at conclusions diametrically opposed to those of the French critic. In general he holds that, examined intrinsically, the Franciscan sources in question do not betray any evidences of having been composed under the influence of party spirit, that the biographies of Tommaso are quite reliable and that the *Speculum* was not composed with a view to favor the cause of the rigorists. Coming to particulars he asserts that the *Speculum perfectionis* does not embody to any appreciable extent authentic primitive material, because, he claims, of the 124 chapters comprised in the work, 50 are not anterior to the time of its

final redaction, 43 are partially derived from older documents but retouched, leaving only 31 which might be a matter of discussion. Of these last ten only may be anterior to the second biography of Tommaso da Celano. In fine, the words "qui cum eo fuimus" that are found in twenty chapters are insufficient to determine the origin of the entire document since the genuineness of that expression is absolutely certain in only six chapters. Sabatier has promised to reply to the strictures of Gaetz whose views he appreciates for their calmness of statement, though he does not consider the arguments on which they rest to be very convincing. It is also the opinion of the present writer that the position of Sabatier has not been weakened by the researches and arguments of his critic.

In the first place, the assertion that the Franciscan sources do not reflect in their composition the strong opposing tendencies then at work in the order is surprising, to say the least, although an attempt is made to substantiate it by the quotation of a few texts. Mere internal evidence is not always of itself sufficient to furnish an adequate idea of documentary sources; these must be carefully scrutinized in the light derived from the surroundings from which they emanated. At all events, we cannot compare with one another the various Franciscan documentary sources without being struck by the great psychological differences that characterize the respective authors. If we read a passage from the *Legenda trium sociorum* after having perused one from the second biography of Tommaso, or a chapter from the *Legenda nova* of St. Bonaventure, these differences reveal themselves in nearly every sentence, and it is indeed very hard to account for them otherwise than as a result of a different party spirit which animated the writers. As to the *Speculum*, it appears to the present writer to be penetrated throughout by a deep spirit of abnegation; the very joy of the seraphic founder singing the beauties of nature seems to beam forth from every page, and the love of poverty that it reveals is as strong as that of St. Francis, only applied more fully to things spiritual—qualities which go to show that the work emanated from one of the earliest followers of the saint. There is, for instance, a chapter (ii, 4) concerning a novice who wished to have a psalm book of his own, which is so naif and gives such a living picture of the personages that we can never persuade ourselves that it is only a later conventional compilation.[8] The style and phraseology

[8]The chapter runs as follows: "...Cum ergo venisset beatus Franciscus ad locum ubi erat ille novitius dixit ille novitius: 'Pater, mihi esset magna consolatio habere psalterium, sed licet generalis illud mihi concesserit, tamen vellem ipsum habere,

are not so pure as in the work of Tommaso, but it is here, it seems to us, that the Franciscan spirit is more plainly revealed than in any other source. In it we are brought back to the days of the foundation and we behold the perplexities of the saint who in the last years of his life had to witness the creeping in of elements foreign to the original institution and the diminution of the pure spirituality which had characterized its beginnings.

So far as Fra Tommaso is concerned, there are strangely conflicting theories. While Gaetz and d'Alençon maintain strongly his veracity and good faith, Tamassia impugns his work in a dissertation full of detail and animated by an exceedingly malicious spirit. To the latter writer the Franciscan question is very simple. According to him the only sources worthy of consideration from the point of view of historical value (little though that may be) are the first and second biography of Tommaso; all the others are but later recasts dependent upon them. Of this two-

Pater, de conscientia tua.' Cui beatus Franciscus respondit: 'Carolus imperator, Rolandus et Oliverus et omnes palatini et robusti viri qui potentes fuerunt in praelio, prosequendo infideles cum multo sudore et labore usque ad mortem, habuerunt de illis victoriam memorialiter, et ad ultimum ipsi sancti martyres sunt mortui pro fide Christi in certamine; nunc autem multi sunt qui sola narratione eorum quæ illi fecerunt volunt recipere honorem et humanam laudem. Ita et inter nos sunt multi qui solum recitando et praedicando opera quae sancti fecerunt, volunt recipere honorem et laudem.' Ac si diceret: non est curandum de libris et scientia sed de operibus virtuosis quia scientia inflat et caritas aedificat. Post autem aliquot dies cum sederet ad ignem beatus Franciscus idem, novitius iterum locutus est ei de psalterio. Et ait illi beatus Franciscus: 'Postquam habueris psalterium concupisces et volueris habere breviarium. Et postquam habueris breviarium sedebis in cathedra tanquam magnus praelatus, et dices fratri tuo: apporta mihi breviarium.'

Haec autem dicens beatus Franciscus cum magno fervore spiritus, accepit de cinere et posuit super caput suum, et ducendo manum super caput suum in circuitu sicut ille qui lavat caput, dicebat: 'Ego breviarium, ego breviarium!' Et sic reiteravit multoties, ducendo manum per caput. Et stupefactus et verecundatus est frater ille. Elapsis autem pluribus mensibus, cum esset beatus Franciscus apud locum s. Mariae de Portiuncula, juxta cellam post domum in via, predictus frater iterum locutus est ei de psalterio. Cui beatus Franciscus dixit: 'Vade et facias de hoc sicut dicet minister tuus.' Quo audito frater ille coepit redire per viam unde venerat. Beatus autem Franciscus remanens in via coepit considerare illud quod dixerat illi fratri, et statim clamavit post eum dicens: 'Expecta me, frater, expecta! Et ivit usque ad eum et ait illi: 'Revertere mecum, frater, et ostende mihi locum ubi dixi tibi quod faceres de psalterio sicut diceret minister tuus.' Quum ergo pervenisset ad locum beatus Franciscus genuflexit coram fratre illo et dixit: 'Mea culpa, frater, mea culpa, quia quicumque vult esse frater minor non debet habere nisi tunicam sicut regula sibi concedit, et cordam et femoralia, et qui manifesta necessitate coguntur, calceamenta.' Unde quotquot fratres veniebant ad eum pro habendo consilio ejus super hujusmodi, hoc modo respondebat eisdem. Et quia saepe dicebat: 'Tantum homo habet de scientia, quantum operatur, et tantum est religiosus bonus orator, quantum ipse operatur, nam arbor ex fructu cognoscitur.'"

fold source Tamassia claims to have made a special study never attempted by anyone else, and certainly he seems to have arrived at some strange and unwarrantable conclusions.

After picturing somewhat incompletely the religious conditions of the time of Innocent III, and pointing out a number of heretical tendencies then lurking in various quarters, Tamassia declares that Francis was really a heretic. "Francis," he says, "came from a mercantile family. Now it is known that men of that profession were the active propagators of the Albigensian errors. Moreover, he lived in a city not at all friendly to ecclesiastical rule, which had stuck to its cold absolute policy in spite of the 'signorie' and the free municipalities; he lived in the midst of the disturbances of doctrines and of civic order; in a time when the attractions of heresy were enhanced by the force given to it in Italian thought; when both he who was condemned and fell and he who pronounced the condemnation and triumphed, invoked with equal confidence the name of Jesus—amid such surroundings as these arose Francis of Assisi, a symbol and apostle of peace and love" (p. 30). "But, as a matter of fact," he continues, "such is not the picture of the saint which has come down to us from Tommaso or even through the works of the stricter brethren." For these our critic has no use, and even of Tommaso he says that he is an official, well informed biographer, who, in his first work has described his hero as being humble and orthodox with a view to harmonize his reform with the exigencies of Roman authority, and who again in the second biography has traced an ideal of religious perfection which is impracticable, unreal and fantastic. To prove this radical and novel theory Tamassia compares at great length and with much detail the two biographies with various other medieval hagiographical documents, his object being to show that Tommaso had no intention of giving a true portrait of the "Poverello," but was rather intent on adorning it with all the characteristics with which the traditional hagiography had surrounded the conventional type of the Catholic ascetic.

We would not feel justified in rejecting as fruitless the work of Tamassia as a whole; rather we think that directly or indirectly it will help to throw some light on the questions at issue. We are far from denying that the mind of Tommaso was well furnished with hagiographical reminiscences, and especially is it to be granted that he was familiar with the works of Gregory the Great, and that he possessed a knowledge of things sacred and religious which was quite exceptional in his age. But from the mere fact that in his narratives he has made

use of forms and phrases found in more ancient writers, and that he has drawn the picture of Francis by employing the imagery which is the stock in trade of the general hagiographical tradition, it does not legitimately follow that the portrait is distorted or radically false. That it is not faithful in all respects we readily grant, for we are thoroughly convinced of this fundamental fact, viz.: that Tommaso, though writing at a time when the echo of the saint's preaching had scarcely died out, composed his biography with the purpose in mind of furthering these tendencies in the order which he knew to be in favor with Gregory IX and to put forward Brother Elias as the privileged disciple.

Furthermore, Tamassia, who is thoroughly familiar with medieval literature, has the credit of being the first to call attention to the affinity between the hagiographical writings of the Middle Ages and the works of Tommaso. But it must not be forgotten that the study which has for its object to determine the historical value of the biographies is quite distinct from that which busies itself with their character and literary form. The first refers chiefly to the veracity of the author and his knowledge of the events narrated, the second takes account of such topics as style, method, literary independence, etc. of the writings in question. Tamassia believes in treating the two simultaneously, and thus, according to him, the work of Tommaso is devoid of historic value, because, from the literary standpoint, it bears the impress of the hagiographical works in which are depicted the lives of the earliest Benedictine monks or the contemplations of the Fathers of the desert. By thus identifying the two questions, viz. of substance and of form, he reaches some rather paradoxical conclusions, and naively suggests some commonplace observations which at times become grotesque. It will not be amiss to illustrate this by quoting a few examples.

"Tommaso," remarks our critic, "constructed the two opening paragraphs of his first biography by combining together ideas, phrases and words borrowed *undoubtedly* (the italics are his own) from St. Gregory the Great, Juvenal and St. Augustine. Gregory's opening lines of the biography of St. Benedict gave him the first inspiration; the miserable end of the boy who had fallen into the habit of swearing, mentioned in the *Dialogues* of the same writer, and the conversion of St. Augustine, jumbled together with some classical reminiscences of the *Satyr*, complete the tableau." (p. 44).

But these alleged reproductions are confined to short phrases and incidents, and do not prove even a literary dependence upon the works referred to, but rather they are made use of as the natural vehicles whereby to convey similar ideas—a thing most natural, when we recall that hagiography had long before acquired a vocabulary of its own with which Tommaso must have been familiar.

Thus he begins his narrative: "Vir erat in civitate Assisi;" Gregory begins his reference to St. Benedict: "Fuit vir" etc. (*Dial.* II, 1.) Is it not little short of puerile to claim that here Tommaso has copied Gregory? How indeed, on that score could he have expressed himself in such a way as to avoid the charge of plagiarism? St. Augustine tells us that he was converted on the occasion of reading a book; Francis is described as converted by a friend, who, however, is mentioned by Tommaso as a mere witness, and consequently the circumstance exhibits only a very remote analogy with the episode of St. Augustine.

"The enthusiasm," writes Tamassia," that is displayed in the description of the beautiful bride, viz.: evangelical poverty, appears to me to have some relation to the splendid dream of John the Almoner." But when the two passages are placed side by side, we are convinced that their interdependence can be perceived only through the lens of a strong preconception. Here is the passage from Tommaso:

"Dicebat se in Apuliam nolle ire, sed in patria propria promittebat nobilia et ingentia se facturum. Putabant homines quod uxorem ducere vellet, ipsumque interrogantes dicebant: 'Uxorem ne ducere vis, Francisce?' Qui respondens eis aiebat: 'nobiliorem et pulchriorem sponsam, quam unquam videritis ducam, quae coeteris forma praeemineat et sapientia cunctas excellat.'" The passage from the *Vita Joannis Elem.* (Migne, LXXIII, 345) upon which the other is supposed to be copied is as follows: "Video una noctium, in somnis, puellam quamdam, cujus species supra solem splendebat: aestimavi esse Mulierem. . . .'Ego sum prima filiarum regis.'"

Finally among the passages in which the weakness of Tamassia's argumentation is most fully revealed, we note the one in connection with the famous episode immortalized by the artistic genius of Giotto. It is the scene where Francis in presence of the bishop who is sitting in judgment, divests himself of his garments which are relinquished to his angered father and he is received by the bishop under his mantle. Tamassia begins by casting a doubt on the possibilityof such a trial being brought before a bishop at a time when the rulers of the municipalities were so jealous of their prerogatives; then he proceeds to deny the his-

torical truth of the event, alleging that Tommaso was led to thus symbolize the detachment of the saint from things of the world, and his taking refuge under the shelter of the Church, because the author had in mind and wished to reproduce certain texts of the *Lives of the Fathers* and the *Monastical Institutions* of Cassian. The passage runs as follows: "A young man who had made up his mind to renounce the world was all at once surrounded by a troop of demons; whereupon he quickly takes off his clothes, throws them away and runs naked to take refuge in a monastery. Meanwhile God speaks to the abbot saying: 'Arise and receive my athlete who is coming to you.' On receiving admission he renounces all right to his worldly possessions, and learns with satisfaction that according to the rule of the monastery he will not be allowed to own even his clothes. Thereupon he is surrounded by the monks and his nakedness is covered by the religious garb at the hands of the abbot." It is hardly necessary to say that comparisons of this kind carry with them their own refutation. By following this method it would be easy to call in question the authority and originality of documents the most authentic, simply because they exhibit by fortuitous coincidence, words or phrases found in writings of an earlier date.

And besides, in the present case it is difficult to understand how Tommaso writing only two years after the saint's death was obliged to fall back on any hagiographical reminiscences, or how, by accumulating these he could have radically altered the physiognomy of his hero without provoking a protest on the part of the multitudes both in Italy and elsewhere in whose memory the image of Francis must have remained still vivid from having seen him and listened to his preaching. On the contrary, the conclusion to be drawn from the general resemblance of the picture of the saint as it appears in the various written or popular legends, is, that notwithstanding the influence of party spirit, a substantially true record of his life has been preserved, at least in outline, and this record can be easily reconstructed and completed by eliminating certain touches due to a spirit of partisanship, and discreetly blending the different sources which to some extent are mutually complementary.

* * *

So much for the question of the sources; a word must now be added concerning the ideal of St. Francis.

It must not be supposed that the religious brotherhood brought together by means of the life and teachings of the saint assumed from the very outset the character of a well organized regular order. On the contrary, the movement inaugurated by the ecstatic Umbrian exhibits at its inception the peculiar characteristic of being without form or organization, in accordance with his strong wish to do away with all stiff, mechanical discipline, all that implied distinctions among the brethren, all mediums of authority—in a word, all merely positive or arbitrary restriction of Christian liberty.

Not unlike the first spread of the Gospel was the early dissemination of the Franciscan ideas (down to the year 1209). It was a great stirring of the public mind owing its origin not to any initiative on the part of the ruling powers lay or ecclesiastical, but to the marvellous influence of a "poverello" whose dearest ambition was to be considered as the least among his brethren. The movement was by no means called forth by the need of adding another religious order to those already in existence; it sprung rather from the deeply felt necessity of bringing together in a bond of brotherhood all those who from a deeper understanding of the Gospel felt themselves called to become the promoters of peace and charity among men.[9] Substantially the Franciscan movement began in the same way as did that of the Waldenses, of the Humiliati and others who sought to effect the purification of society through the democratic spirit of evangelical poverty—the only means which seemed available to check the lawless violence and strife which was constantly menacing the common welfare.

This is the less known aspect of the Franciscan movement, viz.: its correspondence to the social needs of the time, its political and economical causes, its relation with similar movements of the age; on these heads even the work of Sabatier is inadequate, partly on account of the over deferential attitude of the author.

But while the democratico-religious tendencies and agitation of these times—generally animated by a strong hatred of Roman authority—led to schism (not heresy) in southern France and Lombardy, the Franciscan movement originating in Umbria, a province so intimately connected in history with the destinies of Rome, and besides, imbued with a strong spirit of Catholicity, showed itself free from insubordination and was always guided in such a way as to maintain towards

[9]Cf. Mandonnet, *Les origines de l'ordo de poenitentia. Comptes-rendus du quatrième congrès scientifique international des Catholiques tenu a Fribourg en Suisse*, 16-20 d'Aout, 1897.

Rome and the papacy an attitude of orthodox submission. It is undeniable that Francis looked upon Rome as the authentic source of discipline as well as of doctrine; the center also of all collective religious life destined to be fruitful in the church. But this was in him not so much an attitude of the soul as a reasoned conviction due chiefly to his religious education, and in this respect he exhibits two opposing tendencies. In theory and on principle he is bound by strict obedience to the Holy See, but in practice he is unable to understand its aims, and he allows himself a goodly amount of liberty in following its suggestions. Rome, fearing that the movement aimed at autonomy with regard to the hierarchy and its authority, endeavored to check it, to keep it under the constant supervision of the Curia, and to impose upon the brethren a systematic rule of life. But Francis nevertheless persists in allowing them full freedom to come and go as they please, to go through the fields when the reapers gather the harvest, to go through the cities where the commercial revival of Italy is in progress. In 1218, impelled by his apostolic zeal, Francis left his native Italy. During the two years of his absence the order under the able direction of Brother Elias, assumed for the first time something of a regular organization. Hearing of it, Francis returned in haste, but he found things so far advanced in the direction of systematic regularity that he gave up all hope of reverting to the primitive unorganized condition. The rule was definitely promulgated in 1221. During the last years of his life Francis was so chagrined by the later developments of the order as compared with the ideals of its humble beginnings that he wholly abdicated his authority. But by this time his great work was really accomplished; all Europe had been stirred by his appeal for peace, and everywhere was felt the stimulus of the new evangelical life.

The primitive rule contained this clause: "Arma mortalia contra quempiam non recipiant, vel secum ferant." This precept, which may appear to a later generation as more or less superfluous, was of great importance at a time when the soil of Provence was red with the blood of the Albigenses, at a time when the cities of Italy were engaged in bitter feuds, and taking sides in the great struggle between the papacy and the empire—between Innocent, Honorius, and Gregory on the one side, and Barbarossa, Henry and Frederick on the other.

Francis preached love towards the Creator and love towards our fellow men; he preached with the eloquence of an example that has never been reproduced, the complete detachment from wealth as a source of peace, as the starting point of a more energetic life of the soul.

At the time of his birth Calabria was still agitated by the recent apocalyptic announcements of the seer of Fiora; and the towns of Lombardy—overjoyed by the victory of Legnano where Italian bravery had particularly distinguished itself—were anxiously awaiting the dawn of a new epoch in history. That dawn went forth from Assisi, the Orient of Dante; and to the desolate medieval populations, who still bore in their flesh the marks of the feudal chains, Francis revealed the consoling scheme of restoring all things through love. After all, it matters little if in the space of a few years the Franciscan tree seemed to languish: it matters little if the newly engrafted shoots of wealth and learning (two things of which the "poverello" was always afraid) seemed to dry up its very sap; for the words of peace and love spoken by the seraphic founder were still re-echoed in the souls of men, dilating them with higher hopes and inspiring them with a stronger determination to be faithful and zealous in their apostolate of peace and love.

In the great events of history it is difficult to appreciate to what extent the leaders are influenced by the multitude and *vice versa*, but in all such movements both factors should be taken into account. A personality like that of St. Francis is always sure to leave on mankind a deep impression of its own. Around his tomb flourished the new born arts of the Renaissance; around it gathered the "communi" of Italy, and there they received a strong inspiration in the direction of true civilization; and, what is more, there went forth from it a spirit which was gradually assimilated by the Italian consciousness, and which continues to exert its benign influence even in our own day, when the struggle of the masses for industrial amelioration, like that of the "communi" of old, causes us to sigh again for the dawn of a more Christian civilization.

E. Buonaiuti.

STUDIES

DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

AN EXEGETICAL STUDY. (I)

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

The teaching of the Roman Catholic Church regarding the important and vexed question of divorce is well-defined and well-known. Catholics are expressly taught that after the Christian marriage has been validly contracted and consummated, divorce cannot be allowed for any reason. Separation for sufficient cause may indeed be lawful, but re-marriage during the lifetime of either consort is positively forbidden under the pain of adultery. They are also taught that this strict doctrine is based on Our Lord's very injunction concerning such a marriage, and that consequently, no human power, whether of Church or State, can lawfully authorize the re-marriage of either husband or wife, so long as the bond of holy matrimony has not been sundered by death.

Such is the plain teaching of the Church of God, "the pillar and ground of the truth" (I Tim. iii, 15). Its correctness is certain even irrespective of the fact that it is embodied in the inspired records of the New Testament. Before a single line of the sacred Scriptures of the New Law had been written, the Church existed and was in possession of the oral teaching of her divine Founder on this important point. Christ's words were the law regarding the question of divorce among the Christians of St. Paul's time, and it is to this fact that the Apostle of the Gentiles bore distinct testimony when he wrote to the faithful of Corinth: "As to the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband . . . and that the husband dismiss not his wife" (I Cor. vii, 10). It is true that, at an early date, this authoritative pronouncement of Jesus was embodied in the sacred records of Christianity. But, of course, such event did not invalidate the previous testimony of the Church to Our Lord's doctrine concerning divorce. It simply added to the hitherto unwritten Christian tradition, a written one to which we may even now appeal confidently to prove that the present Catholic teaching on this

point is no other than that which is ascribed to Christ in the early documents of our faith. As a matter of fact, the use of the most recent methods of literary and historical criticism simply confirms the conclusive character of this appeal. And the present exegetical study will show that the more thoroughly the passages of the New Testament bearing on the question of divorce are investigated in the light of modern criticism, the more also it becomes evident that the Catholic doctrine regarding divorce is identical with the teaching of Our Lord which is recorded in these passages of Holy writ.

The following is the order in which we shall examine these passages: (1) Mk. x, 2-12, which teaches directly the absolute indissolubility of the marriage tie; (2) Lk. xvi, 18, and I Cor. vii, 10-11, which also inculcate that indissolubility without any restrictive clause; (3) I Cor. vii, 12-16, which contains what is known as "the Pauline Privilege"; (4) Mt. xix, 3-12 and v, 31-32, in both of which is found the significant clause "except for fornication." The present paper will be devoted to the study of Mk. x, 2-12.

St. Mark's section may be rendered directly from the Greek, as follows:

Mk. x.

2. And Pharisees having approached
asked Him:
Is it lawful for a man to put away a wife?
3. But He answering, said to them:
What did Moses command you?
4. But they said:
Moses allowed to write a bill of divorce
and to put away.
5. But Jesus said to them:
For your hardness of heart
he wrote you this commandment.
6. But from the beginning of creation,
male and female he made them.
7. On account of this a man shall leave his father and mother,
and shall cleave to his wife;[1]
8. and the two shall become one flesh;
so that they are no longer two, but one flesh.
9. What therefore God has joined together,
let not man put asunder.
10. And in the house again the disciples asked Him
concerning this.

[1]This line is doubtfully genuine in St. Mark's Gospel. Fr. Jos. Knabenbauer, S. J., (in Marcum, p. 261), thinks that it was added from Mt. and lxx. Tischendorf, Westcott-Hort, etc., reject it because absent from the Sinaiticus and Vaticanus MSS. It is certainly genuine in Mt's parallel passage (Mt. xix, 5b).

11. And He says to them:
Whoever shall put away his wife
and shall marry another,
commits adultery against her;
12. and if she, having put away her husband,
shall marry another,
commits adultery.

The opening verse of this section bears the distinct impress of St. Mark's personal style and primitive simplicity, which we have repeatedly pointed out in our preceding Studies on the Synoptic Gospels. It begins with the direct rendering of the Hebrew conjunction ו *και* (and); leaves understood the precise object of the verbs "asked," "tempting," although this object, "Jesus," has not been named in the preceding context; and gives only at the end of the whole sentence, the clause "tempting Him" which a more studied, but also less primitive narrator, than St. Mark, would have coupled directly with the word Pharisees" at the beginning of the verse as qualifying that subject,[2] and would have placed before their words of inquiry: "Is it lawful for a man to put away a wife?"[3] as being the secret motive which prompted Our Lord's enemies to ask Him this captious question. In particular, Mk's opening verse quotes that question in its primitive form. First of all, it naturally speaks of a man's right to divorce "Is it lawful for *a man* to put away his wife"? for the Mosaic Law granted to the husband alone the power of severing the marriage bond. In the second place, it records the words of Our Lord's adversaries in that unconditional form which is invariably found in the other places where the first three Gospels speak of a question put to Jesus as a "temptation" to Him.[4] Lastly, it has the exact wording that was suggested by their desire of betraying Him into a flagrant opposition to Moses, the great lawgiver of Israel. They do not inquire "when," "under what conditions," etc., divorce may be lawful among them, for this could place Jesus in opposition only to Hillel, or Shammai, or other contemporary authorities on such topics. Their question bears on the very lawfulness (Is it *lawful*?) of divorce. They know that the Law permits a man to put away his wife. Does Jesus think this to be right? such is the purport of their question. In asking it, they hope to draw from Him a statement contrary to Moses;[5] and by simply saying: "Is it lawful

[2] This is done by St. Matthew, as we shall point out when examining Mt. xix, 3-12.

[3] Mk's wording "to put away *a* wife" instead of "*his* wife," is also a very primitive form of expression.

[4] Cf. Mk. viii, 11; xii, 14, 15; Mt. xvi, 1; xxii, 17-18, 35-36; Lk. x, 25; xi, 16; xx, 22, 23.

[5] Cf. B. Weiss, *Das Marcusevangelium und seine synoptischen Parallelen*, p. 330.

for a man to put away his wife?" they think that they leave Him no escape from the alternative of an unconditional "yea" or "nay:" Is it lawful, *or not*, for a man to put away his wife? As is well stated by a recent Protestant writer:[6] "These Pharisees wish to know if Jesus considers *divorce* to be wrong. They have, no doubt, heard such rumor about Him, and they ask the question not from an honest desire to understand His position and compare it with their own, but 'tempting' Him. If what they heard about Him is true, then He is setting Himself up against the Law, which explicitly recognizes divorce, and if He can be induced to make such a statement publicly, they will have a good charge against Him."

That this is the correct interpretation of the mind of the Pharisees appears also from the manner in which their question was met by Our Lord, and which is naturally recorded in St. Mark's very next verse:

Mk. x, 3.
But He answering, said to them:
What did Moses command you?

Jesus clearly saw that the question put by His enemies bore on the lawfulness of divorce; and this is why He immediately referred them to the Law which determined what was lawful for them. He no less distinctly realized that no one would be asked by orthodox Pharisees: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" unless he was regarded as liable to respond in the negative; and that, as worded, their question was meant to elicit a definite and immediate answer. In view of this, He returned at once an answer, as was expected of Him; but He purposely gave it an interrogative form: "What did Moses command you?" which the Pharisees had not anticipated. They had hoped to take Jesus unawares, and to obtain such a reply as would appear to all in contradiction with the Mosaic Law. But in answering their question by a question, He manifestly did not commit Himself to any position, and so foiled their insidious plan.

It will be noticed that the Pharisees did not complain that Our Lord had misconstrued their intention. They were conscious that the view He had taken of their question and of its purpose was absolutely correct. In consequence, they hastened, as is implied in St. Mark's brief introductory formula: "but they said," to specify the regulation of Moses which they had in mind when they put their ques-

[6] Prof. Allan Menzies, *The Earliest Gospel*, p. 188 sq. (Macmillan and Co., 1901).

tion, and against which they still hoped that Jesus would set Himself up publicly:

Mk. x. 4.

> But they said:
> Moses allowed to write a bill of divorce,
> and to put away.

They thus referred Our Lord to Deuteronomy xxiv, 1-4, a passage classical among them concerning divorce. In its full form, the Mosaic enactment therein contained reads literally as follows:

Deuteronomy xxiv.

1. When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, and it cometh to pass, if she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found in her some indecency, that he writeth her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out of his house.
2. and she departeth out of his house, and goeth and becometh another man's [wife],
3. and the latter husband hateth her and writeth her a bill of divorce, and delivereth [it] into her hand, and putteth her out of his house; or if the latter husband, who took her as his wife, die;
4. her former husband who put her away, is not allowed to take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled, for this is an abomination before Yahweh, and thou shalt not cause to sin the land which Yahweh, thy God, giveth thee [as] an inheritance.[7]

The prompt and short reference of the Pharisees to this passage of the Mosaic Law, bears, in their answer to Our Lord as it is given by St. Mark (x, 4), the distinct impress of primitive simplicity and rabinical accuracy. Although Jesus had asked: "What did Moses *command* you?" His adversaries carefully refrained from using in their reply the verb "to command." They employed the verb "to allow," and said: "Moses *allowed* to write a bill of divorce and to put away," so as to bring their answer into a strict harmony with Deut. xxiv, 1-4. In this passage, Israel's lawgiver decides explicitly not that a man is allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but that having thus divorced her, he must not take her back after she has contracted a second marriage. At the same time, as can readily be seen, in framing that decree Moses assumes the validity of the act whereby the man has dismissed his wife, and in this way permits the practice of divorce under the condition that a man shall supply his wife with a bill of divorce. Whence it appears that Our Lord's adver-

[7]This is practically the direct rendering from the Hebrew, suggested by Prof. S. R. Driver, who justly finds fault with the one given in the Authorized and the Revised Versions.

[8]Note in Mk. x, 4 b c, the absence of the object for the verbs "to write," "to put away," which is one of the features of St. Mark's primitive simplicity.

saries were particularly careful in answering: "Moses *allowed*," instead of saying: "Moses *commanded*," "to write a bill of divorce and to put away." Nor were they less careful in omitting all reference to "the indecency" spoken of in Deut. xxiv, 1, as the cause for which a man would be justified in divorcing his wife. This expression of the Mosaic Law was the object of an ardent discussion in the Jewish schools of the time: while Shammai understood it solely of unchastity, Hillel took it to include almost anything calculated to render a woman distasteful to her husband.[9] Now, the Pharisees purposely did not make so much as an allusion to it, because it was their intention to set Jesus publicly at variance with what was then regarded by all as allowed by Moses. Besides, in so doing, they were consistently pursuing the aim which had prompted them to ask simply Our Lord: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" with a view to preclude every escape from the alternative of an unconditional "yea" or "nay."

As His adversaries have given a positive answer to the question of Jesus, so it now behooves Him to return a positive answer to their inquiry. This He does at once, and indeed with such distinctness that none of His hearers could easily be mistaken as to His exact mind concerning divorce:

Mk. x.

5. But Jesus said to them:
   For your hardness of heart
   he wrote you this commandment.
6. But from the beginning of creation,
   male and female he made them.
7. On account of this a man shall leave his father and mother,
   and shall cleave to his wife;
8. and the two shall become one flesh;
   so that they are no longer two, but one flesh.
9. What therefore God has joined together
   let not man put asunder.

Whoever examines impartially this answer of Our Lord, will readily admit that the one purpose which pervades it and makes it a continuous whole, is to show, in direct opposition to the Pharisees,[10] that divorce is decidedly wrong. It is with this end in view that Jesus bids at once His opponents to take notice of Moses' frame of mind in writing that part of the Law to which they have just appealed.

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[9]Cf. S. R. Driver, *on Deuteronomy*, p. 270 sq.

[10]This direct opposition is denoted by St. Mark's use of the Greek particle δέ (but) to introduce this answer of Jesus. (Cfr. Mk's similar use of that particle in his preceding verses).

He urges that the lawgiver of the Jews drew up this enactment in view of their hardness of heart. As he knew but too well the inner unfitness of his contemporaries for a higher and better law, Moses deemed it a practical necessity to tolerate what he did not see his way to suppress. Hence Our Lord's stern indeed, but deserved, rebuke:

> For your hardness of heart
> he wrote you this commandment.

In hearing it, Jesus' adversaries must have realized at once how telling it was against their own position. It pointed out to all present, the temporary character of the Mosaic legislation regarding divorce. As the Jewish lawgiver had framed it in view of a temporary necessity, it could be only of a temporary duration. Centuries therefore after it had been promulgated, its *raison d'etre* might very well have ceased; so that one, like Jesus, might pronounce against it, without conflicting with it. Again, Our Lord's statement disclosed to His hearers Moses' personal aversion to the practice of divorce. It was because he had not seen his way to forbid it altogether, that Israel's lawgiver had allowed its existence among the Jews. Whence it clearly appeared that in considering divorce as wrong, Jesus far from being at variance with Moses, was in positive harmony with him. The only way for the Pharisees to evade the force of this part of Our Lord's argument would have been to show that in Deut. xxiv, 1-4 there was no trace of a desire on the part of the Jewish lawgiver of meeting the evil inherent in divorce and of discountenancing its practice. But they must have known too well this passage of the Mosaic Law,—one very much discussed at the time, as we have said,—not to feel that such an attempt could not even be thought of. In settling in Deut. xxiv, 1-4,—and this is the only point directly settled in the passage,—that a man must not take back his divorced wife after she has contracted a second marriage, Moses manifestly wants to compel the husband to pause before severing the marriage tie by means of a bill of divorce. This commandment duly warns him that whatever his present ill-will towards his wife, he had better be careful before proceeding to a regular divorce. He might regret such a step after a while. Chances are that his dismissed wife will meantime contract a second marriage, and he must bear in mind that in such contingency he will no longer be free to take her back. Again, this same commandment contains an implicit invitation to the husband who has actually divorced his wife, to consider the advisability of taking her back while it is still

time, viz.: before "she was defiled"[11] by her union with another man. It thus appears that as far as an enactment can readily disclose Moses' desire of discountenancing the practice of divorce, the commandment he has directly inscribed in Deut. xxiv, 1-4 discloses it. Besides this explicit commandment, Deut. xxiv, 1-4, contains an implicit one, the very one to which the Pharisees had directly referred Our Lord, in their answer: "Moses allowed to write a bill of divorce and to put away," meaning thereby that Moses had permitted divorce under the condition that the husband supply his wife with such a document.[12] The fact that the only divorce whose validity was assumed in Deut. xxiv, 1-4, was one accompanied by the writing of a bill of divorce, had rightly led the Jews to consider this writing as required by their great lawgiver for a lawful dismissal of a man's wife. Now to what did this regulation point if not to Moses' distinct consciousness of the evil consequences of divorce, and to a desire on his part of discouraging its use as far as it lay in his power? Moses knew to what undesirable extent the right of divorce vested in the man, placed a wife at the mercy of her husband; and since, owing to the hardness of heart of his people, he did not see his way to abolish divorce altogether, he wanted to regulate it in a manner that would effectively deter them from its use. Of such a nature was manifestly his regulation that the husband must supply his wife with a bill of divorce. Many a man who would have easily put away his wife by simple word of mouth, would naturally feel deterred from dismissing her by the consideration that if he wants to do so he will have to write a bill of divorce and to get it signed by willing and reliable witnesses. Again, the writing of that bill would necessarily compel a husband to reflect that once in the possession of his divorced wife the document will be an undeniable proof that he has deliberately and regularly put her away, and that consequently, she is henceforth perfectly entitled to refuse a reconciliation with him, however sorry he may feel for

[11]This expression which is used of the marriage of a divorced woman in Deut. xxiv, 4, is the one applied to adultery in Levit. xviii, 20; Number v, 13, 14, 20. Hence the significant remark of Keil: "The marriage of a divorced woman is thus treated implicitly as tantamount to adultery, and the way is prepared for the teaching of Christ on the subject of marriage, 'Whoever marrieth her that is put away, commiteth adultery' in Mt. v, 32."

[12]Apparently the answer of the Pharisees formed a *consequential* sentence, in which the consequence was expressed by the simple conjunction ו which is represented by καί, in St. Mark's Gospel. It is in view of this that Prof. Allan Menzies (*The Earliest Gospel*. p. 189) renders Mk. x, 4, as follows: "Moses allowed a man to put away his wife on writing a certificate of divorce for her."

having dismissed her, or even to contract a second marriage which will for ever separate her from him.[13]

It is plain therefore that the Pharisees could not gainsay directly Our Lord's pungent remark:

> For your hardness of heart
> he wrote you this commandment.

They could not deny the restrictive and temporary character of the Mosaic enactment concerning divorce. Still, they could object that a man was not wrong in using a permission granted, however reluctantly, by the great lawgiver of Israel. And it is to preclude this possible objection of His adversaries, that Jesus proceeds at once to show how despite[14] the toleration of divorce by Moses, divorce is radically wrong for the people of God:

Mk. x.

6. But from the beginning of creation,
   male and female he made them.
7. On account of this a man shall leave his father and mother,
   and shall cleave to his wife;
8. and the two shall become one flesh;
   so that they are no longer two, but one flesh.
9. What therefore God has joined together
   let not man put asunder.

True it is, argues Our Lord against the Pharisees, Moses wrote "you this commandment;" but what does this fact prove? Does it prove that a man is right in putting away his wife? Assuredly not. Although tolerated by Moses, divorce is decidedly wrong because it goes against God's primitive and unchanged will anent the conjugal union between a man and a woman. To establish this position Jesus brings back His opponents to the beginning of the human race as it is described by Moses himself. Man is God's handiwork. To God's creative power man and woman owe their respective constitution which fits them for the closest human relationship, that of husband and wife.:

> From the beginning of creation,
> male and female he made them. (Gen. i, 27).

In virtue of this structural unity established by the Creator, there must exist between husband and wife a union superior to that

[13]These remarks are true with regard to even the simplest and most primitive form of a bill of divorce. (Cf. J. H. Greenstone, art. "Get" (bill of divorce) in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, vol. v, p. 646).

[14]This opposition is denoted by Mk's use of the particle δὲ (but) at the beginning of x, 6

which binds a child to his parents, a union so compelling that a man shall leave his father and mother for his wife, a union so intimate that it will make of husband and wife the one principle that transmits natural life:

> On account of this a man shall leave his father and mother
> and shall cleave to his wife;
> and the two shall become one flesh. (Gen. ii, 24).

The union once consummated, man and woman are no longer simply fitted for each other; they belong together and form the one principle whereby God intended from the first, and still intends to perpetuate human life. They having been thus joined together by God Himself, and plainly their physical constitution remains His after as before the union. The marriage tie is unbreakable according to God's primitive and unchanged will, and consequently no man has a right to put it asunder:

> so that they are no longer two, but one flesh.
> What therefore God has joined together
> let not man put asunder.

If this line of thought of Jesus means anything, it means that a man's action in dismissing his wife, even by writing for her a bill of divorce, is decidedly wrong. It remains wrong in the eyes of conscience and religion which rightly view it as opposed to the divine will, although it be treated as valid by a law which tolerates and regularizes it as a necessary evil. As is well stated by a distinguished Protestant writer:[15] "When the Pharisees appealed from Him to Moses, who permitted the putting away of a wife under the form of writing a bill of divorcement (Deut. xxiv, 1), He declared that this Mosaic ordinance had been given on account of the hardness of heart of the Jews. He meant that this ordinance did not prove that a man was really entitled to put away his wife, and would be held guiltless; it only prescribed a legally valid form of the dissolution in regard to the actual cases of culpable dissolution. But the original Divine decree in regard to marriage was the word spoken at creation, that a man and his wife shall become perfectly one (Mark x, 2-8). Where the union of husband and wife thus rests on a Divine command, a human divorce could not be justifiable (verse 9)."

Humanly speaking, it was a bold thing on Our Lord's part thus to stand alone denouncing divorce as intrinsically evil. Bold indeed

[15]Prof. Hans Hinrich Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, vol. i, p. 352 sq. (Eng. Transl.)

it was, on His part, thus to appeal from a Mosaic regulation to the original meaning of the matrimonial institution. The remembrance of such a scene easily clung to the mind of those present, and it is only natural to regard St. Mark's account of Jesus' answer to the Pharisees on this memorable occasion, as distinctly true to fact. In vain would we look in this passage of our second Evangelist, for even a word that would betray his desire of diminishing the opposition of Jesus' doctrine to that universally received at the time. In point of fact, if St. Mark's record of the whole transaction bespeaks one concern on his part, it is that of putting into the strongest light, and at each step, the contrast which existed between Jesus and His adversaries. Again, in our second Synoptist here, we have a faithful representation of Our Lord's method of reasoning when He wishes to depart from the common view of His Jewish contemporaries. Instead of "simply grouping together the decisions of the Law in order to maintain their validity without distinction, He weighs them one against another by dwelling upon the original meaning of the institution He is discussing. He pursued precisely the same method, when He considered the precept regarding the Sabbath in the light of the original purpose which governed its institution as a day of rest (Mk. ii, 27)."[16] In like manner, several literary particulars may be easily noticed in Our Lord's answer to the Pharisees which point to a very primitive and objective character of its account in St. Mark's Gospel. Of this description are: (1) the absence in that account, of formulas to introduce as Scripture words borrowed from Gen. i, 27; ii, 24: Jesus naturally dispensed with such formulas in giving out words perfectly known to the Pharisees, and indeed to all persent, as actual passages of Holy Writ; (2) the putting of the two passages of Genesis (i, 27; ii, 24), the one right after the other, although they are distant from each other, and are not meant to be taken together, in the original text: Jesus acted thus in harmony with the then-received methods of quoting and interpreting Holy Scripture; (3) the scrupulous accuracy with which St. Mark gave the words of Genesis without supplying the subjects however necessary such supplying might seem to complete the sentences quoted (for instance, St. Mark wrote simply: "Male and female he made (*εποιησεν*) them," instead of "Male and female *God* made them"): Jesus had probably quoted most strictly those words as reciting them to Pharisees, that is to men most punctilious

[16] Oscar Holtzmann, *The Life of Jesus*, p. 368, footn. 1. (Eng. Transl., 1904).

in their quotations of the Sacred Text.[17] Lastly, the distinct and authoritative tone of the conclusive words ascribed to Our Lord:

> What therefore God has joined together
> let no man put asunder.

stamps them with that impress of originality and decision which characterized the genuine utterances of the One who "taught with authority, and not as the scribes" of the time. (Cf. Mk. i, 22; Mt. vii, 29; Lk. iv, 32).

Thus then, Mk's account of Our Lord's answer to the Pharisees bears an unimpeachable testimony to Christ's exact mind concerning divorce. It records with an equal vividness and accuracy, the captious question: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? asked Jesus by His enemies; the ready manner in which Our Lord realized its malicious purpose; the rapid exchange of opposite questions and answers between Him and His inquirers; and lastly, His solemn and unambiguous declaration that divorce is wrong because it goes against a Divinely constituted union. It thus forms one consistent whole wherein an impartial reader finds the distinct proof of Jesus' personal and emphatic condemnation of divorce, and of the narrator's truthful care of recording that condemnation in the most manifest manner. Had we therefore no further information about Christ's mind concerning divorce, we should still feel perfectly justified in affirming that the Catholic teaching anent the absolute indissolubility of the marriage tie among Christians, is no other than that ascribed to Our Lord in one of the most primitive records of Christianity. But yet, this further information is forthcoming. It is supplied by St. Mark himself, and indeed in his very next verses:

Mk. x.

10. And in the house again the disciples asked Him
    concerning this.
11. And He says to them:
    Whoever shall put away his wife
    and shall marry another,
    commits adultery against her;
12. And if she, having put away her husband,
    shall marry another,
    commits adultery.[18]

[17] When we shall examine the parallel passage in St. Matthew, we shall see that our first Synoptist actually modifies Mk's text in these and other particulars, and thus proves himself later than the redactor of St. Mark's Gospel.

[18] These verses bear, especially in the original Greek, the distinct impress of Mk's primitive style, as well shall show when we compare them with the parallel passage in St. Matthew's Gospel.

Whoever studies these verses of our second Gospel in the light of the foregoing answer of Our Lord to the Pharisees, cannot help realizing how strongly they confirm the view we have taken of that answer. Their meaning, briefly stated, amounts to this: the union between husband and wife remains unbroken by a dismissal, so that the husband or the wife who re-marries after the separation is guilty of adultery. We have therefore in these verses a second statement, and indeed a more explicit one, of the position which Jesus has taken up in answering the question of His adversaries: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" That this position should now be more distinctly stated is naturally accounted for by the fact that Our Lord is represented as speaking no longer to the Pharisees, but to His own disciples. In addressing the former, Jesus was speaking in public, that is under a circumstance when one usually sets forth with considerable reserve a position of his that goes against a universally received opinion of the day; He was answering a captious question asked by ill-disposed men bent on misconstruing His words, so that He had naturally to use guarded expressions that could not be found fault with, or be easily misrepresented; He was arguing with legal experts used to all kinds of chicanery, and consequently had to frame His own answer in distinct view not only of the words which they had used in their question, but also of their methods of interpreting the Law and of testing the conformity of a statement with the numerous and apparently conflicting regulations of Moses. No wonder then that, before committing Himself to a definite position and in public, Jesus first asked for the Mosaic commandment in variance with which strictly orthodox Pharisees desired to place Him and next reasoned with them concerning the enactment to which they had referred Him, setting over against it other words of command found in the same Mosaic Law. In thus dealing with the question of His well-known enemies, Our Lord simply followed a manner of action which prudence would have dictated to any man under similar circumstances. But evidently this manner of action was no longer suitable in answering His disciples when they questioned Him about the lawfulness of divorce. Their asking was not prompted by a malicious intent, but by a very legitimate desire of ascertaining whether they had understood aright words of His which, in excluding every lawful cause of divorce, went beyond the strictest Jewish school of the day, viz.: that of Shammai which considered divorce as allowed only for the cause of unchastity. They were His own select and trusted friends who made their inquiry

in private: "And in the house again the disciples asked Him concerning this." He could therefore speak freely and explicitly to them. Nay more, it was in every way desirable that He should do so. He had chosen them to be the continuators of His mission to the world, the faithful heralds of His doctrine, and His doctrine on divorce was in their eyes a new one, one that went against the traditions of their race and also against all existing legislations outside of Israel. Their understanding was dull and limited, as He was well aware, and it behooved Him to speak in the plainest manner, so that they would take in the exact import of His mind concerning this important matter. This He actually did. Hence the more direct and explicit character of His answer to the disciples which appears particularly manifest when that answer is compared with the one He had made to the Pharisees:

Mk. x.

10. And in the house again the disciples asked Him concerning this.
11. And He says to them:
Whoever shall put away his wife
and shall marry another,
commits adultery against her.
12. And if she, having put away her husband,
shall marry another,
commits adultery.

This then, according to St. Mark's Gospel,—that is according to one of the earliest documents of Christ's teaching,—is the full mind of the Master speaking to men whom He keeps under His special training. He draws for them, in the plainest manner, the consequences which follow strictly from the position He has taken in public concerning divorce. As He has already proclaimed that by matrimony, God Himself makes husband and wife perfectly one, and rejected divorce as unlawfully contrary to that divinely constituted union, so He now explicitly states that neither of the two parties thus joined, can repudiate the other and marry again, without committing the heinous sin of adultery.

It is indeed true that many contemporary critics, among whom may be mentioned V. Rose, O. P., (*Evangile selon St. Marc*, p. 94, Paris, 1905), do not admit that the last verse of St. Mark:

and if she, having put away her husband,
shall marry another,
commits adultery,

contains words actually uttered by Our Lord, because Moses did not recognize to the woman the right of putting away her husband. Then

think that it is a sort of appendix which our second Evangelist directly writing for the Gentiles, added in view of the Greek and Roman laws which granted the right of dismissal to the woman as well as to the man. Of course, this manner of thinking does not interfere materially with Jesus' actual frame of mind concerning divorce: in ruling out a man's right to divorce, the Savior by the very fact, ruled out all divorce, if He spoke directly in view of the Mosaic law, since man's right to divorce was the only one expressly allowed by that law. Nor does it really go against the position of the Catholic apologist who maintains that the Church's prohibition of divorce under the penalty of adultery is identical with the one ascribed to Our Lord in the early documents of Christianity. We think, however, that this view of Mk. x, 12, is incorrect. The right to divorce is not Our Lord's direct object in His answer to the disciples. He wishes to tell them of the moral penalty which attaches to re-marriage after the repudiation, as is clear from Mk. x, 11, where He speaks explicitly of a man marrying another wife, as committing an actual adultery. Now this re-marriage may be effected by the woman, as well as by the man, in which case she also is guilty of adultery. It is not surprising therefore that Jesus should have spoken distinctly of the woman commiting adultery, as is recorded in Mk. x, 12. The woman's right to dismiss her husband was not indeed referred to in the Mosaic Law, but it was granted by the Greek and Roman laws, which were so well known in Palestine that the disciples were certainly aware of them: the Greeks and the Romans had ruled over the Holy Land for a long time and formed a considerable percentage of its population in Our Lord's day. Again, it was well known to the Jews of Christ's time that the women of the princely house of the Herods had dismissed their husbands to contract a second marriage,[19] and it is particularly significant that at the very time indicated in Mk. x, 1, Jesus was passing through the territory of Herod Antipas who had been married to a Herodian princess who had dismissed her husband.[20] Moreover, according to A. Edersheim (*Sketches of Jewish Life in the Days of Christ*, p. 158), "the wife would insist on being divorced if her husband were a leper, or affected with polypus, or engaged in a disagreeable or dirty trade, such as that of a tanner or coppersmith; one of the cases in which divorce was obliga-

[19]Cf. Josephus, *Antiquities of the Jews*, Book xv, chap. vii, § 10, and Book xviii, chap. v, § 4.

[20]Cf. F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 99 sq. (T. T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1906).

tory was, if either party had become heretical, or ceased to profess Judaism." One therefore readily sees how the Master could in answering His disciples inveigh against a Jewish custom of the day regarding a woman's dismissal of her husband, and be prompted after condemning a man's second marriage as adultery, to do the same at once in regard to a woman's second marriage. That He actually did so, as is stated in Mk. x, 12, is confirmed by St. Paul's knowledge of a distinct command of the Lord prohibiting the divorce of the wife as well as of the husband (Cf. I Cor. vii, 10, 11).[21]

To conclude. In Mk. x, 2-12, we find Christ's public and private condemnation of divorce. To it, the Catholic apologist may even now turn confidently, to point it out as conveying the full mind of His master and Lord, and as manifestly identical with the teaching of the Church of God in the course of ages. In prohibiting divorce among Christians under the penalty of adultery, the Roman Catholic Church simply proves faithful to the mission intrusted to her: "teach all nations all things whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matthew xxviii, 19 sq.) Like her Divine Founder, she proclaims that no one bound by holy matrimony is relieved of the marriage tie however careful his or her compliance with all the requirements of a human law. In the eyes of Christ, there is no such a thing as a lawful divorce, and whoever acts as if there were and contracts a second marriage, commits adultery.

Francis E. Gigot.

[21] Cf. H J. Holtzmann, *die Synoptiker*, p. 157 (Third edit.)

THE REAL PRESENCE IN THE FATHERS. (II)

III. THE SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRIA.

A. The Alexandrians of the Third Century: Clement and Origen. In order to get a proper appreciation of the tenets of the Alexandrian school on the Eucharist, it must be remembered that there were two sorts of teaching given at Alexandria: one exoteric or popular, corresponding somewhat with our catechism; the other esoteric and scientific, for the benefit of the better instructed class of Christians. It is this higher theological teaching that was given by Clement and Origen in the school which they have made famous. Accordingly, we find two concepts of the Eucharist. The one presented to the simple faithful is in perfect conformity with the traditional realism; while the esoteric explanation runs to a symbolical interpretation.

Clement and Origen are strong witnesses of the perfect orthodoxy of the simple faithful in this matter of the Eucharist. In his *Pædogogus*[1] Clement presents successively both concepts of the Eucharist. First he states in realistic language that we really eat the flesh of the Lord and drink His blood, and that thus we hide the Savior in our breasts; and then he advances a theory of symbolism. Origen says explicitly, after having proposed a similar theory, that such was not the teaching which the ordinary faithful received.[2] In his own homilies delivered before the people his language concerning the Eucharist was always realistic. Thus in *Homily xiii*, on the Exodus, exhorting the faithful to profit by the word of God, he uses a comparison borrowed from the liturgy of the Eucharist which implies a belief in the Real Presence: "I would instruct you by borrowing my comparison from your religious customs. You are used to partake of our mysteries, and when you receive the body of the Lord, you hold it with much care and respect for fear lest anything fall to the ground and any part of this sacred gift be lost. You believe yourself culpable, and rightly so, if through your fault any part falls on the ground." He then exhorts his hearers to receive with equal care the word of God.

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[1] *Paed.* Lib. I, c. 6.
[2] *In Joan.* xxxii, 16.

There seems therefore little reason to doubt that the teaching given to the faithful in Alexandria was quite in conformity with the traditional realism.

As much cannot be said, however, for the higher theological teaching in the famous School. The Christian School of Alexandria had received as its inheritance from the school of Philo its method of allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures and its Judæo-Alexandrian philosophy—a mixture of Platonism and Judaism. An adept of this school was never satisfied with the literal sense of the Sacred Writings; he was always in quest of something deeper and more mysterious, the allegorical meaning. This sort of exegesis, joined to a more or less unsound philosophy, led the Alexandrians of the third century into error on more than one point and especially on the Eucharist.

We find in the writings of Clement several allegorical interpretations of texts bearing on the Eucharist. When our Savior said at the Last Supper: Take and drink, this is my body, He declared allegorically that "the Word would be spread abroad for the remission of sins," since wine is the blood of the vine and the vine is a figure of Jesus Christ.[3] The command of the Lord in John vi, 13: Eat my flesh and drink my blood, signifies that the Spirit and the Word are the nutriment of the soul, for the flesh signifies the Spirit and the blood the Word: "The flesh figuratively represents to us the Holy Spirit; for the flesh (of Christ) was formed by Him. The blood indicates the Word, for as rich blood the Word has diffused life; and the union of both is the Lord, the food of the babes—the Lord who is Spirit and Word."[4] Such language is definite and unmistakable. But it would be going too far to say that for Clement the Eucharist is nothing but a symbol. He sometimes calls it a "mixture" χρᾶσις of the Eucharistic drink and the Word, which bestows immortality.[5] Even in this manner of speaking, however, we cannot claim to find an orthodox expression of the Real Presence.

Like Clement, Origen offers us figurative interpretations of texts of Scripture bearing on the Eucharist. The bread and wine are symbols of the word of God which nourishes souls. "The bread, which God the Word says is His body, is the word of God which nourishes souls. . . and the drink which God the Word says is His blood,

[3] *Paed.* II, 2 (*P. G.* viii, 428).
[4] *Ibid.* I, 6.
[5] *Ibid.* II, 2.

is the word of God, filling and intoxicating the hearts of those who imbibe it . . . The bread is the word of righteousness which feeds the souls of those who eat of it; the drink is the word of the knowledge of Christ, of the mystery of His birth and passion."[6] A similar interpretation of the Eucharist is given by Origen in his commentary on the Gospel of St. John.[7] But in the case of Origen, as in that of Clement, it would not be fair to conclude that he looks on the Eucharist as being *merely* a symbol, for he says elsewhere that the eucharistic bread "sanctified by the word of God and the invocation," sanctifies of itself those who eat of it worthily. It is "the typical and symbolic body" of Christ,[8] that is, according to Harnack's interpretation, the "mystical" body of Christ. There is then in the Eucharist the body of Christ, but a mystical body, which probably means something other than His historical body.

Writers like Eusebius of Cæsarea, who followed in the footsteps of Origen, also speak of the eucharistic bread and wine as "types" and "symbols" of the body and blood of Christ.[9] The same expressions are found in the *Apostolic Constitutions*.[10]

B. Athanasius and the Cappadocians. In these writers we find a decided reaction against the tendencies of the Alexandrian school in favor of the traditional realism. St. Athanasius affirms that when the prayers of consecration have been pronounced, "the bread becomes the body and the wine the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ."[11] And his writings may be searched in vain for any expression in the least degree indicative of a figurative interpretation. The Cappadocians also, in spite of their regard for Origen, are opposed to his theory of symbolism—an excellent proof that the Faith, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, is preserved in its original purity, in spite of human influences to the contrary. St Basil carefully avoids the use of the word symbol in speaking of the Eucharist. He says that when the Christian communicates he receives "his portion of the sacred body and blood of Christ."[12] And this insistence on realism is still more manifest in St. Gregory of Nyssa, who advances a doctrine of conversion: "I believe with a firm faith that this bread,

[6] *In Matt. Comm*, ser. 85 (*P. G.* xiii, 1734, 5).
[7] *In Joan.* xxxii, 16 (*P. G.* xiv, 809).
[8] *In Matt.* xi, 14.
[9] *Demonst. Evan.* I, 10 (*P. G.* xxii, 89).
[10] v, 14; vi, 23.
[11] *Ad Nuper Bapt.* (*P. G.* lxxxvi, 2401).
[12] *Epist.* xciii.

when it has been sanctified by the word of God, is changed into the body of the Word of God."[13] St. Gregory Nazianzen makes use of the word "symbol," but in such a way that his faith in the Real Presence is not left open to doubt.

This reaction against Origenism, begun by Fathers of the Fourth Century whose affiliations were with the school of Alexandria, was still further accentuated by the school of Antioch. The views which we find taught in Alexandria in the Third Century did not long hold sway, and it would not be proper to consider them as the beginning of a current of opinion in the Church in favor of symbolism. They form an isolated phenomenon, which is sufficiently accounted for by the philosophical and exegetical preconceptions of the school.

IV. THE GREEK FATHERS OF THE SCHOOL OF ANTIOCH IN THE FOURTH CENTURY.

The school of Antioch, or rather the theological movement which had its center at Antioch, showed a strong reaction against the allegorism of the Alexandrians. In exegesis the Fathers of this school kept to "the literal, historical, and grammatical sense"—its methods are as rigorous as those of the moderns. Accordingly, they have interpreted the words of institution in the most literal sense, and have presented the dogma of the Real Presence in very definite fashion. Indeed, for that matter, they have developed the doctrine of conversion of the bread and wine; but that does not concern us here.

Theodore of Mopsuestia. This important representative of the school of Antioch occupies a prominent place in the history of theology as the real author of the Nestorian heresy; but we are concerned with him here on account of a very remarkable commentary which he wrote on the words of institution of the Eucharist. He insists strongly on the literal sense of these words, and shows that any figurative interpretation is opposed to the intention of Christ: "Christ did not say: This is the symbol of my body and this is the symbol of my blood; but he said: This is my body and this is my blood. He teaches us not to consider the nature of the oblation, but that this is changed into flesh and blood by the eucharistic prayer which is made."[14] And this is the standing interpretation of the words of institution in the school of Antioch. We shall find it also in the writings of St. John Chrysostom and St Cyril of Jerusalem.

[13] *Catech. Magn.* 37 (*P. G.* xlv, 96).
[14] *Matt.* xxvi, 26 (*P. G.* lxvi, 213).

St. Cyril of Jerusalem. St. Cyril, who antedates Theodore, belongs to the school of Antioch by virtue of his tendencies in exegesis. His doctrine on the Eucharist is found especially in his *Catecheses xxii*, addressed to the neophytes, within the octave of Easter. He begins by recalling the narrative of the Last Supper as given by St. Paul (this was probably read before his address), and he adds: "Since therefore Christ Himself has spoken, and since He has said: This is my body, who can still doubt? And since He Himself has affirmed it and has said: This is my blood, how can anyone still hesitate and say that it is not His blood?"[15]

St. Cyril brings up the fact of the change of water into wine at the marriage feast of Cana. Just as we believe that Christ changed water into wine so too we should believe that He changed wine into His blood. "Thus," he adds, "we should be fully persuaded that the gifts which we receive are the body and blood of Christ. For the body is given to you under the figure of bread ἐν τύπῳ ἄρτου, and the blood under the figure of wine ἐν τύπῳ οἴνου so that in receiving the body and blood of Christ, you become one body and one blood with Him σύσσωμος καὶ σύναιμος αὐτοῦ *concorporeus et consanguineus*. We become Christ-bearers by the distribution of the body and blood of Christ in our members; it is in this way that, according to the words of the Blessed Peter, we become partakers of the divine nature." (n. iii).

Then, in nn. v-viii, he explains several passages of the Old Testament which he applies to the Eucharist—the loaves of proposition; Ps. xxii, v. 5: "parasti in conspectu meo mensam;" Eccles. ix, 7ss.: "Veni, comede panem meum." Then, as if he had not sufficiently insisted on the Real Presence, he goes on to say: "After these instructions, be fully convinced that what seems to be bread is not bread, but the body of Christ, though it be bread to the taste; and that what seems to be wine is not wine, but the blood of Christ, despite the testimony of taste (n. ix) . . . Judge not the reality by taste, but by faith, and believe without wavering that you have been vouchsafed the gift of the body and blood of Christ." (n. vi).

St. Cyril's teaching is most clear: the real body and blood of Christ are given to us under the figures τύποι of bread and wine. Our senses (sight and taste) perceive bread and wine, but faith discerns the reality—the body and blood of Christ. The relations of the bread

[15] *Cat* xxii (*P. G.* xxiii)

and wine to the eucharistic species are stated by him almost as precisely as in the theology of the present day.

St. John Chrysostom. The definiteness and completeness of St. John Chrysostom's doctrine on the Eucharist have merited for him the title of "Doctor of the Eucharist." The fact that he was of the school of Origen makes his radical disagreement with the views of that famous master all the more striking as a proof of the strength and persistence of the traditional teaching on the Eucharist.

The chief sources from which we draw his doctrine are: (1) Homily 82, on the narrative of the institution in St. Matthew—preached in Antioch about 390; (2) Homily 46, on the Gospel of St. John—preached in Antioch about 389; (3) Homilies 24 and 27, on I Cor. (a commentary on cc. x and xi)—preached at Antioch about 392; (4) two homilies on the treason of Judas, in which he brings up the question of unworthy communion—preached at Antioch about 395. In our exposition of his doctrine we shall follow the logical rather than the chronological order.

First of all we find an affirmation of the Real Presence based on the words of institution—words which, when spoken at the altar, effect a change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. After speaking of the unworthy communion of Judas, Chrysostom goes on to say; "But now the time is at hand to draw nigh to this awful table. Let us approach with fitting soberness and watchfulness. Let there be no Judas, no reprobate, no one whose heart is infected with the poison of evil, no one whose tongue speaks otherwise than his mind conceives. Christ is present, and it is He who to-day prepares this table, as He did of old. For it is not a man who brings it to pass that the offerings become γενέσθαι the body and blood of Christ, but Christ Himself who was crucified for us. The priest, fulfilling his office, utters these words, but it is the grace and power of God (that operate). 'This is my body,' he says; these are the words which transform μεταρρυθίζει the offerings. Just as the words: Increase and multiply and fill the earth, once pronounced, still continue to give men power to beget progeny, so too these words once pronounced render the sacrifice perfect on every altar in every church from the beginning until now, and until His coming at the end of time."[16] In this passage we find three important dogmas: the Real Presence; the power of the words of consecration

[16] *Hom.* I, n. 26 *De Trad. Jud.*

to effect the eucharistic conversion; and the ministerial office of the priest, who acts by the "power and grace of Christ."

A further testimony to the Real Presence is found in Homily 82, on the narrative of the institution in St. Matthew: "Since then the Word saith, This is my body, let us both be persuaded and believe, and look at it with the eyes of the mind . . . How many now say, I would wish to see His form, His face, His clothes, His shoes. Lo! thou seest Him, thou touchest Him, thou eatest Him. And thou indeed desirest to see His clothes, but He giveth Himself to thee not to see only, but also to touch and eat and receive within thee." (n. 4.) Here we find the expressions of a realism so strong that the modern theologians would probably pronounce it somewhat exaggerated.

The identity of the eucharistic body of Christ with His "historical" body which was crucified, and of the eucharistic blood with that which flowed from his side on the Cross are explicitly affirmed by Chrysostom in his twenty-fourth Homily on First Corinthians (nn. 1, 2, 4).

As effects of the Eucharist he instances: a more intimate union with Christ;[17] an increase of divine life—"Let us return from that table as fire-breathing lions terrible to the demon;"[18] eternal life—"By this Body . . . I hope to gain heaven and the blessings which life immortal there shall find, the lot of the angels and life with Christ."[19]

The holiness required for worthy Communion and the gravity of the sin of receiving unworthily are strongly expressed by Chrysostom. "Indeed no small punishment is appointed to them that partake unworthily. Consider how indignant thou art against the traitor, against them that crucified Him. Look therefore lest thou also thyself become guilty of the body and blood of Christ. They crucified the all-holy body, but thou receivest it in a filthy soul after such great benefits."[20] "When Judas had communicated, he was assailed by the devil . . . in punishment for his audacity. Thus you may learn that the devil assails and torments those especially who have partaken unworthily of the divine mysteries, as happened with Judas."[21]

Finally, St. Chrysostom believes in the sacrificial character of the Eucharist. He frequently calls it a *sacrifice*, and speaks of our

[17]Hom. 46 *in Joan.* n. 3.
[18]*Ibid.* Cf. also Hom. 24 *in* I *Cor.* n. 4.
[19]Hom. 24 *in I Cor.* n. 4.
[20]Hom. 82 *in Matt.* n. 5.
[21]*De Prod. Jud.* 6.

Lord as an *immolated victim*. In short, the writings of this great Doctor are a mine of Eucharistic doctrine.

V. THE OPPONENTS OF ARIANISM IN THE WEST.

Under this heading we shall treat of SS. Hilary and Ambrose, whose teachings on the Eucharist are found, at least in part, in connection with their writings on the Trinitarian controversies.

St. Hilary of Poitiers. In the exile which he underwent in Asia Minor on account of his opposition to the Arian bishops of Gaul, St. Hilary composed his treatise *De Trinitate*, having first made a study of the Greek Fathers. In this work Hilary proves the Divinity and Consubstantiality of the Word, and refutes the objections of the Arians. It is in connection with this latter task that he is led to speak of the Eucharist. The Arians claimed that the text of St. John: "Ego et Pater unum sumus" does not express a unity of nature of the Father and the Son, but only a moral union, an agreement of wills, such as exists between the faithful and God the Father. To support this interpretation, the Arians adduced the text "ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu Pater in me et ego in te, ut et ipsi in nobis sint," in which the moral union of the faithful with God is compared to that which exists between the Father and the Son. To refute this argument, St. Hilary shows that the union between the faithful and God is not merely a moral union; that it is in some sort a union of natures, effected by the mediatorship of Christ. In proof of this he advances two reasons.[22]

Of these the first is drawn from the Incarnation. We are united to the Word by the human nature which He has assumed, and through the Word we are united with God the Father.

His second line of argument is drawn from the Eucharist. When we eat the flesh of Christ and drink His blood, Christ is united to us by His human nature which is in us. Between Him and us there is therefore a union of nature; and since there is also between the Word Incarnate and the Father a union of divine nature, the union between the faithful and God is not merely what the Arians would make it out to be. "Si enim vere Verbum caro factum est, et vere nos Verbum carnem cibo dominico sumimus; quomodo non naturaliter manere in nobis existimandus est qui et naturam carnis nostrae jam inseparabilem sibi homo natus assumpsit, et naturam carnis suae ad naturam

[22] *De Trin.* viii, 13-19.

aeternitatis sub sacramento nobis communicandae carnis admiscuit? Ita enim omnes unum sumus, quia et in Christo Pater est et Christus in nobis est." (viii, 13). "Sic perfecta per Mediatorem unitas doceretur, cum nobis in se manentibus, ipse maneret in Patre, et in Patre manens, maneret in nobis; et ita ad unitatem proficeremus . . . " (19)

But the most direct and striking passages in St. Hilary on the Eucharist are found in his commentary on the sixth chapter of St. John, where he lays special stress on the effects of Communion—union with Christ and the communication of the divine life. "Ipse (Christus) enim ait: Caro mea vere est esca, et sanguis meus vere est potus. Qui edit carnem meam et bibit meum sanguinem in me manet et ego in eo. De veritate carnis et sanguinis non relictus est ambigendi locus. Nunc enim ipsius Domini professione et fide nostra vere caro est et vere sanguis est. Et haec accepta atque hausta id efficiunt ut et nos in Christo et Christus in nobis sit . . . Est ergo in nobis per carnem et sumus in eo . . . " "Quam autem naturalis in nobis haec unitas sit, ipse ita testatus est: Qui edit carnem meam et bibit sanguinem meum in me manet et ego in eo. Non enim quis in eo erit, nisi in quo ipse fuerit . . . Vivit ergo per Patrem; et quo modo per Patrem vivit, eodem modo nos per carnem vivimus . . . Haec ergo vitae nostrae causa est, quod in nobis carnalibus manentem per carnem Christum habemus; victuris nobis per eum ea conditione, qua vivit ille per Patrem."[23] . . . By the Eucharist we are united to Christ, Christ dwells within us, and just as Christ lives by the Father, so we live by Christ present corporeally in us; "manentem in nobis per carnem Christum habemus." Hilary's whole line of argument goes to show that it is the real "historical" flesh of Christ which we receive in the Eucharist.

St. Ambrose. In his controversial works on the Trinity, St. Ambrose also makes use of the eucharistic doctrine as a basis of argument. Thus in his treatise *De Spiritu Sancto* he shows the divinity of the Holy Ghost from the fact of the adoration of the Flesh of Christ in the Eucharist. If we adore the Humanity of Christ, why should we not adore the Holy Ghost, who is its author, since it was formed by Him in the virginal bosom of Mary.

The fullest and clearest expression of his mind, however, is to be found in chapters viii and ix of *De Mysteriis*, an instruction to the neophytes. He speaks first of the Old Testament types of the Eucharist: Melchisedech offering bread and wine is a figure of our Lord insti-

[23]Lib. viii, c. 16.

tuting the Eucharist; the manna is the figure of the eucharistic bread (viii). He then affirms that by the consecration (which is effected by the words of Christ: "This is my body,"), the bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of Christ. "Benedictione etiam natura ipsa mutatur"—there is a real conversion, the result of the consecration. And further: "Ipse clamat Dominus Jesus: Hoc est corpus meum. Ante benedictionem verborum coelestium alia species nominatur, post consecrationem corpus significatur. Ipse dicit sanguinem suum. Ante consecrationem aliud dicitur, post consecrationem sanguis nuncupatur. Et tu dicis: Amen, hoc est, verum est. Quod os loquitur, mens interna fateatur; quod sermo sonat, affectus sentiat." (ix).

Moreover, the body of Christ which is present is the same body which was born of the Virgin Mary, crucified and buried; and this body is produced miraculously in the Eucharist, just as it was formed miraculously in Mary. "Et hoc quod conficimus corpus, ex Virgine est; quid quaeris naturae ordinem in Christi corpore, cum praeter naturam sit ipse Dominus Jesus partus ex Virgine? Vera utique caro Christi, quae crucifixa est, quae sepulta est; vere ergo carnis illius sacramentum est." (ix). This latter passage deals pretty effectively with the assertion sometimes advanced that before the Middle Ages nothing was ever heard of the identity of the eucharistic with the historical body of our Lord.

Then to strengtehn the faith of his neophytes, St. Ambrose proves the possibility of the miracle of eucharistic conversion by citing a large number of Biblical miracles, such as the change of Moses' rod into a serpent, of the waters of Egypt into blood; the miracle of the crossing of the Red Sea, etc. If men could work such prodigies and so change the nature of things, "quid dicimus de ipsa consecratione divina, ubi ipsa verba Domini Salvatoris operantur? . . . Quod si tantum valuit sermo Eliae, ut ignem de coelo deponeret, non valebit Christi sermo ut species mutet elementorum? . . . Sermo ergo Christi qui potuit ex nihilo facere quod non erat, non potest ea quae sunt in id mutare quod non sunt? Non enim minus est novas rebus dare quam mutare naturas." (ix). The strong language used by St. Ambrose in this and the foregoing passages with regard to the eucharistic conversion was naturally made use of by the medieval theologians who were engaged in elaborating the doctrine of transubstantiation.[24]

[24]Cf. also the De *Sacramentis*, iv.

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSIES.

In these controversies the Eucharist is intepreted by each party according to the idea it advocated concerning the nature of Christ. The latter problem, which was of course the primary one to them, is of interest to us here only in so far as it supplied the occasion for bringing out the views of both the orthodox and the heretics on the question of the Real Presence.

Nestorius admitted that in the Eucharist we really eat the flesh of Christ. But this flesh, being void of Divinity, has no vivifying effect on the communicant. This error furnished St. Cyril of Alexandria with the occasion for affirming his belief in the efficaciousness of the flesh of Christ present in the Eucharist. The flesh of Christ, physically united with the Divine Word, is truly quickening, because it is the very flesh of the Word.[25] And in his commentary on the Gospel of St. John, he insists once more on the vivifying effects of the flesh of Christ in the soul of the communicant.[26]

Similar affirmations of realism are found in the arguments advanced on both sides in the Monophysite controversy. According to the *Eranistes* of Theodoret, the Monophysites offered the eucharistic conversion of the body and blood of Christ as an example of what happened in the case of His human nature.[27] In his anxiety to refute this difficulty, Theodoret made the mistake of denying the conversion of the bread and wine. He maintains indeed the Real Presence, holding that the body of Christ is present *with* the bread.[28] This explanation, which is evidently the result of the needs of controversy, is proper to Theodoret.

Against Eutyches Pope St. Leo uses an argument in which he indicates clearly his own orthodox faith in the Eucharist. If the body and blood of Christ, he says, are in very truth present in the Eucharist, then the humanity of the Savior is real and true and not to be confounded with His divinity. "Fides autem catholica . . . istas impietates refutat, damnans Nestorium divina ab homine dividentem, detestans Eutychen in divinis humana vacuantem . . . Sic mensae communicare debetis, ut nihil prorsus de veritate corporis Christi et sanguinis ambigatis. Hoc enim ore sumitur quod fide creditur; et frustra ab illis *Amen* respondetur, a quibus contra id quod

[25] Anath. 11; Denziger, *Enchiridion*, 83.
[26] *In Evang. Joan.* iv, 2.
[27] *Eranistes*, ii.
[28] *Ibid.* i.

accipitur disputatur."[29] One could scarcely wish for a more direct statement of belief in the presence of Christ's "historical" body in the Eucharist. Indeed, on any other supposition St. Leo's argument has no meaning. It would have been absurd for him to appeal to the Eucharist to prove that Christ took a real body at the Incarnation, if in the Eucharist Christ's body were present only spiritually or symbolically.

VI. ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE AUGUSTINIANS OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CENTURIES

St. Augustine. The main difficulty in fixing this great Doctor's position on the question of the Real Presence is that he has left us in his writings two series of texts, one favorable to realism, the other to symbolism. In the Middle Ages both those who defended and those who denied the doctrine claimed the authority of St. Augustine. And since the sixteenth century certain passages in his works have constituted the strongest argument from antiquity at the disposal of Protestant opponents of the dogma of the Real Presence.

First of all, in order the better to appreciate the whole mind of Augustine, it will be well for us to get some idea of the dominating influences in his thought. The first of these is the Christian influence; and this was derived in his case from two sources—the teachings of St. Ambrose and the traditions of the African Church. These influences account for the eucharistic realism of certain passages in his works. The teaching of St. Ambrose we have already examined; the African traditions, so far as we can learn them, are found to be equally satisfactory. As St. Cyprian in the third century, so in the fourth, at a time almost contemporaneous with Augustine, we have St. Optatus, Bishop of Milevis in Numidia, as an exponent of the faith of the African Church in the Real Presence. In his work *Contra Parmenianum Donatistam*,[30] Optatus expresses his indignation at the conduct of the Donatists, who had desecrated the altars and chalices which had been used in Catholic worship. In this connection, he makes evident references to the Real Presence. "Quid enim tam sacrilegum quam altaria Dei (in quibus et vos aliquando obtulistis) frangere, radere, removere? in quibus et vota populi et membra Christi portata sunt. . . . Quid est enim altare, nisi sedes et corporis et sanguinis Christi? . . . Quid vos offenderat Christus, cujus illic per certa momenta

[29]Sermo xci, 2, 3.
[30]vi, 1, 2.

corpus et sanguis habitabant? . . . Judaeos estis imitati; illi injecerunt manus Christo in cruce; a vobis percussus est in altari . . . Hoc tamen immane facinus a vobis geminatum est dum fregistis etiam calices, Christi sanguinis portatores."

The other cause which strongly influenced the thought of Augustine came from his philosophical training. In philosophy he was a Platonist; and his method of interpreting Scripture was by preference the allegorical method of the School of Alexandria. Towards the end of his life his controverses with the Pelagians forced him to become more literal in his exegesis. It was this allegorism, this desire to go behind the plain meaning, to look for symbols, which produced a baneful effect on St. Augustine's doctrine on the Eucharist,—just as it had done before in the case of Clement and Origen.

But let us examine the texts themselves. We shall consider first of all a series of texts favorable to realism, which seem to indicate at least that the faithful of the church of Hippo accepted the Real Presence.

St. Ambrose applies to the flesh of Christ, which is adored in the Eucharist, the verse "Adorate scabellum pedum ejus, quoniam sanctum est." Ps. xcviii, 5. God's footstool is the earth. How can we adore the earth? "Per terram caro Christi (intelligitur) quam hodie in mysteriis adoramus."[31] Explaining this passage, St. Augustine gives the same interpretation: "In the difficulty in which I find myself (of giving an explanation) I turn to Christ, for it is He whom I seek here, and I see how without impiety one can adore God's footstool. Christ has assumed earth from the earth; for flesh comes from the earth, and Christ took His flesh from the flesh of Mary. Christ lived here below in this same flesh; and He has given us this flesh to eat for our salvation (in ipsa carne ambulavit, et ipsam carnem nobis manducandum ad salutem dedit). Now no one eats this flesh without having adored it. I have therefore found how God's footstool can be adored. Not only we do not sin in adoring it, but we would sin if we did not adore it."[32] Here we have, for the moment at least, an explicit affirmation of the Real Presence. We adore and we eat, says Augustine, the very flesh which Jesus received of Mary. As he goes on, however, to develop his explanation, we find him turning to a spirual interpretation of the flesh and blood. Possibly this is only by way of opposing the crude views of the Capharnaites. Be that as it

[31] *De Spiritu Sancto*, iii, 11.
[32] *Enarratio in Ps. xcviii*, n. 9.

may, two points are clear: both he and his people adored the Eucharist before communicating; and while under the influence of St. Ambrose (whose interpretation of the text he has borrowed) he uses language which is strongly realistic.

Another passage in which the Real Presence is affirmed with a literal interpretation of the words of institution is in his *Enarratio in Ps.* xxxiii, 1 of the Septuagint. Explaining the passage "Et ferebatur in manibus suis," he asks who could carry himself in his own hands, and answers that it can refer only to Christ, who at the Last Supper bore Himself in His hands. The text is twice explained.

"Et ferebatur in manibus suis. Hoc vero, fratres, quomodo posset fieri in homine, quis intelliget? Quis enim portatur in manibus suis? Manibus aliorum potest portari homo, manibus suis nemo portatur. Quomodo intelligatur in ipso David secundum litteram, non invenimus; in Christo autem invenimus. Ferebatur enim Christus in manibus suis quando commendans ipsum corpus suum, ait: Hoc est corpus meum. Ferebat enim illud corpus in manibus suis."

And again: "Et ferebatur in manibus suis. Quomodo ferebatur in manibus suis? Quia cum commendaret ipsum corpus suum et sanguinem suum, accepit in manus suas quod norunt fideles; et ipse se portabat quodam modo, cum diceret: Hoc est corpus meum."[33]

The teaching of St. Augustine concerning unworthy communion is also in favor of the Real Presence. There are two ways, he says, of eating the flesh of Christ and drinking His blood. The first is that of the righteous: these eat of Christ and remain united to Him (receive His grace). The second is that of sinners, who eat indeed of Christ but without remaining united to Him (without receiving His Grace).[34] And the same teaching that the reception of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist does not depend on the faith of the recipient, is found in his controversy with the Donatists, where he uses it to prove that baptism conferred by a heretic is valid. "'Corpus enim Domini nihilominus erat etiam illis quibus dicebat Apostolus: qui manducat indigne judicium sibi manducat.'"[35]

Finally in *De Trinitate*[36] he speaks of the miracle of the conversion of the bread and wine, comparing it with the Bible miracles in order to show its superiority. Here too we see the influence of St. Ambrose.

[33]Sermo I, n. 10; Sermo XI, n. 2.
[34]Sermo LXXI, 12.
[35]*De Bapt.* v, 8.
[36]*De Trin.* III, cc. iv. v.

We shall now consider the texts favorable to symbolism.

St Augustine on several occasions attacked the error of the Capharnaites, according to whom the partaking of the body of Christ consisted in eating His flesh, cut up into pieces.[37] In the course of his refutation he frequently makes use of language not in accordance with realistic conceptions of the Eucharist. The command to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Savior, he says in *De Doctrina Christiana*, is an invitation, in figurative language, to share in the passion of Christ: "Nisi manducaveritis, inquit, carnem filii hominis, et sanguinem biberitis, non habebitis vitam in vobis (Joan. VI, 54). Facinus vel flagitium videtur jubere: figura est ergo, praecipiens passioni dominicae communicandum, et suaviter atque utiliter recondendum in memoria quod pro nobis caro ejus crucifixa et vulnerata sit."

In his commentary on the sixth chapter of St. John he puts forward the view that the body of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual reality given to the communicant: it is the spirit which animates the flesh of Christ. "Caro non prodest quidquam, sed sola caro: accedat spiritus ad carnem, quomodo accedit charitas ad scientiam, et prodest plurimum. Nam si caro nihil prodesset, Verbum caro non fieret, ut inhabitaret in nobis. Si per carnem nobis multum profuit Christus, quomodo caro nihil prodest? Sed per carnem spiritus aliquid pro salute nostra egit. Caro vas fuit; quod habebat attende, non quod erat."[38]

He who receives the Eucharist worthily lives by the spirit of Christ, for the spirit of Christ quickens His mystical body, the Church, into which the communicant is incorporated. The spiritual fruit of the Eucharist is therefore a bestowal of the spirit which quickens the natural body of the Lord; and this quickening spirit vivifies the Church, the mystical body of Christ, and maintains union among its members. This union is the direct effect of the Sacrament. "Caro mea est, inquit, pro mundi vita. Norunt fideles corpus Christi, si corpus Christi esse non negligent. Fiant corpus Christi, si volunt vivere de spiritu Christi. De spiritu Christi non vivit, nisi corpus Christi. . . . Non potest vivere nisi de spiritu Christi. Inde est quod exponens nobis apostolus Paulus hunc panem, Unus panis, inquit, unum corpus multi sumus (I Cor. x, 17) O Sacramentum pietatis. O signum unitatis. O vinculum charitatis!"[39]

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[37] III, xvi.

[38] *In Joan.* xxvii, 5.

[39] *Ibid.* xxvi, 13; Cf. Sermo cclxxii.

The Eucharist in bestowing the quickening spirit of Christ by which we are incorporated into His mystical body, confers eternal life.[40] The eucharistic body of Christ is a reality altogether of the spiritual order of things—the spirit of Christ. His "historical" body is in heaven.[41] The passages which set forth this view are numerous but it is not necessary to cite them all.

This exposition of Augustine's doctrine shows that with him the Eucharist is not merely symbolical nor subjective: it bestows an objective gift, the spirit of Christ, which even children receive,[42] though not capable of an act of faith.

The question naturally arises, how St. Augustine's mind could find room, as it seemed to do, for the existence together of two divergent currents of thought. The answer must be sought, it seems to us, in the mental temperament of the holy Doctor. His was one of those minds that remain unsettled until forced into definiteness by the stress of discussion. Remark for instance the variations of his thought on the question of original sin. What a distance there is between the Augustine of the *De Genesi contra Manichæos* and the Augustine of the *Opus Imperfectum*. These variations made the *Retractationes* necessary. Now on this matter of the Eucharist no discussion arose in his time to compel him to formulate a definite opinion. His mind, therefore, remained floating between the realistic conception of St. Ambrose and of the African church, and the more or less figurative view suggested by the Alexandrians. Had controversy forced him into more definite thinking, it is quite possible we should have another set of "Retractationes" from the Bishop of Hippo.

The Augustinians of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries.

It is a well known fact that the Latin Fathers of the fifth and sixth centuries are great admirers of St. Augustine. As a general rule they have remained faithful to his teachings. Now, with the exception of St. Fulgentius, we do not find any of them influenced by the symbolistic conceptions of their master on the question of the Eucharist. And this certainly goes to prove that they considered his statements in this regard as expressions not of Catholic tradition but of his personal views.

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[40]*Ibid.* 15.

[41]Sermo cclxxii.

[42]Sermo clxxiv, 7.

St. Fulgentius. Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspe (†533) was consulted by Ferrandus, a deacon of Carthage, who was worried about the salvation of a catechumen who died right after baptism without being able to receive Communion. How could he be saved, since our Lord had made the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood a condition of salvation? (John vi, 54). Fulgentius reassured the good deacon by telling him that baptism is sufficient for salvation, for by it we become members of the mystical body of Christ, and by that very fact partake of the eucharistic bread, which is the "sacrament of the mystical body of Jesus": "Qui ergo membrum corporis Christi fit, quomodo non accipit quod ipse fit? Quando utique illius fit verum corporis membrum, cujus corporis est in sacrificio sacramentum. Hoc ergo fit ille regeneratione sancti baptismatis, quod est de sacrificio sumpturus altaris."[43] Here we have a reproduction of the views we found in the writings of St. Augustine. In fact St. Fulgentius bases his teaching on the 272nd sermon of Augustine.

But in the writings of the rest of his followers we find only the traditional realistic conception. We have seen the doctrine of St. Leo. That of St. Cesarius of Arles, who had imbued himself so deeply in the mind of his master, contains no element of symbolism.[44] But we must devote special attention to the doctrine of the most celebrated follower of St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, of whom it is said, "doctrinam Augustinianam . . . ipse sitibundus hauserat et inebriatus eructabat."[45]

St. Gregory the Great. This great Pontiff merits the title of "Doctor of the Eucharist as a Sacrifice." His whole dogmatic and moral teaching on the Eucharist bears on the sacrifice of the Mass. And in his teaching are found a number of affirmations of the Real Presence.

We shall consider first his dogmatic teaching on the subject. This bears on the nature and the efficaciousness of the sacrifice of the Mass. St. Gregory is not contented, as were his predecessors, with merely affirming the sacrificial character of the Eucharist; he enters into the nature and essence of this sacrifice. And this marks a considerable step forward. The eucharistic sacrifice is a representation and a real renewal, effective and mysterious, of the sacrifice of Calvary. In it Christ is immolated anew, and His flesh and blood are given to

[43] S. Fulgentii *Epist. xii, ad Ferrandum*, 24.
[44] Cf. Serm. 265, 3 and 279, 5 (*P. L.* xxxviii, 2238, 2273).
[45] *Gregorii Vita*, IV, iv, 2 (*P. L.* lxxv, 431).

the faithful. By the eucharistic sacrifice the merits of the Passion are applied to the living and the dead. This doctrine concerning the Mass is found especially in the Fourth Book of the Dialogues (chap. 58). The purpose of this part of his work is to prove the immortality of the soul. Among other arguments he cites several miraculous visions in which appeared souls of the dead who had been delivered from purgatory by the sacrifice of the Mass, offered for them.

In this connection St. Gregory speaks of the efficaciousness of the eucharistic sacrifice both to aid the living and to assuage the pains of the dead. "Debemus itaque praesens saeculum vel quia jam conspicimus defluxisse, tota mente contemnere, quotidiana Deo lacrymarum sacrificia, quotidiana carnis ejus et sanguis hostias immolare. Haec namque singulariter victima ab aeterno interitu salvat, quae illam nobis mortem Unigeniti per mysterium reparat, qui licet resurgens a mortuis jam non moritur et mors ei ultra non dominabitur, tamen in semetipso immortaliter atque incorruptibiliter vivens, pro nobis iterum in hoc mysterium sacrae oblationis immolatur. Ejus quippe ibi corpus sumitur, ejus caro in populi salutem partitur, ejus sanguis non jam in manus infidelium, sed in ora fidelium funditur. Hinc ergo pensemus quale sit pro nobis hoc sacrificium quod pro absolutione nostra passionem unigeniti Filii semper imitatur. Quis enim fidelium habere dubium possit in ipsa immolationis hora ad sacerdotis vocem coelos aperiri, in illo Jesu Christi mysterio angelorum chorus adesse, summis ima sociari, terrena coelestibus jungi, unumque ex visibilibus atque invisibilibus fieri?"[46]

"Sed necesse est ut cum haec agimus, nosmetipsos Deo in cordis contritione mactemus, quia qui passionis dominicae mysteria celebramus, debemus imitari quod agimus. Tunc ergo vere pro nobis hostia erit Deo, cum nos ipsos hostiam fecerimus."[47]

In Book I of his *Morales* (c. 24) St. Gregory, commenting on the passage in the Book of Job where it says that Job offered sacrifice every day to expiate the sins of his children, explains that Christ constantly offers to God in the Eucharist His flesh as an expiation for our sins. "Cunctis diebus Job sacrificium offerre non cessat; quia sine intermissione pro nobis holocaustum Redemptor immolat, qui sine cessatione Patri suam pro nobis incarnationem demonstrat. Ipsa quippe ejus incarnatio nostrae emundationis oblatio est; cumque se hominem ostendit, delicta hominis interveniens diluit. Et humani-

[46] *Dial.* IV, 58.
[47] *Ibid.* 59.

tatis suae mysterio perenne sacrificium immolat, quia et haec sunt aeterna quae mundat."

The moral teaching of St. Gregory on the subject of the Eucharist points out what should be the purity of soul and body both of the priest who celebrates the sacrifice and of the people who share in it by Communion. This teaching is found in his homilies to the people,[48] and also in his letters where he solves a number of cases of conscience concerning the dispositions requisite for saying Mass or receiving Communion.[49]

Here we close our enquiry. In the succeeding ages it is the dogma of Transubstantiation that is discussed and defined. Our study has had for its object the fact of the Real Presence during the age of the Church Fathers. But before closing, we might point out a few general conclusions to which we think the facts lead.

(1) The theory of two wide currents of tradition, one symbolistic, the other realistic, has no sound basis in the facts. The symbol view is restricted to definite localities; it is accounted for by the philosophical opinions of its framers; and it had no appreciable effect on the course of tradition.

(2) Nor is there good ground for the contention that during this period the eucharistic body of Christ was not identified with His "historical" body. We must, it is true, make an exception of the Alexandrians, and also of Augustine and Theodoret. But the great bulk of tradition is opposed to them. This is shown by the use made of the Eucharist in the controversies with the heretics as well as by explicit statements in the Ignatian Epistles, and in St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. John Chrysostom, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Leo and others. The appearance of the symbolistic view among theologians of the ninth century marks the rise of what was to them a new theological question, and not the continuance of a sustained current of tradition.

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[48]Hom. xxii *in Evang.* 7 ss.
[49]Cf. *Epist.* Lib. XI, Ep. 64.

DISCUSSION

EVIL AND FAITH: A REPLY

I should like to be permitted to say a few words in further explanation of the view of evil, as inherent in the present order of things, which I have ventured to put forward, and a criticism of which by Father Gerrard in the April-May number of this Review has just been brought to my notice.

(1). I would first of all observe that the difficulty which that view endeavors to meet is primarily and essentially a theoretical one; though it has practical consequences of the gravest kind. The question to be answered is not, "How am I to view the evil which abounds in the world, to regard the world's Creator?" but "How am I to reconcile the goodness of the Creator which I am compelled to believe in by reason and by revelation, with the existence in the world of an enormous amount of evil, the origin of which must, at least indirectly, be attributed to Him?" Father Gerrard declares that he knows of no answer to this question from purely rational sources: and holds that it is the function of faith, transcending reason by the power of the will, to assert the absolute goodness of God in spite of the fact that as far as our limited powers of reasoning go, God does at times appear cruel and unjust.

Now I would by no means deny that faith can, and should, and does act in this way. But as Father Gerrard is evidently aware, there are numbers of people who do not possess faith, and for whom, humanly speaking, the one insuperable obstacle to its acquisition is their preoccupation with the theoretical difficulty stated above. It is mainly in the interest of such people, whose claim to our sympathy and consideration seems to me indisputable, that some answer (however conjectural) of a rational kind, ought to be found. For it must be remembered that faith "perficit intellectum"—it crowns, but cannot contradict reason: it does not abrogate, but confirms and applies the laws of reason: and though it may require our assent to propositions regarding the transcendental sphere to which reason is inadequate—such as the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity and of Transubstantiation, yet it cannot, in the sphere of phenomena at least, command our assent to a self-contradictory statement. But the assertion that a God who within our experience acts in a cruel and unjust manner is nevertheless not cruel or unjust, is as much a self-contradictory proposition as that two and two make five, or that anything can both be and not be. Faith, indeed, refuses to accept the proposition as truly representing the actual case, but it does so only in virtue of its already acquired certainty of the goodness of God; whereas for those who have no such certainty, and for whom the goodness of God is the very question at issue, no such escape is possible; to many of them the choice, not unnaturally, seems to lie only between Agnosticism and some form of Pessimism.

It is evident, therefore, that some solution of the difficulty is urgently needed; and that the solution must be of a rational nature, if it is to be

effectual. St. Augustine (whom St. Thomas follows) was conscious of the same need in his day; and the solution which I have advocated is really implied in his; though, as Father Gerrard truly says, the apologetic of a past age needs development or restatement, before it can supply the needs of our own.

(2). St. Augustine's reply to the objections, founded on the existence of evil, to the goodness of God, when its implications are expanded, is shortly thus: God has done and does all His actions for His own pleasure, *omnia propter seipsum operatus est Dominus*; but His pleasure in the world is from the contemplation of the harmony and perfection of the whole (cf. *Summa* I, xv, 21), in which harmony evil has a certain place—"ut si qua singillatim fiunt delinquendo deformia, semper tamen cum eis universitas pulchra sit" (*De Gen. ad litt.* 3). But again, it is absolutely right and good that God should please Himself, no less than that His creatures should please Him: consequently the creation of this world for God's pleasure is a right and good act, the goodness of which cannot be impaired by the suffering which man has brought on himself by the misuse of his free-will. But when it is asked why God, is He is good, did not deny Himself this pleasure, in order to save man from the consequences of his free actions, and so abstain from creating; it must be answered, first, that God cannot deny Himself, else He would cease to be God; or in other words, if it were essentially right that God should create this world (as *ex hypothesi* it must have been), then it would have been wrong for Him not to create it; God cannot disobey His own will, or suspend His action on the will of His creatures.

Father Gerrard takes exception to this argument, and adduces, as a parallel to God's action in creating, the action of a father who gives his child a razor to play with. But the case is evidently not parallel; the father has no inducement to give his child a dangerous plaything beyond his desire to amuse the child; but God's principal object in creation is His own pleasure and glory; the comfort of the human race is, at most, only a secondary object. The father may rightly submit his own will, which is to amuse the child, to the child's foreseen perversity in the use of the plaything; but that God should deny Himself His due pleasure in order to prevent man from acting unreasonably to his own hurt is, to anyone who has grasped the nature of the distinction between Creator and creature, simply inconceivable.

Father Gerrard again adduces the providence of God by which men are restrained from conditions under which it is foreseen that they would certainly fall into sin, as an example of what God might conceivably have done in regard to creation; as if God in so restraining men must be supposed to act as He would have acted, if because of His foresight, He had abstained from creating men who would sin. But then again, the parallel is only imaginary: we cannot say that God's only or chief reason for so safeguarding individuals is His desire to preserve them from temptation; indeed, the petition, "Lead us not into temptation" would seem to show that this desire is not a sufficient motive of itself, since our Lord required that the all-powerful influence of prayer should be added to it.

Lastly, Father Gerrard suggests that God might have abstained from creation "not because of the evil He foresaw, but in spite of it." This suggestion seems not a little obscure; and it is only partially elucidated

by what follows—"God, foreseeing (a man's) eternal loss, could have abstained from creating the sinner, and yet in so doing not have been influenced by the action of the sinner." Father Gerrard surely cannot mean that God could have found an excuse, apart from His real reason, for not creating; though this is what his words seem to signify. If they have any other meaning, it can have no bearing on the question under consideration—which is, precisely, whether God, foreseeing man's sin, could have refrained from creating him on that account.

But there is a second answer to the question without which the one now given is, in respect of the Divine goodness, incomplete. God has, in point of fact, denied Himself His own pleasure, and submitted to the will of man, in order to save man from the consequences of his actions. God could not do this simply as God—since, were He to do so, He would thereby (by a wild impossibility) have destroyed Himself. But He became man, submitted to death at the hands of men, and abides still as man among men in His sacramental presence, for the redemption of the human race from sin and from its consequences; and so has vindicated His own goodness, while maintaining His divine supremacy.

(3). Behind all this lies the unfathomable mystery of Creation, in which faith finds abundant scope, but is hampered by no conflict with reason. The mystery of evil is one with that of creation. We cannot know why God for His own pleasure and glory chose to create this world, until we know why He chose to glorify and please Himself by creating anything when He already needed nothing; nor can we really understand (whatsoever Hegelians may tell us) how God, being Himself infinite, could yet bring into being that which is not Himself. This mystery is far above reason and we have no data that will enable us so much as to guess at its explanation. But here there is no contradiction to anything that reason requires us to accept; reason is silent and faith has the last word. Here too, as always, the will is free to choose: God's truth is not so clear as to force itself on minds unwilling to receive it, nor so obscure that "men of good will" can fail to find it when they seek it.

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NOTES.

With the idea of presenting to our readers a "bulletin" of views on the recent decision of the Biblical Commission, we cast about among the periodicals for expressions of opinion concerning it. The labor has produced scanty results. A writer in the *Ecclesiastical*, representing the Catholic conservative school, welcomes the decision; in the *Expository Times*, Dr. Hastings, representing the moderate Protestant school of criticism, considers it a mistake. Here and there we lit upon colorless comments on it, but in general it would seem that the writers are either maturing deep studies on the subject or are fighting shy of it.

At least from the point of view of news, by far the most interesting development on the matter has been an interchange of letters between Professor Briggs and Baron von Hügel, letters which have been published by Longmans under the title *The Papal Commission and the Pentateuch*. Both of the writers present a summary of the arguments which in their opinion render the decision of the Commission concerning the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch an untenable one. With these portions of of the letters we shall not concern ourselves here, as they bear on a question which has been at least temporarily declared closed by ecclesiastical authority. But the letters touch incidentally on a number of interesting topics, some of which were briefly treated in this department last issue.

One of the main points of interest in the affair is the personality of Dr. Briggs. At first impulse, a Catholic might confess to feeling of irritation that a professor of the Union Theological Seminary of New York should express himself even to a Catholic friend as being surprised and dismayed by the ruling of a Papal Commission. This feeling, however, is not one of long duration for one who has followed the course of Dr. Briggs' mind for some years past. To quote Baron von Hügel's testimony concerning him: "When the American Presbyterian Church publicly tried, formally condemned, and crippled you to the best of its ability, it did so on the double ground of your Pentateuchal positions and your Popish heresies; you were as explicitly condemned for insisting on a 'Roish' Purgatory as for holding a 'Rationalist' Hexateuch. And since then you have moved out of the acuter Protestantism of Presbyterianism into the *Via Media* of the Episcopal Church, with its considerable Catholic affinities. Indeed, no man who knows you could doubt the sincerity and generosity with which you recognize, and strive to spread the recognition of, many amongst Rome's special rights and gifts."

Two or three years ago Dr. Briggs spent considerable time in Rome consulting the Catholic authorities, including the Holy Father himself, on the possible basis for a reunion of Christendom. One result of his stay was an article in the *North American Review* (July, 1905) on the "Reform in the Roman Catholic Church," which was quite enthusiastic concerning the character and purposes of the reigning Pontiff. Another and still more noteworthy result was a paper (not yet published) which he read at

a meeting of Protestant clergymen in New York, and in which he proposed a plan for reunion under the headship of the Pope. In his letter to Baron von Hügel he tells some of the assurances which he received while in Rome, and presents his views concerning the influence which such decisions as the recent one will have on the prospect of reunion of other Christian bodies with Rome.

"When we were in Rome together," he writes, "I had the very highest authority for the statement that I have made in many places, that a reasonable amount of liberty would be given in Biblical criticism, so long as its results did not conflict with the established dogmas of the Church." "The Church," he goes on to say, "has never committed itself officially to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; and to recognize that Hebrew laws and institutions were a development of a divinely guided Theocracy, rather than given all at once to Moses at the beginning of the Hebrew Commonwealth, suits the Roman Catholic position as to Christian Dogma and Institutions, better than the usual Protestant position that we must build on the New Testament alone." The theological position presented here is well worthy of consideration.

Concerning the prospects of reunion Dr. Briggs expresses himself as being disheartened by the decision. Speaking of the expectations he had been led to form in Rome, he says: "It would be a great grief to me, and it would dash many hopes to the ground, if it should appear that I have been mistaken, and that I have misled others also." The grounds of this discouragement he expresses later on as follows: "They (the framers of such opinions) weaken the Catholic Church in its entire relation to the Bible; they give the adversaries of the Church an opportunity of asserting its antagonism to Biblical Christianity; they conjure up a fresh conflict with science and erect another stumbling-block to scholars; and build up an additional barrier to the reunion of Christendom."

Another incidental, but none the less interesting, point in the letter is Dr. Briggs' account of the views on Infallibility which he received while in Rome, where he had the rather unusual privilege of an audience on the matter with the Pope himself. There is indeed nothing new in the statement concerning the Papal signature appended to the decision: "the Holy Father assured me that such decisions, even when approved by the Pope, have not the character of infallibility." But an "obiter dictum" on the syllabus of Pius IX is surely worthy of italics: "*The Holy Father himself assured me that it did not come under the category of Infallibility.*" Of course this itself is by no means an infallible decision, though we may expect some over-anxious member of the advanced school to borrow a trick from the repertory of his conservative rivals and hurl anathema against all who dare to go against this opinion of the Holy Father. Such happenings supply an element of humor to the situation. Setting them aside, it is evident that it is a matter of some practical importance that the Pope should have these personal views about the syllabus. By the way, all recent rumors from the Holy City are to the effect that he has put a quietus on the proposed new syllabus, of which we spoke in the recent issue of the Review.

Aside from his arguments about the Mosaic authorship, which we do not intend to discuss, the main interest in Baron von Hügel's reply is his vindication of his course of action in speaking out. It is the old question concerning the relations of the individual to the subordinate authorities in the Church, a question which we touched on in these notes in the last issue. Then we presented and defended the claims of authority to our obedience, and the propriety of the attitude of "Silentium." Certain reservations made in Baron von Hügel's statement of his own position indicate that he would be willing to subscribe at least in part to the views which we set forth. He says that, since the Commission's answer has received the Papal sanction, "its proposals should be criticized only under the pressure of serious necessity and only by men thoroughly conversant with the complex critical problems directly concerned."

He then advances the reasons which in his way of thinking save his course of action from "impertinence" or disloyalty. The answer of the Commission "is not put forward as a Dogmatic Decision, but, apparently, as a simple Direction and Appeal from scholars to scholars. The endorsement of the opinion by working scholars, simply on the ground of scholarship, would evidently be welcomed by the issuing authority; and hence the contrary expression—of difficulty or sheer inability to apply the proposed solutions to the concrete problems of the case—can hardly be taxed as necessarily impertinent." More than that, he contends, loyalty on the part of the workers may demand open speech if the suggestions made by authority be found unworkable: "To speak may be a painful, but is surely a strict duty on the part of such of them as have the honour to be Catholics and who love the Church. For the danger here would lie in the situation itself, not in the respectfully frank admission of its existence: indeed this admission might help to prevent its further accentuation, an accentuation which could not fail to be profoundly damaging to Rome."

In order to reassure Dr. Briggs about the future, he gives four reasons to show that Catholicity can and will in the long run find a place for established modern intellectual positions: it presents itself as an historical religion, and so cannot logically reject historical methods and results; it is a universal religion, and cannot build a wall between itself and the educated portion of the world; it is not merely a Bible religion, and is thus freer in its action than old-time Protestantism; it is an organism, and so is possessed of a principle of development. "Such a development, throughout the strictly revelational period of the Old and New Testaments, has ever been acknowledged by Catholicism on a scale so large as to cover the immense changes from Polygamy to Monogamy and from the *Lex Talionis* to the Law of Forgiveness, since the Church, with grand profundity and courage, refused to follow Marcion and proclaimed the Old Testament to come from the same God as the New."

In conclusion, as a motive for patience he presents a line of thought which, in our opinion, admits of being much more strongly worked out. "I would point out that all Religious Institutions without exception are at their worst in the matter of their relations with Science and Scholarship, doubtless chiefly because they exist, at bottom, as the incorporations and vehicles of requirements and realities, deeper and more immediately

important and necessary than are Science and Scholarship. . . . These Religions and Churches are not, then, mistaken in the primary objects of their work, or in holding them to be thus primary,—the highest and deepest given to man." And with regard to readiness to inflict condemnations he adds, and Dr. Briggs will probably agree with him: "Certainly it is not for Protestant ecclesiastical bodies to throw the stone at Rome in these matters."

Epistles seem to be taking as prominent a part in the development of theology in the Modern as they did in the Primitive Church. Still another letter has been given to the public (also by Longmans), *A Much Abused Letter*, by Rev. George Tyrrell—none other than the much talked of letter to a Continental professor which was the occasion of Father Tyrrell's expulsion from the Society of Jesus. The question as to whether it was wise to publish it is one that admits of discussion; on the whole, however, considering the vague and disquieting rumors which have been afloat concerning it, probably Father Tyrrell has done the best thing in the circumstances by letting those interested read it for themselves. Taken by itself, without preface or notes, it is in some places startling enough, and Father Tyrrell himself is not disposed to be censorious of the action of authorities who, having read it in a translation which made it sound even more disquieting, condemned him for having written it.

But when the reader studies the letter in connection with the preface and the notes; when he considers the special case of need which originally produced it; when he asks himself how others deal and how he would deal with the case of a man who is sincerely attached to the Catholic Faith but is worried by intellectual difficulties to which no one can just yet give an entirely satisfactory answer; when he reads in the notes the restatement in orthodox theological terminology of expressions which shocked through their novelty of language, or historical instances which explain the meaning and bearing of vague generalizations, or in one or two cases a frank withdrawal of forms of expression as being theologically indefensible—after all this he may be still disquieted at a condition of things which would call for such a letter, but he will be reassured (if he had been led to entertain a doubt) as to the loyalty of our foremost Catholic writer to the doctrines and authority of the Church.

Still more letters—this time a collection, or rather collections, of them. Under the title *Lord Acton and His Circle*, Dom Gasquet presented to the public letters written by Lord Acton to Mr. Simpson, his associate editor on the *Rambler*, between 1858 and 1875. These letters have naturally attracted a good deal of attention. They are reviewed in this issue of the *New York Review*. They have been made the subject of reviews or articles in the *Month*, the *Messenger* (by the editor), the *Catholic World* (by Father Thurston and Father Taunton), and in the *Tablet*,—especially in the *Tablet*. Here they received eulogistic notice not only from the reviewer but from "Literary Notes" and from other sources. This chorus of praise appeared to Father Herbert Thurston, S. J., as excessive. Father Thurston it need scarcely be remarked, is no professional heresy-hunter. His own critics would class him as a liberal, and his opinions on certain questions have not

given satisfaction to those devoted to traditional positions. But he could not forget, if others seemed to do so, the famous "Drew Letters" of Lord Acton, in which were expressed shocking statements concerning the moral standards of saints and pontiffs. He set forth his views in the *Tablet*, and in consequence there followed a controversy which became just a little acrid before its close.

As a result of it, however, two points, we think, have been made evident. The first is one of fact, a fact that is gratifying to no one more than it is to the eminent Jesuit who thought it proper to protest against what he considered as the setting up of Lord Acton as the ideal Catholic scholar. It is this: that however "unsatisfactory" a Catholic Lord Acton may be considered to have been during certain periods of his life, the testimony of those who knew him during his latter years, when he was a professor in a great Protestant university, shows him to have been a sincere and practical Catholic. The other point to which we refer is one of literary expediency. It has been well stated by Father Wynne in his article in the *Messenger*. "The fragmentary character of the life-work of the late Lord Acton," he says, "seems destined to repeat itself in the work of his literary executors . . . No doubt, the controversy aroused in the English press on the appearance of *Lord Acton and His Circle* will impress upon his executors the wisdom of withholding further fragments of his literary remains until his life shall have provided a key for them."

Friends of our American Catholic University will find reasons for moderate rejoicing in the recent financial report of the Chancellor, Cardinal Gibbons: "The amount of the collection for 1905-1906 was $100,489.45. As the University is now free from debt, this sum has been employed, partly in meeting current expenses and partly in increasing the endowment fund which at present amounts to $431,290.46, and which is invested in the best securities. By their loyal support our hierarchy and faithful people have enabled the University to discharge fully all its financial obligations and to continue its work during a most critical period without closing a department or releasing a single professor. They have moreover,, by their prompt sympathy, filled us all with fresh confidence and hope and have infused new vigor into the academic life of the University itself. Now that the great trials of the University are over, it remains for us to push on by common endeavor, the development of this great work, having in mind the needs of our schools and colleges and the educational wants of all our people." To one who appreciates the difficulty of raising money by parish collections, the hundred thousand dollars collected will indicate a real and active interest on the part of the priests of the United States in the University. But it is evident that the wealthy Catholics of the country need to be educated up to the level of their opportunities and responsibilities. The University will be put upon a proper financial footing when such men have been taught to emulate the wisdom and generosity of their non-Catholic fellows and contribute large sums to the cause of higher education.

The Ancient Order of Hibernians will provide free scholarships in the Catholic University to worthy students from every State and Territory in the Union. The vote to provide the scholarships was taken in a recent meeting of the board in New York. The

sum of $500 will be annually subscribed by each of the various State boards. It is believed that some States will expend even more than that sum. The Order has already endowed the University with $50,000 for a chair of Gaelic language, which is filled by Professor Dunn, and the plan to send free students to the University is part of the movement to revive the study of the ancient language of Ireland.

A glorious example of generosity in this respect has been set by an eminent Irish Catholic, Mr. William O'Brien, whose life has been devoted to the service of his faith and country. At a meeting held in Cork to discuss means for furthering the efficiency of the Queen's College of that city, he made the offer that if the borough and county councils of the Province of Munster would supply by a slight tax the necessary annual funds for a few years, he and his wife would leave at their death their fortune of $250,000 or more to recompense the councils and put the College on a permanent financial basis. Since in the working of the system of Queen's Colleges, the one founded in Cork has been really made a Catholic institution, this proposal is practically one to endow a Catholic University for the south of Ireland. As Mr. O'Brien says, it does not prejudice the claims of Catholics for a national Catholic University in the city of Dublin.

Convincing testimony of the worth of the recently published Crampon translation of the Bible is given by the reception accorded to it by the Protestants of France and Switzerland. The *Revue Augustinienne* has made a collection of the opinions expressed by Protestant critics. One of them says: "It is remarkable for the mingling of two qualities which are often mutually exclusive: scrupulous fidelity of translation and classic elegance of style. It is at once literal and literary." There is a certain element of naive astonishment in the way in which some of the writers gaze on the unexpected perfections of a work done by a Catholic priest and reviewed and published by the Jesuits. One good pastor says that it has convinced him "qu' on peut s'appeler jésuite et interpreter la sainte parole avec beaucoup de conscience et d'intelligence." The Jesuits have need of a large fund of quiet humor to receive such generous admissions with becoming gravity.

The well-known English medical journal, the *Lancet*, pays a less doubtful tribute to the work of Jesuit scholars in the scientific field: "What visitor to the Vatican has failed to be struck, in the gallery of the Geographical Maps, with the sagacity of the missionaries who framed them—the watershed of sub-equatorial Africa, for example, being given, hypothetically indeed, but with an approximate accuracy which it was reserved for the latter half of the nineteenth century to complete and to ratify? Again, what student of the medical past has forgotten the beautiful story of the discovery of the quinine bearing cinchona and the introduction into the physician's armory of 'Jesuits' bark,' first exhibited in the seventeenth century and since developed into the salt which is to the European sojourner in the tropics what the Davy lamp is to the miner. Even in the modern day the Jesuit remains true to his scientific traditions—witness those worthy descendants of the Père Boscovitch, the Padre Secchi, famed for his *Solar Physics*, and his successor in the directorate of the Vatican Observatory, the Padre Denza."

In this connection we may quote from the Catholic press an interesting paragraph which is not only a testimonial to the present director of the Vatican Observatory, but which also gives evidence that the American laity can be gotten to give generous cooperation to scientific endeavors: "Chicago Catholic laymen, in response to an appeal from the director general of the Vatican observatory, the Rev. Dr. John G. Hagen, S. J., will present as their jubilee offering to Pope Pius X on the occasion of the golden jubilee of his ordination, December 18, 1908, observatory instruments of American manufacture valued at $15,000." Father Hagen, though an Austrian by birth, is an American by adoption, having spent twenty-six years in this country as chief astronomer at Georgetown University, Washington, a position which he filled until last April, when he was appointed by Pope Pius X director of the Papal observatory. While at Georgetown University Father Hagen devoted his time to stellar photography. He is the author and publisher of an *Atlas Stellarum Variabilium*, the fourth series of which will soon be published.

At the opening of the church built at Edgbaston in memory of Cardinal Newman, Archbishop Bourne spoke of him as a witness to the supernatural: "He was meant to be a witness to the supernatural in an age which, for the most part, was forgetful of everything but the concerns of material existence. . . . Again, he was a witness to the necessity of faith, to the great fact that if God exists, and if He has made us, there must be many things in His existence and in our creation and in the providence which is a continuing of that creation, which we can never understand, which we can never adequately explain and which we must, therefore, accept simply and humbly on the word of God Himself, who has been pleased to make them known to us. . . . Lastly, he was a witness to the supremacy of faith. No one, perhaps, was ever more sensible to the difficulties of revelation, and no one could state them more cogently and put them in a form more difficult to refute. And on this account Cardinal Manning did not hesitate to call him 'our greatest witness for the faith,' because, in spite of the clearness of his perception of difficulty, he saw how God's own inspired word must prevail against all difficulties, and that when there is certainty that God has spoken, there can be no place for doubt."

In this connection the Archbishop read an interesting letter which Newman wrote in 1848 in reply to a letter from his father, Mr. Bourne, then a recent convert: "I can only say, if it is necessary to say it, that from the moment I became a Catholic, I never have had, through God's grace, a single doubt or misgiving in my mind that I did wrong in becoming one. I have not had any feeling but one of joy and gratitude that God called me out of an insecure state into one which is sure and safe, out of the war of tongues into a realm of peace and assurance. I shrink to contemplate the guilt I should have incurred, and the account which at the last day would have lain against me had I not become a Catholic, and it pierces me to the heart to think that so many excellent persons should still be kept in bondage in the Church of England, and should, among the many good points they have, want the great grace of faith, to trust God and follow His leadings."

Announcement is made of a forthcoming Catholic quarterly—the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*—to be issued in Belgium under the editorship of a group of Dominican professors, assisted by other Catholic scholars of note, mainly French and Belgian in nationality. In the board of editors we notice the names of Scheil, professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes; Lagrange, director of the Biblical School at Jerusalem and editor of the *Revue Biblique Internationale*; Peillaube, editor of the *Revue de Philosophie*; Mandonnet, O. P.; Dom Cabrol, Abbot of Farnbourough, and a number of the Dominicans who are professors in the University of Freiburg in Switzerland, the Catholic Institute in Paris, the Biblical School at Jerusalem, the theological faculty of Louvain, and the Seminary of Kain in Belgium (the place of publication). The Review will be a quarterly of about 200 pages to the issue. Publication will begin in January next. The price of foreign subscription is fixed at 14 francs per annum. Contributions and subscriptions are to be sent to the review at the address: Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgium.

The general scope of the review is indicated by its title. Further indications of its aims and spirit are given in the prospectus. "By 'philosophical sciences,' we hear mean Logic, Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Psychology and Morals in relation both to society and to the individual, and the History of Philosophy. By 'theological sciences' we wish to indicate not only the branches commonly so-called, but also cognate studies in so far as they bear on theology. Under his heading will be included theological Methodology, speculative Theology, biblical Theology, the History of Doctrine, the History of Ecclesiastical Institutions, the History of Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.

"This breadth of scope gives to the Review a synthetic character which constitutes its main reason for existence and which we intend to maintain as its primary characteristic. It is just here, we believe, that it can answer to a daily increasing need—the need of presenting and comparing methods and results which is felt by specialists who are cooped up in their own departments of study. To attain this end, it must make information one of its principal tasks; on the other hand, the needs of the situation cannot be met by an organ of the semi-popular type; what is required is a publication of a strictly scientific character. Accordingly, the *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* will be scientific in spirit and method. All *parti-pris* will be excluded from original articles as well as from items of news and appreciations of books. To carry out this program, we are assured of the co-operation of specialists in each matter. Thus we hope that this publication, after many others, will be a living proof that sincere Catholic convictions and a filial submission to the authority of the Church are perfectly compatible with scientific exactness."

The Review will be made up of articles, notes, bulletins, a chronicle, and a review of other reviews. The three last-named departments will occupy about half of each number. Two bulletins are promised in each issue. They will consist of a review of books and articles in some special department of study, the idea being to present the latest results and theories so that whatever is new can be easily grasped. The chronicle

will contain bibliographical information of minor importance, notices of meetings of scientific bodies, happenings in universities, etc. The other departments explain themselves. The editors have planned this undertaking on a vast scale, but their names are a guarantee of efficiency and scholarship, and with the host of Catholic scholars in France and Belgium on whom they can call, there can be little doubt that the new Review will fully justify the promises of its prospectus and the hopes of its founders.

The firm of Letouzey et Ané announces the inception of two new series in their grand "Encyclopédie des Sciences Ecclésiastiques." They are a *Dictionnaire du droit Canonique* and a *Dictionnaire de Biographie, d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques*. If carried out (as they no doubt will be) on the same generous plan as the "Dictionnaires" already in course of publication, they will be of the highest service to Catholic scholarship. The three other series now running are making slow but steady progress. The forthcoming "fascicule" of Vigouroux' *Dictionnaire de la Bible* treats NAMSI-OIE; of Mangenot's *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, CONCLAVE-CONFESSION; of Dom Cabrol's *Dictionnaire d' Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie*, ARCHIMANDRITE-AZYMES.

Scribners also announce the completion of the first volume of a new work of reference, the *Dictionary of Christ and of the Gospels*, edited by Dr. Hastings. The purpose of the Dictionary is to give an account of everything that relates to Christ—His person, life, work, and teaching. It treats Christ not only as a Biblical personage, but in His place in subsequent history; and special attention is paid to His relations with various aspects of modern life. The work is prepared with a special view to the needs of the preacher. Although many of the topics have naturally been treated already in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, they are discussed in the later work more fully and from a different point of view. The writers are all Protestants.

After a year's trial, The Dolphin Press has ceased publishing the magazine *Church Music*, as the public for whom it was intended have not accorded it the financial support it has so richly deserved. It will be henceforth issued bi-monthly (instead of quarterly) by the music-publishers, Fischer and Brother of New York. The new editor is Rev. Norman Holly, member of the Pontifical Commission for Church Music and professor in that branch at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N. Y. In a characteristically generous editorial the editor of the *Ecclesiastical Review* rallies his friends to the support of the publication under its new management.

Abbot Ford, whose suggestive papers in the *Tablet* on the question of Inspiration were noted in the initial issue of this Review, has resigned his position as Abbot of Downside. The *Tablet* says: "If anything could temper the universal regret which was felt at the retirement of Abbot Ford, it would be the news that the distinguished scholar, Father Cuthbert Butler, has been chosen to succeed him. The newly elected Abbot, the only son of the late Mr. Edward Butler, is a nephew of Sir. Francis Cruise, M. D., and was born in Dublin in 1858. After passing through the school at Downside with distinction, he entered the novitiate in 1876, and was

ordained priest in 1884. He taught for many years in the school, and eventually became head-master. He is an M. A. of London and Cambridge Universities, and has edited the Lausiac *History of Palladius* in the Cambridge "Texts and Studies," besides being the author of many papers in the *Dublin Review*, the *Hibbert Journal*, and other periodicals. He has also contributed articles to the forthcoming edition of the *Encyclopedia Brittanica* and of the American *Catholic Encyclopedia*, as well as to these columns."

Sir Christopher Nixon, M. D., Dean of the Faculty of the Medical School of the Catholic University, Dublin, has been unanimously elected Vice-President of the Royal University of Ireland to fill the place left vacant by the death of the distinguished and venerable Mgr. Molloy. Honors of this sort seem to be quite the ordinary thing in the career of this eminent physician and devoted Catholic. He has been President of the Royal College of Physicians in Ireland and also President of the Royal Veterinary College, of which he may be called the founder. His life has been devoted not only to the advancement of his own noble profession but also to the cause of higher education in general for Catholics. In recognition of his services for the good of the country he was recently made a baronet by the Crown. It is pleasant to note that his nomination to his new post of honor and influence was made by a Catholic Archbishop, Dr. Healy of Tuam, and seconded by a Presbyterian divine, Dr. Hamilton, President of Queen's College, Belfast.

During the past few months religion and learning have lost the services of three Catholic laymen who were of various nationalities, and were devoted to different pursuits, but who were at one in their devotion to the Catholic faith: an Italian physician—Dr. Lapponi; a British economist—Mr. Devas; and a French man of letters—M. Brunetière. Dr. Lapponi was best known to popular fame as the attending physician of Leo XIII and of Pius X. This position, however, was not obtained by accident or by favor, but was a result of his high standing in his profession. Throughout his life he displayed a keen and intelligent interest in the advancement of his chosen branch of science, and also in questions of religion which bordered on fields which he had made his own.

A still more serious loss is suffered by the rather sudden death of M. Ferdinand Brunetière, member of the French Academy and editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. His position as editor of that periodical as well as his remarkable power as a critic had made him for a number of years past a sort of literary arbiter, in France, especially for those who kept the best traditions of the French classical literature. His position as literary critic rested not solely on his quickness of intuition and refinement of taste; it had a solid basis of erudition. His historical studies on the literature of his country and his constructive work on lyric poetry and similar topics gave him the authority of the *savant* as well as that of the seer. His return to allegiance to the faith of his baptism some years ago was an event of worldwide interest; and since that time he has devoted himself, tongue and pen, to the now allied causes of religion and liberty in France. Among his works of this period are his two series of essays entitled *Discours de Combat*, his *Cinq Lettres sur Ernest Renan*, and a

philosophical work, *L'Utilisation du Positivisme*. This latter work was announced by him as the "first stage" on the road to faith, "sur les chemins de la croyance." He intended to supplement it with further studies, first to lessen the difficulties of faith, and then to establish the transcendent nature of Christianity. His health, however, could not stand the excessive strain he put upon himself, and these works and many others which his teeming brain might have produced, are lost to us forever.

Concerning the life and work of Mr. Charles Stanton Devas, we cull the following notice from the *Tablet*: "Born in 1848, he was educated at Eton, and Balliol College, Oxford. A member of Lincoln's Inn, in 1876, he accepted the position of Professor of Political Economy at the Catholic University College, which had then been recently opened, under Mgr. Capel. For nine years he was Examiner in Political Economy to the Royal University of Ireland. His best known works are *Groundwork of Economics*, published in 1884, and *Key to the World's Progress*, published only a few months ago. He was a man of wide culture, and his literary and philosophical studies brought him into contact with the leading men of the day. He was also a frequent contributor to *The Dublin Review*, *The Economic Journal*, and *The International Journal of Ethics*. He also read papers on more than one occasion before the British Association. A convert to the Catholic Church at an early age, he was through life one of the most devoted of her sons, and his pen was always at her service."

The passage at arms of the Genoese Oratorian, Father Cereseto, and Dom Amelli, Prior of Monte Cassino, has become the occasion of a more general combat. The fact that many Catholic periodicals in France and Italy took sides with the Benedictine scholar aroused the fighting spirit of Father Prévost-Badino, a confrère of Padre Cereseto. He devotes a booklet to parrying with Dom Amelli, while in a letter to the priests of Italy he slashes indiscriminately at Lagrange, Minocchi, Prat, Durand, Bonaccorsi, von Hügel, Hogan, Fracassini—every learned head in sight. His onslaught has drawn upon him the attention of a most worthy representative of Catholic scholarship, the eminent Jesuit, Père Condamin, who says of him: "He does not seem to have gotten a right idea of the seriousness of the problems now disputed, nor to have a proper feeling of respect for the character of the writers whom he attacks. Exegetes from the ranks of the secular clergy and the religious Orders who are putting forth views with the approbation of their Ordinaries, have the right to be not classed with rash and dangerous 'neo-critics.' At any rate, if they are to be refuted, let it be done without falsifying their statements. In place of giving currency to false views by attributing them to reputable Catholic scholars, it would be better to make a serious study of the Bible and so bring to bear on the topics under discussion a fair and unbiased judgment."

Some months ago we noted the adverse report on the authenticity of the Holy House of Loretto, originally made by the Barnabite Leopoldo da Feis in the *Rassegna Nazionale*, and afterwards presented to French and English readers respectively by M. Boudinhon in the *Revue du Clergé Français* and by Father Conway in the *Catholic World*. The question was even then being investigated independently by a well known French

scholar, Canon Ulysse Chevalier, who presents the facts and his conclusions in a very carefully documented work, *Etude historique sur l'authenticité de la Santa Casa.* His opinions do not differ from those of da Feis except in his manner of accounting for the origin of the mistake. There are numerous indications that Canon Chevalier's work will be accepted as decisive. Father Lepidi, the Dominican who holds the important post of Master of the Sacred Palace, has approved of the work, unofficially indeed, but none the less effectively. M. Léon Clugnet, writing in the *Polybiblion*, avers that his own studies had been turned in the same direction by two Jesuit hagiographers. The critics in the organ of the Order of St. Benedict, the *Revue Benedictine*, and in that of the Assumptionists, the *Revue Augustinienne*, have received the book with praise. In the *Tablet* the matter has been presented in a similar spirit by Edmund Bishop, and, what is still more significant, the same attitude is frankly assumed by the learned Jesuit Father De Smedt in his extensive review of Chevalier's work in the last issue of the *Analecta Bollandiana.* So far therefore as scientific authority is concerned, the question may be considered as settled.

The National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws, in its second annual meeting held recently at Philadelphia, recommends that the States limit the number of causes for which divorces may be granted to six: infidelity, imprisonment for felony, bigamy, desertion, habitual drunkenness, and intolerable cruelty. To a Catholic the list seems long enough, to say the least, and yet, taking the country as a whole, it would work a great improvement in present conditions if the grounds for divorce were limited to those recommended. And that is a sad commentary on the drift of things. In this connection we may call attention to an article by Dr. Gigot in the present number of this REVIEW, which begins a series of studies on Divorce in the New Testament. They will contain no *parti-pris* or special pleading—only a calm objective evaluation of the texts with the object of discovering the mind of Christ and of the Church of the Apostles on the permanence of the marriage bond.

BOOK REVIEWS.

A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels—Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, D. D.with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, D.D. Vol. I. Aaron —Knowledge. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. In 4to pp. xii—930; in two columns. Price $6.00.

With the present Dictionary (the second and last volume of which will appear within the present year) the indefatigable Dr. Hastings has once more placed ministers of the word, Bible students, theologians, apologists, and the Christian public at large under a real obligation, and has established for himself a new claim on their sincere gratitude. As the editor of the interesting and scholarly magazine, the *Expository Times* (published by him since its foundation in 1890) and of the *Dictionary of the Bible* (published in 1898-1904, in five volumes; reviewed in the June-July number of THE NEW YORK REVIEW) he has already gained the respect and admiration of all scholars who have at heart the interests and real progress of Biblical studies. Having supplied the student with the monumental Bible Dictionary, he comes now more particularly to the aid of ministers and preachers by the publication of a work in which they will find a real treasury of information concerning the august person of Christ. The works and teachings of the Savior as contained in the Gospels and other available sources are viewed not only in the light of tradition, but also in that of recent sober biblical criticism and theological learning.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the present Dictionary is either an expansion or a recast of the New Testament articles contained in the same editor's *Dictionary of the Bible;* it is a new work, conceived on a different plan from that of the other; the purpose is different as is also the corps of contributors. It is a new and independent work, quite original in form, conservative and reverent in tone. The underlying apologetic purpose does not interfere with the scientific character of the volume, which is strictly scientific in method, but on the whole it will appeal to the earnest theologian and scholarly preacher rather than to those biased hypercritics who are more drawn to sensational and revolutionary hypotheses than to sober scientific discussion.

The purpose and plan of the Dictionary is thus described by the editor himself. "The purpose of the Dictionary is to give an account

of everything that relates to Christ—His person, Life, Work and Teaching. It is in a sense complementary to the *Dictionary of the Bible*, in which, of course, Christ has a great place. But a Dictionary of the Bible, being occupied mainly with things biographical, geographical or antiquarian, does not give attention to the things of Christ sufficient for the needs of the preacher, to whom Christ is everything. This is first of all, a preacher's Dictionary. The authors of the articles have been carefully chosen among those scholars who are, or have been themselves preachers. And even when the articles have the same titles as articles in the *Dictionary of the Bible*. they are written by new men, and from a new standpoint. It is thus a work which is quite distinct from, and altogether independent of the *Dictionary of the Bible*. It is called a *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, because it contains everything that the Gospels contain, whether directly related to Christ or not. Its range, however, is far greater than that of the Gospels. It seeks to cover all that relates to Christ throughout the Bible and in the life and literature of the world. There will be articles on the Patristic estimate of Jesus, the Medieval estimate, the Reformation and modern estimates. There will be articles on Christ in the Jewish writings and in the Muslim literature. Much attention has been given to modern thought, whether Christian or anti-Christian. Every aspect of modern life, in so far as it touches or is touched by Christ, is described under its proper title. Still, the Gospels are the main source of our knowledge of Christ, and it will be found that the contents of the Gospels, especially their spiritual contents, have never before been so thoroughly investigated and set forth."

An enumeration of some of the articles included in the first volume will serve to give an idea of the originality of the Dictionary as well as of the thorough carrying out of its plan. *Abgar* (his person and his legendary correspondence with Christ); *Absolution* (i. e. Our Lord's words for absolution, and the history of Absolution in the Church); *Accommodation* (i. e. the principle or law according to which God seems to adapt His self-revelation to the capacities and limitations of created intelligences, covering the principal mysteries of Jewish and Christian revelation), a thorough and suggestive article occupying ten full pages; *Adultery; Advent; Affliction and Agony; Agriculture* (in the New Testament); *Almsgiving; Alpha and Omega; Angels; Anger; Announcement of Death* (of our Lord); *Annunciation; Apostles; Apocalyptic Literature* (16 pages); *New Testament Apocrypha; Ascen-*

sion; Asceticism; Atonement; Authority of Christ; Authority in Religion; Baptism; Beatitude; Belief; Betrothal; Birth of Christ (a valuable article on the various Gospel, Jewish and Christian traditions concerning the birth of Christ), in seven pages; *Blessing; Boyhood of Christ* (discussed in the light of what is known of Jewish boyhood at the time of Christ); *Blood, Body and Water* (in the New Testament), *Brethren of the Lord* (an able and exhaustive article contributed by Dr. C. Harris); *Christian Calendar*, by A. J. McLean, (a very scholarly and suggestive study, covering 14 pages, and in which the following topics are treated, viz. the Christian Week, the Lord's Day, Wednesday and Friday, Saturday, the Christian year, Easter, Early observance of Easter, the Quartodeciman Controversy, Determination of Easter, Paschal Cycles, the Fast before Easter, Palm Sunday, Maundy Thursday, Easter Week, Pentecost and Ascension, Christmas and Epiphany, Advent, Presentation of Christ in the Temple, Commemoration of Saints, Recapitulation of festal Cycles etc.); *Children of God; Christ in Art; Christian* (the name); *Christianity; Church; Circumcision; Circumstantiality in the Parables; Communion with Christ; Confession* (of Christ); *Circumcision* (of Christ); *Corban; Criticism* (containing a comprehensive survey of the various views and estimates regarding the person, character and teachings of Christ put forward by ancient writers and modern critics, together with a critical appreciation of these views) in 12 pages; *Cross and Crucifixion; Date* (of Christ's Nativity, Baptism, public Ministry and Crucifixion) an important article covering ten pages. *Day of Judgment; Death of Christ; Demoniacal Possession* (in the New Testament; *Diseases* (in the N. T.); *Divinity of Christ* (16 pages); *Divorce* (in the N. T.); *Ebionism; Education of Christ; Christ's entry into Jerusalem; Eschatology in the New Testament* (11 pages); *Eternal Fire; Eternal Punishment; Eternal Life; Christ and Evolution* (a timely article); *Fact and Theory* (about Christ and Christianity); *Faith; Fall* (in its relation to the Incarnation); *Father and Fatherhood; Feeding Multitudes; Flight* (of the Holy Family into Egypt); *Forgiveness of Sin; Friendship* (pre-Christian and Christian); *Genealogies of Jesus* (in the Gospels with reference to the O. T. genealogies); *Golgotha; Gospels*, (canonical and apocryphal), a very exhaustive article of 26 pages; *Happiness* (Pagan and Christian); *Hardening of Heart; Hell* (Christ's descent into); *Herod and the Herodians; Holiness* (of Christ in the Gospels); *Holy Spirit* (14 pages); *Hosanna; Humanity of Christ; Humiliations of Christ; Humility of Christ; Hypocrisy; Leading Ideas of Christ* (con-

cerning God's kingdom on earth, purity of heart, the soul, the universality of love, self-renunciation, Fatherhood of God, the Son of God and the Son of Man, Faith, Paraclete, future life, etc.); *Immanuel; Immortality* (10 pages); *Incarnation* (19 pages); *Individuality of Christ; Jerusalem* (article of 11 pages by F. W. Masterman); *John the Baptist; John the Apostle; Gospel of John and its Theology* (two learned articles by R. H. Strachan and W. R. Inge) covering 28 pages; *Joseph; Judas Iscariot* (7 pages); *Justice and Justification; Kindness of Christ; Kingdom of God* (or Heaven) etc., etc., etc.

The above rapid enumeration covers hardly more than one third of the volume. The contributors are scholars of long recognized ability in the various topics assigned to them, and are no less than one hundred and eighty in number, all of them with the exception of eight being clergymen and theologians by profession. Among them are such scholars as W. F. Adeney, B. W. Bacon, A. Bonus, A. W. Cooke, W. Th. Davison, M. Dods, A. E. Garvie, Ch. Harris, W. R. Inge, J. T. Marshall, J. Moffat, L. A. Muirhead, W. O. Oesterly, A. Plummer, J. Robertson, W. Sanday, W. B. Stevenson, R. H. Strachan, G. Voss, T. H. Weir, T. H. Wright, etc. Among the lay contributors mention may be made of E. W. Masterman, of the Palestine Exploration Fund, in Jerusalem; Eberhard Nestle, Greek and Syriac scholar and New Testament exegete of Maulbronn; Arthur Peake of Manchester; John Weiss, one of the leading New Testament exegetes of Germany, professor at the University of Marburg, etc.

It is a pleasure to remark that the tone of the articles, the theological attitude and standpoint of the various contributors are extremely reverential, sober and judicious. In our opinion the Dictionary cannot fail to be very useful to all Christian clergymen and scholars Catholic as well as Protestant. The criticism is fair, the learning sound, and the abundant material is set forth clearly and in an attractive garb. In form and size the Dictionary of Christ is similar to the *Dictionary of the Bible* of which it is the complement and counterpart.

It is further announced that the same distinguished editor has in preparation two other dictionaries, one on Philosophy, the other dealing with Theology, Patrology and Christian Literature. It is to be hoped that Dr. Hastings will be granted sufficient health and vigor to bring to a successful issue his well devised plans, and both he and his contributors are to be congratulated on the excellent work already accomplished. The eminent services rendered to the theo-

logical and classical world some thirty or forty years ago by another Englishman, William Smith, editor of several Dictionaries excellent for their time, are being more than superseded by Dr. Hastings in the more modern and more exhaustive works that bear his name.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

Essays in Pastoral Medicine—BY O'MALLEY AND WALSH. Longmans, Green and Co. 1906.

Medicine and Theology as sciences, are both subject to the laws of progress and development which control the evolution of every branch of human knowledge. The science of medicine in obedience to these laws, has made advances little short of the marvelous within recent decades. In this advancement much light has been thrown upon not a few obscure and vexing problems with the result that many a conjectural position has been raised to the rank of certainty and many a position once admitted as safe and secure has been found untenable and as such abandoned.

As a matter of fact the development that has taken place within this favored field, has within a fractional part of a century, revolutionized the whole science. This of course must have its bearing upon theology, which as we know is an extremely conservative science, one that moves slowly yet none the less surely. There are many problems within the domain of theology a solution of which can not satisfactorily be given, unless the theologian has at hand, as his working material, a mass of data to be obtained only from the cultivated fields of medical research. That this is true may be ascertained by a cursory glance at some of the opinions advocated even in recent times by learned theologians. Here it becomes at once evident that serious errors have been admitted because decisions have been formulated independent of, in some instances despite, the assistance proffered by the ancillary science of medicine. Impressed then with the need of such a work, we are happy to be able to say a word of praise in behalf of the volume open before us. Many an effort has been made in the past to produce a treatise on pastoral medicine but such attempts have in too many instances been abortive or have resulted in the production of a more or less valueless treatise on hygiene. This can not be said of the work now claiming our attention. It is beyond doubt pastoral and medical and in its plain yet thorough and scientific treatment of the obscure problems within its scope leaves very little

to be desired. The essays are presented, according to their authors, "to serve as a temporary bridge in crossing the bog until better engineers lay down a more permanent causeway." The modesty of these bridge builders is in keeping with the learned and deep scholarship, medical and theological, that is displayed in the construction of this book, and our own opinion is that they themselves, as competent and skilful engineers, have succeeded in placing upon a firm footing the basic structure of the permanent causeway.

In the first essay stress is laid upon the difficulty of positive diagnosis in suspected cases of extra-uterine pregnancy and upon the advisability or the permissibility of operation in these worrisome cases. This of course is an important matter and it is at once apparent that when spiritual advisers are conversant with the facts here stated they will be the more fitted, as well as the more willing to undertake the responsibility of a practical decision in matters the outcome of which is so frequently a fatal one to soul as well as body.

Of no less importance are the essays on abortion and craniotomy, studied in connection with the decisions of the Holy Office on these grave subjects.

A very interesting if not practical essay is that on human monstrosities with special reference to the administration of the sacraments. A most important chapter is the one dealing with the moment of death. In this section there is given a description of the position taken by physiologists of the present day on this point. Experiment has proven that the human heart can be made to functionate at least one hour and maybe longer after death has seemed to supervene. In support of this contention a number of interesting cases are cited in which by simple manual compression of the heart substance, animation was restored to what seemed to be a lifeless body. This of course was proof positive that the soul had not abandoned its earthly tabernacle. The significance of this discovery is beyond estimation. Theology must be more than a little indebted to those vivisectionists whose courage and skill have made it possible to clothe with the sanctifying grace of the sacraments a soul still tenanting a supposedly lifeless tenement of clay. This position now established must be reckoned with by all whose duty leads them to the administration of the sacraments: for as the writer says, "the number of complete and partial resuscitations are enough to justify a priest in giving conditional absolution or baptism within an hour or even two hours after a patient has to all appearance died, especially in accident cases."

In the discussion of the question of hypnosis and its bearing on crime the author states that "subjects cannot be brought by hypnotic influence to perform actions that are directly contrary to their own feelings of right and wrong." Though there is something to be said on the opposite side of this question, yet it is well to keep this conclusion in mind, as it has a bearing on certain disquieting cases which present themselves from time to time in the confessional.

The attitude of the writer in the section devoted to the consideration of suicide is worthy of note. Statistics are quoted to show the increase of this crime within recent years. "The higher the scale of civilization, the greater the material progress, and the more strenuous the life, the higher the death rate. . . . The saddest feature of the suicide situation is the increasing number of the children who commit suicide . . . Our modern newspapers by supplying all the details of every suicide that occurs, especially if it presents any criminally interesting features, familiarize the mind particularly of the impressionable young with the idea of suicide." There is something here to meditate upon and maybe to preach about if not from the pulpit, at least into the ears of those who mould public opinion or who control the consciences of morality-loving lawmakers. Other points discussed in the various essays are mental diseases and spiritual direction, hysteria, venereal infections as affecting marriage, alcohol and patent remedies, the relations of priest and physician. This last is a plea for cordial co-operation on the part of both, with a warning to the clergyman to remember that the field of medicine is not ex officio his domain.

A careful examination of chapter VIII will more than repay the labor. Certainly too much importance cannot be attached to the question of alcoholism and its bearing upon responsibility; upon marriage; upon idiocy. In this connection a strong word of warning is spoken anent the admission into our seminaries of students in whose families there is a tendency, acquired or inherited, to the over-use of this drug. "If bishops," says the writer, "would investigate the alcoholic tendencies of the families of candidates for seminaries, and reject all that have this taint, there would be much less scandal. It is a serious error of judgment to ordain a seminarian that has even once been under the influence of alcohol . . . " We may not fully agree with this decision, but all will be led to admit the necessity of extreme caution in this matter, freighted as it is with possibilities of danger for religion and society. The prudence of the authors in treating in the Latin tongue the delicate subject of impotency as a

diriment impediment is to be commended. A strong light is thrown upon the much discussed question, and a solution is offered at once broad and intelligent and in full accord with the teachings of theology.

An interesting appendix which has for its topic the Bloody Sweat brings the work to a close. The psychic and physiological elements of this phenomenon are set before the reader clearly and forcefully. The position assumed is that this by no means exceptional condition may be natural, or may be produced by supernatural causes and hence the dictum of certain scientists who would throw out of court every case of the kind as one which can by no means be held as miraculous, is to be ignored. By way of criticism it may be said that some of the essays pre-suppose a little too much medical learning for the theologian, or too much theological erudition on the part of the physician. Again, Dr. O'Malley's contention that extraction of an immature ectopic fetus is not clearly condemned by the Holy Office, needs to be corrected, to bring it in harmony with the decision of March 5th, 1902.

The book is a strong solid scientific presentation of topics a knowledge of which is helpful, and in some points essential, to the clergy and to the members of the medical profession. It is a contribution of value to the literature of a subject not yet fully explored.

J. Leo.

Lord Acton and His Circle.—Edited by Abbot Gasquet, O. S. B. Longmans, Green & Co.

The first feeling the reader has in opening this enormous volume is one of annoyance with its extreme and unnecessary bulk. The habit of using extra thick paper in book-making has become common of late, and the present volume is an extreme instance of the fad. One takes it up expecting to find it running to the thousand pages or so, while in reality it does not attain to half that number. The awkwardness of handling such volumes, not to mention the space they take up, leads us to hope that this paper fad is not going to continue.

As to the book itself, it is one of considerable and permanent value, both as to its contribution towards the proper understanding of an interesting and somewhat vexed period of English Catholic annals, and also as to the light it throws upon the life and character of the remarkable man who is its hero.

The title of the book is somewhat misleading. Knowing beforehand, from press notices, that the volume was to consist of letters of Lord Acton, and remembering the large number of distinguished men of whom his "circle" was composed—Gladstone, Newman, Döllinger to mention no others—one's expectations were aroused at the prospect of the feast of good things to be looked for in his correspondence with such men. The reality, however, is quite different. Not that there is not much of real interest in these letters, much also which adds largely to our knowledge of the mind of the writer; but, with few exceptions, they are written to one man, and he by no means the best-known of Acton's "circle," Simpson, editor with Acton of the *Rambler* and of the *Home and Foreign Review*, into which the former periodical was eventually transformed. Besides that there are a few letters relative to other periodical ventures in which Acton was, less directly, interested. Accordingly it is but one phase of the man's life that is here set before us, that of his connection with or direction of journalistic enterprises designed to advance the ideas of himself and his associates, in religion and kindred subjects mainly, but also in education, politics and social science.

It has been often a subject of wonder to those who know of Lord Acton only his immense reputation for learning (Mr. Gladstone's description of him as the most learned man in Europe is well-known) that, with the exception of the plan and beginning of the Cambridge Universal History, he has left behind him no literary monument to sustain and explain that reputation.[1] Such wonder will have an end when one reads this book. Through the channel of periodical literature a man like Acton could indeed hope to do much in influencing and moulding the thought of his contemporaries, but to throw himself into it as Acton did, to expend in its production the time and energy and research which this book exhibits him as doing, necessarily means his foregoing the thought of leaving behind him a literary memorial of a more enduring character. An editor such as was Acton has simply no time to write books.

This volume fully justifies Lord Acton's reputation for learning. His knowledge is encyclopedic. How in such a busy life (he was a member of Parliament too and no idle one) he ever found time for the reading he did, must remain a marvel. No less admirable is his conception of his editorial duties, his determination, so far as his own

[1]As another exception must now be noted his lectures on modern History just published by Macmillans.

contributions were concerned, to give his constituency of his very best and to secure the highest possible standard from his other writers, his conscientiousness, his carefulness as to the smallest details—all this is wholly admirable and will be a revelation to many as to what an editor's work may be.

Abbot Gasquet contributes to the volume an introduction of considerable length (as well as numerous explanatory footnotes through out the book) giving in detail the history of the various periodicals referred to in the letters. The total effect of the picture presented to us is one of much interest. We see Acton and Simpson, eager, enthusiastic, full of ideas many of which they know are held suspect by the powers that be, the sword of a possible official condemnation hanging constantly over them, planning how best to avoid this and yet say all their say—the picture is one which cannot but arouse interest, different as will be the feelings it will awaken in different minds. The editor has undertaken this work, we have been told, as a "reconciliation." The somewhat acrimonious correspondence evoked by the appearance of this volume, in the columns of the London *Tablet* prove that there is need for such reconciliation. Whether the present volume will prove to be so remains to be seen. Without doubt, many utterances of Lord Acton, notably in the published volume of his letters to Mary Gladstone, have been a cause of grief and irritation to Catholics and the Abbot has been accused, in his wish to clear Acton's reputation as a Catholic, of making a careful selection of the letters, such as would produce the effect desired. There seems to be no ground for such accusation. The editor had evidently determined to confine his labors to one phase and period of Acton's life and work, that of his connection with Catholic periodical literature, and, as to that, the matter provided seems to be exhaustive. The Abbot, in answer to criticism, has made the statement that he has included every letter of any importance bearing on the period in question; (our only complaint in the matter is that he has been too generous; some of the letters included, or parts of them, might well have been spared). Accordingly the materials are ample for forming a judgment as to Acton's editorial action in respect of the Catholic Church, whether it was dominated by a spirit of loyalty to the Church and her teachings or by one of criticism, self-will and contempt of authority. It seems to us that this book will require the abandonment of the latter opinion—somewhat widely held as it has been—in regard to Acton's editorial work. Simpson stands out as the pugnacious member of the firm,

eager to fight, careless of provoking a rupture. Newman evidently regards him as an *enfant terrible.* Acton writes to him that Newman is very much annoyed at his (Simpson's) habit of pea shooting at any dignitary who happened to look out at the window as he passed along the street. Acton himself, however, is shown to be animated by a different spirit. True, the aim of the *Rambler* and other magazines with which he was connected were so widely different from those set forth for instance by Cardinal Wiseman as proper for a Catholic review, that friction was almost inevitable, friction for which, in some cases at least, there was blame on both sides. But there is nothing here to show that Acton was not sincerely and heartily a Catholic, and also extremely anxious to avoid writing anything or having anything written which could give just cause of offense to those in authority. To pass from this, however, to giving Acton, so to speak, a clean bill of health as a Catholic, and, on the strength of these letters, proclaiming him, as some recent critics have done, "a valuable asset for Catholicism," is another matter. This cannot be done without taking into account his later activities and utterances, as to which, it is evident, there is considerable disagreement. With this, however, we have not at present to do. It is sufficient to express our indebtedness to Abbot Gasquet for the present publication, which largely increases our knowledge of a remarkable man and some interesting episodes in ecclesiastical affairs.

SAMUEL P. MACPHERSON.

The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A. D., 325. Ten Volumes. Charles Scribners' Sons; New York. 1903.

Various causes have contributed to what might almost be described, within limits, as a "popular" revival of interest in the Fathers at the present time. Within the Church, of course, on account of our views on the importance of Tradition, patristic studies have always occupied a more or less prominent place. Especially in the post-Tridentine period magnificent work was done by the Catholic scholars in collecting and editing the literature of the early Church. And the Church has arranged it that every one of her priests shall be a bit of a patrologist, so far at least as Breviary lessons and texts from the Fathers in theology manuals can produce the effect.

But nowadays this study, like every other, is caught up in a wider sweep of thought. The new and acute interest in New Testament

problems has broadened the field of inquiry for many who formerly would have been content to study the wording of the Sacred Text as all-sufficient in itself. Even though the Catholic view of the Fathers as witnesses of orthodox faith be not accepted, it is recognized that their writings are necessary aids for the study of the date, authorship, and interpretation of the New Testament books. And apart from purely religious and apologetic considerations, the patristic writings, especially those of the earlier centuries, occupy a central place in the interest of students by reason of the dominant tendency of modern scholarship to study origins and development. All questions have become historical questions; and the most important historical questions are those which treat of beginnings and processes of growth.

Fortunately for us, this application of the law of development to Christian ideas was first definitely made by a great Catholic theologian, Cardinal Newman, who gave us a thread to guide us through what otherwise might have proved a labyrinth. And in the numerous discussions which have arisen of late in connection with patristic studies, Catholic scholars have more than held their own. We may instance Funk, Bardenhewer, Turmel, Loisy, Batiffol, Vacandard, Tixeront, Lepin, Chapman.

The diffusion of interest in questions formerly confined to specialists gives a new value to works such as that under review, which are intended to serve as aids to those to whom the problems at issue are important but who find it difficult or irksome to deal with original texts. And one easily grows rusty in his Greek. Of course, no translation quite takes the place of the original, but common experience shows that with a good translation of the Bible, it is usually not difficult to follow the course of even a scholarly argument on the meaning and bearing of the Sacred Text.

And these translations of the early Fathers (originally edited forty years ago by two learned Scotchmen, Principal Donaldson and Professor Roberts) are good, readable, and all things considered, fair and scholarly. The editors sum up the purpose and result of their labors in a singularly brief and modest preface: "Their object has been to place the English reader as nearly as possible on a footing of equality with those who were able to read the original. With this view they have for the most part leaned towards literal exactness; and whenever any considerable departure from this has been made, a *verbatim* rendering has been given at the foot of the page. Brief introductory notices have been prefixed, and short notes inserted, to

indicate varieties of reading, specify references, or elucidate any obscurity which seemed to exist in the text."

Twenty years later the present American edition was produced by the Christian Literature Co., of New York under the editorship of Right Rev. A. Cleveland Coxe, of Buffalo. The good bishop has not contributed to the fairness of the production, but his funny little notes are not likely to do much harm—or good. In 1896 a new volume (volume ix) was added, edited by Prof. Allan Menzies, D. D. It contains Origen's commentaries on St. Matthew and St. John, and (its main purpose) the recently discovered additions to early Christian Literature, especially the Gospel of St. Peter and the Diatessaron of Tatian. The two latter are especially well edited, the references to the canonical Gospels being carefully given.

Some idea of the extent of the field covered in these ten portly volumes can be gained by a rapid glance at the names of the better known works they contain—Clement of Rome, Polycarp, Ignatius, Barnabas, Papias, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Novatian, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Origen (not complete), Methodius, Arnobius, Lactantius, Theodotus, Melito, Hegesippus, Serapion, Pantaenus, the *Didache*, the early Liturgies, the Apocrypha of the New Testament, the Decretals, and Syriac documents.

The Index deserves special mention. In addition to a number of brief historical prefaces on the different writers and their works, each volume contains an extensive bibliography and an exhaustive general index for the eight original volumes. The bibliography first takes up each work separately, giving references to Editions, Translations, and Literature. In an appendix to this section there is a list of general works, such as patrologies, collections, and Church histories. The bibliography comes down to 1887, but up to that date it is very good. Works of varied merit have been referred to on account of "the scanty and heterogeneous collections on which American scholars must depend for their tools;" but frequently a brief note is added to indicate the value of the work. The General Topical Index occupies 72 three-column pages in fine print. The General Scriptural Index takes all the texts of the Bible which occur in the early Fathers and arranges them by book, chapter and verse with reference to volume and page of the series. The Deutero-Canonical books are not passed over.

All in all, therefore, and in spite of some defects—the only ones worth mentioning are that it is not quite up to date, and that Bishop Coxe was ever allowed to have anything to do with it—it is an excellent and useful work. No one who wishes to pursue studies in theology, scripture or early Church history should be without it; nor need he, since the price at which the present publishers offer it is within the compass of a modest purse.

FRANCIS P. DUFFY.

The Queen's Tragedy—by ROBERT HUGH BENSON. Pitman's, London,; B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo.

With the present volume Father Benson completes his trilogy of historical romances dealing with the period of the English Reformation, though the books have not been written, or at least published in chronological order, the present, though last published, being the intermediate one of the three. The first published "By What Authority" is distinctly the best of the series, but "The Queen's Tragedy" though inferior to that in interest and skill of execution, yet well repays perusal, and, even by itself, would establish the reputation of its author in this field of literature. The "Queen" is Mary Tudor, whose brief and troubled reign has been for long a happy hunting ground of fierce religious controversy, and Father Benson directs his efforts, as we should expect from his former works, not to presenting us with the picture of a flawless heroine to take the place of the bloody-minded persecutor shown us in Foxe's "Book of Martyrs," but to giving us a true picture of a life with both its lights and shadows and of the conditions and surroundings which helped to make it what it was and which explain if they do not justify what in it we cannot commend. Mary is the principal figure in the book; the interest centres round her in a way which is true neither of Elizabeth or Henry VIII in the two previously published novels. Unlike most romances, the hero of the story is involved in no love affair; the only love story of any consequence in the book is the strange and unfortunate one of Mary herself with Philip of Spain which added so largely to the troubles of her brief reign. The interest of the book so centres around the unhappy Queen that the other characters for the most part seem somewhat shadowy, and to anyone coming to this volume as one ordinarily comes to a novel the result would probably prove disappointing. We can promise a different result however to anyone coming to it

hoping to get some intelligent understanding of a much misunderstood character. The character of Mary Tudor is not one which is attractive on the surface, nor does Father Benson succeed in (or perhaps, we should say, aim at) making us love her, but he enables us to understand her, to sympathize with her, to see what were the hard conditions which thwarted, to the extent they did, the fair promise of a life at heart noble and sincere. We can see how the bitter experiences of her early days had tended to sour and harden her disposition and so to create a barrier between her and not only the great body of her subjects but even those nearest to her and most devoted to her interests. It is a moving picture which Father Benson sets before us. We see Mary first in the brief sunshine of the early days of her reign—the reconciliation of the kingdom with Rome and the completion of the Spanish match on which she had set her heart—sunshine however so soon to be lost in the dark clouds of disappointment and failure—her people cold and unresponsive, her husband neglectful and faithless, plottings at home, the loss of territory abroad, finally the pathetic death scene. It is all very touching, very convincing and we have no doubt will to many for the first time set in a light of sympathetic interest the character of one of the most hardly dealt with of historical figures. We trust this will not be the last effort of Father Benson in a department of literature for whose treatment he shows himself so well equipped.

SAMUEL P. MCPHERSON.

The Religion of the Plain Man—by FATHER ROBERT HUGH BENSON. Burns & Oates, London.

Father Benson's literary activity is remarkable. The appearance of another volume of his so close on the heels of that above noticed, might raise a doubt as to whether quality was not being sacrificed to quantity, were it not for this fact that we learn from the introduction that this book consists merely of lectures delivered in the Church at Cambridge to which the author is attached. The book is controversial though cast in a different form from most works of this class. It details the steps by which the "plain man" John is led on from a sort of vague undenominationalism through High Church Anglicanism to the Catholic Church. Considering Father Benson's own experience, it is not to be wondered at that a good part of the book is devoted to an exposure of the weaknesses of the High Anglican position, which

will make it more suitable for general use in England than in this country, where this particular phase of religion is not much in evidence among "plain"men. Still we do meet those who have got as far as the "Branch" theory to whom this little work will be helpful in showing a way through the wood, and outside of these are many others who will find it useful and suggestive. It aims at being popular in character, addressed to the "man in the street," to whom appeals to theologians, councils and the Fathers would not have much weight, but who, granting the fact of a Divine Revelation, can appreciate an intelligible, working system of religion, whereby such Revelation is guaranteed and preserved. It is as such a system that the Catholic Church is here presented and that clearly and interestingly. We must say however, that Father Benson's "plain man" is hardly as plain as the average plain man of our acquaintance who is ordinarily not the possessor of a University education. However, it need not be supposed that such training is needful in order to understand "John's" progress towards his spiritual haven. Granted ordinary intelligence and a strong interest in religion to begin with, the reader will have no difficulty in appreciating the different steps in this spiritual journey. We prophesy a considerable field of usefulness for this little book.

SAMUEL P. MCPHERSON.